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79 Ergebnisse, ab 31
Diskussionspapiere 968 / 2010

Quality Distortions in Vertical Relations

This paper examines how delivery tariffs and private quality standards are determined in vertical relations that are subject to asymmetric information. We consider an infinitely repeated game where an upstream firm sells a product to a downstream firm. In each period, the firms negotiate a delivery contract comprising the quality of the good as well as a non-linear tariff. Assuming asymmetric information ...

2010| Pio Baake, Vanessa von Schlippenbach
Diskussionspapiere 919 / 2009

Mergers in Imperfectly Segmented Markets

We present a model with firms selling (homogeneous) products in two imperfectly segmented markets (a "high-demand" and a "low-demand" market). Buyers are mobile but restricted by transportation costs, so that imperfect arbitrage occurs when prices differ in both markets. We show that equilibria are distorted away from Cournot outcomes to prevent consumer arbitrage. Furthermore, a merger can lead to ...

2009| Pio Baake, Christian Wey
Diskussionspapiere 793 / 2008

Upfront Payments and Listing Decisions

We analyze the listing decisions of a retailer who may ask her suppliers to make upfront payments in order to be listed. We consider a sequential game with upfront payments being negotiated before short-term delivery contracts. We show that the retailer is more likely to use upfront payments the higher her bargaining power and the higher the number of potential suppliers. Upfront payments tend to lower ...

2008| Pio Baake, Vanessa von Schlippenbach
Diskussionspapiere 782 / 2008

Accidents, Liability Obligations and Monopolized Markets for Spare Parts: Profits and Social Welfare

We analyze the effects of accidents and liability obligations on the incentives of car manufacturers to monopolize the markets for their spare parts. We show that monopolized markets for spare parts lead to higher overall expenditures for consumers. Furthermore, while the manufacturers invest more in order to offer cars with higher qualities, monopolization tends to reduce social welfare. Key for these ...

2008| Pio Baake
Diskussionspapiere 568 / 2006

New Networks, Competition and Regulation

We consider a model with two firms operating their individual networks. Each firm can choose its price as well as its investment to build up its network. Assuming a skewed distribution of consumers, our model leads to an asymmetric market structure with one firm choosing higher investments. While access regulation imposed on the dominant firm leads to lower prices, positive welfare effects are diminished ...

2006| Pio Baake, Ulrich Kamecke
Diskussionspapiere 500 / 2005

Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation

We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile-to-mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition ...

2005| Pio Baake, Kay Mitusch
Diskussionspapiere 409 / 2004

Complexity and Progressivity in Income Tax Design: Deductions for Work-Related Expenses

We analyze optimal income taxes with deductions for work-related or consumptive goods. We consider two cases. In the first case (called a complex tax system) the tax authorities can exactly distinguish between consumptive and work-related expenditures. In the second case (called a simple tax system) this distinction is not exact. Assuming additively separable utility functions, we show that work-related ...

2004| Pio Baake, Rainald Borck, Andreas Löffler
Diskussionspapiere 402 / 2004

Competition with Congestible Networks

We analyse competition between two network providers when the quality of each network depends negatively on the number of customers connected to that network. With respect to price competition we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Comparative statics show that as the congestion effect gets stronger quantities will decrease and prices increase, ...

2004| Pio Baake, Kay Mitusch
Diskussionspapiere 260 / 2001

Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs

In a framework with an upstream monopoly and a downstream duopoly, we analyze the impact of convex costs on the downstream level. In constrast to the case of constant marginal costs, vertical integration does not imply complete market foreclosure. While the nonintegrated downstream ¯rm receives a strictly positive amount of the intermediate good, the downstream allocation is ine±cient. However, a parametrized ...

2001| Pio Baake, Ulrich Kamecke, Hans-Theo Normann
DIW Berlin - Politikberatung kompakt 44 / 2008

Telecommunications Policies in Comparison: Industrial Policy Indicators; Research Project on behalf of Deutsche Telekom AG

2008| Pio Baake, Christian Wey. Based on Contributions by Michel Berne, Peter J. Curwen, Fernando Gallardo, Daniel Nepelski, Teodosio Pérez-Amaral, Gérard Pogorel, Enzo Pontarollo, Vanessa von Schlippenbach, Jason Whalley
79 Ergebnisse, ab 31