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81 Ergebnisse, ab 21
  • DIW Weekly Report 6 / 2018

    EU Roaming Regulation: Theoretical Model Suggests a Positive Assessment

    Since June 15, 2017, mobile network operators in the European Economic Area may not impose surcharges for making telephone calls, sending text messages, or using data services in other EEA countries. The regulation was designed to create a digital domestic market without adversely affecting consumers. The regulation raises the expectation of changes in mobile network operators’ tariff structures. Theoretical ...

    2018| Pio Baake, Lilo Wagner
  • Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 4 / 2012

    Ernährungssicherung und Lebensmittelqualität: Herausforderungen für Agrarmärkte: Editorial

    2012| Vanessa von Schlippenbach, Kornelia Hagen, Pio Baake
  • Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 1 / 2012

    Regulierung netzbasierter Sektoren: Editorial

    2012| Pio Baake
  • Diskussionspapiere 1904 / 2020

    Local Power Markets

    In current power markets, the bulk of electricity is sold wholesale and transported to consumers via long-distance transmission lines. Recently, decentralized local power markets have evolved, often as isolated networks based on solar generation. We analyze strategic pricing, investment, and welfare in local power markets. We show that local power markets with peer-to-peer trading are competitive and ...

    2020| Pio Baake, Sebastian Schwenen, Christian von Hirschhausen
  • Diskussionspapiere 1686 / 2017

    Competition between For-Profit and Industry Labels: The Case of Social Labels in the Coffee Market

    We model strategic interaction on a market where two labeling organizations compete and firms in duopoly decide which labels to offer. The incumbent label maximizes its own profit, and is challenged by an industry standard which maximizes industry profit. Using a nested logit, the result of this multi-stage game depends crucially on the degree of horizontal differentiation. Joint firm profit always ...

    2017| Pio Baake, Helene Naegele
  • Diskussionspapiere 1635 / 2017

    Upstream Monopoly and Downstream Information Sharing

    We analyze a vertical structure with an upstream monopoly and two downstream retailers. Demand is uncertain but each retailer receives an informative private signal about the state of the demand. We construct an incentive compatible and ex ante balanced mechanism which induces the retailers to share their information truthfully. Information sharing can be profitable for the retailers but is likely ...

    2017| Pio Baake, Andreas Harasser
  • Diskussionspapiere 1629 / 2016

    Interconnection and Prioritization

    We analyze pricing and competition under paid prioritization within a model of interconnected internet service providers (ISPs), heterogeneous content providers (CPs) and heterogeneous consumers. We show that prioritization is welfare superior to a regime without prioritization (network neutrality) and yields higher incentives for investment in network capacities. As ISPs price discriminate between ...

    2016| Pio Baake, Slobodan Sudaric
  • Diskussionspapiere 1543 / 2016

    Information Acquisition in Vertical Relations

    We analyze a simple supply chain with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about market demand. Focusing on the incentives of the supplier and the retailer to enhance their private information about the actual market conditions, we show that choices on information acquisition are strategic complements. While the retailer's incentives are mainly driven by the information rent that he can earn, ...

    2016| Pio Baake, Andreas Harasser, Friederike Heiny
  • Diskussionspapiere 1342 / 2013

    Crop Failures and Export Tariffs

    We analyse a stylized model of the world grain market characterized by a small oligopoly of traders with market power on both the supply and demand side. Crops are stochastic and exporting countries can impose export tariffs to protect domestic food prices. Our first results is that export tariffs are strategic complements and that for poor harvests equilibrium tariffs can explode (shedding some light ...

    2013| Pio Baake, Steffen Huck
  • Diskussionspapiere 1335 / 2013

    Price Guarantees, Consumer Search, and Hassle Costs

    The paper deals with the competitive effects of price guarantees in a spatial duopoly where consumers can search for lower prices but have to incur hassle costs if they want to claim a price guarantee. It is shown that symmetric equilibria with and without price guarantees exist but price guarantees will have no effect on prices if search costs are low, hassle costs are high and the number of uninformed ...

    2013| Pio Baake, Ulrich Schwalbe
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