Information Acquisition in Vertical Relations

Aufsätze referiert extern - Web of Science

Pio Baake, Andreas Harasser, Friederike Heiny

In: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 17 (2017), 1, 14 S.

Abstract

We analyse a simple supply chain with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about market demand. Focusing on the incentives of the supplier and the retailer to enhance their private information about the actual market conditions, we show that choices on information acquisition are strategic complements. While the retailer’s incentives are mainly driven by the information rent that he can earn, the supplier will choose to acquire information only if the retailer is rather well informed, even though the information is free of charge.

Pio Baake

Forschungsdirektor Regulierung in the Firms and Markets Department

Topics: Digitalization



JEL-Classification: D82;D83;D86
Keywords: asymmetric information, information acquisition, vertical relations
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2015-0211