I build a model where creditworthy countries use fiscal austerity to communicate their ability to repay sovereign debt. I show that the signalling channel is active only for high levels of asymmetric information. The model generates ceteris paribus a negative association between the amount of public information (provided by the rating agencies) and fiscal tightness. Informed by the model...
Anna Gibert
Genf, Schweiz,
22.08.2016
- 26.08.2016| 31st Annual Congress of the European Economic Association: EEA 2016
I build a model where creditworthy countries use fiscal austerity to communicate their ability to repay sovereign debt. I show that the signalling channel is active only for high levels of asymmetric information. The model generates ceteris paribus a negative association between the amount of public information (provided by the rating agencies) and fiscal tightness. Informed by the model...
Anna Gibert
Bath, Großbritannien,
06.04.2016
- 26.08.2016| External Seminar: University of Bath
Filtern (1)
3 Ergebnisse, ab 1
Sortieren
Diese Webseite verwendet Cookies. In unserer Datenschutzerklärung finden Sie Informationen zum Einsatz dieser Cookies sowie zu den Möglichkeiten, sie abzulehnen.