DIW Berlin: Thema Finanzmärkte

Thema Finanzmärkte

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317 Ergebnisse, ab 281
DIW Roundup 11 / 2014

Die Verbindung zwischen Staats- und Bankrisiken: wie kann man diese entkoppeln?

Finanz- und Schuldenkrisen treten häufig gemeinsam auf, da Banken in Staatsanleihen ihrer Heimatländer investieren. Unumstritten ist, dass Bankenrisiken von Staatsrisiken stärker entkoppelt werden sollten. Die Bankenunion, deren Ausgestaltung zugegebenermaßen schwierig ist, wird häufig als Mittel der Wahl genannt. Doch reicht das schon aus?

2014| Claudia Lambert
DIW Roundup 12 / 2014

Ein fiskalischer Versicherungsmechanismus für Europa

Während die europäische Bankenunion seit dem Finanzministertreffen im Dezember 2013 konkrete Züge annimmt, bleiben die Vorschläge der Politik zur Gestaltung einer Fiskalunion vage. Hingegen werden in der Wissenschaft und politischen Beratung mittlerweile mehrere Modelle eines finanzpolitischen Transfersystems für die Europäische Union oder die Eurozone diskutiert. Diese Zusammenfassung erklärt,

2014| Malte Rieth
Diskussionspapiere 1346 / 2013

Granularity in Banking and Growth: Does Financial Openness Matter?

We explore the impact of large banks and of financial openness for aggregate growth. Large banks matter because of granular effects: if markets are very concentrated in terms of the size distribution of banks, idiosyncratic shocks at the bank-level do not cancel out in the aggregate but can affect macroeconomic outcomes. Financial openness may affect GDP growth in and of itself, and it may also

2013| Franziska Bremus, Claudia M. Buch
Diskussionspapiere 1348 / 2013

Big Banks and Macroeconomic Outcomes: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence of Granularity

Does the mere presence of big banks affect macroeconomic outcomes? In this paper, we develop a theory of granularity (Gabaix, 2011) for the banking sector, introducing Bertrand competition and heterogeneous banks charging variable markups. Using this framework, we show conditions under which idiosyncratic shocks to bank lending can generate aggregate fluctuations in the credit supply when the

2013| Franziska Bremus, Claudia M. Buch, Katheryn N. Russ, Monika Schnitzer
Diskussionspapiere 1344 / 2013

Cross-Border Banking, Bank Market Structures and Market Power: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence

Patterns in cross-border banking have changed since the global financial crisis. This may affect domestic bank market structures and macroeconomic stability in the longer term. In this study, I theoretically and empirically analyze how different modes of cross-border banking impact bank concentration. I use a two- country general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks developed by De Blas and

2013| Franziska Bremus
Diskussionspapiere 1343 / 2013

Capital Controls and Macroprudential Measures: What Are They Good For?

Are capital controls and macroprudential measures successful in achieving their objectives? Assessing their effectiveness is complicated by selection bias and endogeneity; countries which change their capital-flow management measures (CFMs) often share specific characteristics and are responding to changes in variables that the CFMs are intended to influence. This paper addresses these challenges

2013| Kristin Forbes, Marcel Fratzscher, Roland Straub
Diskussionspapiere 1349 / 2013

What Influences Banks' Choice of Risk Management Tools? Theory and Evidence

This paper investigates the factors influencing banks' decision to engage in advanced risk management, from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. In recent decades, credit risk management in banks has become highly sophisticated and banks have become more active and advanced in the management of credit risks. We identify two driving factors for risk management: bank competition and

2013| Dilek Bülbül, Hendrik Hakenes, Claudia Lambert
Zeitungs- und Blogbeiträge

Big Banks and Macroeconomic Outcomes

In: VoxEU.org (10.07.2013), [Online-Artikel] | Franziska Bremus, Claudia M. Buch, Katheryn N. Russ, Monika Schnitzer
DIW Economic Bulletin 6 / 2013

Implicit State Guarantees Exacerbate Problem: Separated Banking System Alone Not a Solution

Many banks are now too big, complex, and closely interconnected to be liquidated. When they run into difficulties, they threaten the entire financial system of their economic area. Five years of financial crisis have not alleviated but exacerbated this problem. The cost of stabilizing banks is enormous, posing serious challenges to the states affected. In addition, such state guarantees create

2013| Benjamin Klaus, Dorothea Schäfer
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