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Influence in the Face of Impunity

Referierte Aufsätze Web of Science

Alexander S. Kritikos, Jonathan H. W. Tan

In: Economics Letters 141 (2016), S. 119–121

Abstract

We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the rejection option. This threat psychologically influences proposers. Some proposers avoid rejection by offering nothing. Others raise offers, but only when they receive feedback from responders. Responders lose this influence in the absence of feedback.



JEL-Classification: C78;C92
Keywords: Dictator, Impunity, Experiment, Psychological influence, Guilt
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.020

Frei zugängliche Version: (econstor)
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162877

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