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  • DIW Wochenbericht 22 / 2024

    In der Fusionskontrolle Verhandlungsmacht von Unternehmen beachten: Interview

    2024| Morgane Guignard, Erich Wittenberg
  • DIW Wochenbericht 22 / 2024

    Fusionskontrolle muss Verhandlungsmacht in Wertschöpfungsketten beachten

    Im Rahmen der Wettbewerbspolitik spielt neben dem Kartellverbot und der Missbrauchsaufsicht die Fusionskontrolle eine zentrale Rolle. Fusionen zwischen großen Herstellern beeinflussen typischerweise den Wettbewerb und müssen daher von den Wettbewerbsbehörden genehmigt werden. Dabei sind Entflechtungen, bei denen die fusionierenden Unternehmen Unternehmensbeteiligungen oder Marken abgeben müssen, eine ...

    2024| Yann Delaprez, Morgane Guignard
  • DIW Weekly Report 22/23 / 2024

    Quantifying Bargaining Power in Supply Chains: Essential for Merger Control

    Merger control plays a central role in competition policy. When assessing proposed mergers, Competition Authorities should consider its impact on all relevant markets. Large mergers between manufacturers typically impact competition, thus requiring the approval of Competition Authorities. Divestitures are often a condition of merger approval. This report investigates the effectiveness of implementing ...

    2024| Yann Delaprez, Morgane Guignard
  • Diskussionspapiere 2088 / 2024

    Merger Remedies and Bargaining Power in the Coffee Market

    This paper analyzes a merger of large manufacturers with divestiture in the French coffee market. In contrast to previous approaches used to study the effects of upstream divestitures on prices and welfare, we model the vertical market structure. First, our results show that the standard policy recommendation to require divestiture to small recipient firms may not hold when asymmetric bargaining power ...

    2024| Yann Delaprez, Morgane Guignard
  • Diskussionspapiere 2071 / 2024

    Buyer Power and the Effect of Vertical Integration on Innovation

    Our article investigates the impact of vertical integration (without foreclosure) on innovation. We compare cases where either (i) two manufacturers or (ii) a manufacturer and a vertically integrated retailer invest. Then, the independent manufacturer( s) and the retailer bargain over non-linear contracts before selling to consumers. We show that vertical integration always increases the incentives ...

    2024| Claire Chambolle, Morgane Guignard
  • Nicht-referierte Aufsätze

    Effectiveness of Horizontal Merger Remedies in Vertical Markets

    The article explores the effectiveness of divestitures as a remedy for upstream horizontal mergers in vertically related markets. We argue that competition authorities ignoring the asymmetric bargaining power between upstream and downstream firms when assessing the choice of the buyer of the divested brands is likely to implement an inadequate policy. First, a small buyer with high bargaining power ...

    In: Concurrences (2024), 1, S. 32-37 | Yann Delaprez, Morgane Guignard
6 Ergebnisse, ab 1
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