Direkt zum Inhalt

Optimal Taxation: The Design of Child Related Cash- and In-Kind-Benefits

SOEPpapers 65, 27 S.

Peter Haan, Katharina Wrohlich


get_appDownload (PDF  374 KB)

Published in: German Economic Review 11 (2010), No. 3, 278-301


This paper contributes to the debate about the optimal design of tax-transfer systems. Based on the theory of optimal taxation, combined with microsimulation and microeconometric techniques we derive the welfare function which makes the current German tax and transfer system for single women optimal. Furthermore, we compare the welfare function conditional on the presence and age of children and asses how reforms of in-kind childcare transfers would affect the welfare function. This analysis allows us to derive conclusions about the optimal design of child related transfers and in-kind benefits.

Peter Haan

Head of Department in the Public Economics Department

Katharina Wrohlich

Head in the Gender Economics Department

Topics: Taxes, Gender

JEL-Classification: C23;C25;J22;J64
Keywords: Optimal taxation, labor supply behavior, transfers for children
Frei zugängliche Version: (econstor)