This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner; if the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor. Increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under different assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution ...
Following Keen and Marchand (1997), the paper analyses the effect of fiscal competition on the composition of public spending in a model where capital and skilled workers are mobile while low skilled workers are immobile. Taxes are levied on capital and labour. Each group of workers benefits from a different kind of public good. Mobility of skilled workers provides an incentive for jurisdictions to ...
A comparison based on German and French micro data shows that the redistributive effects of family support provided in the form of tax relief are stronger in Germany than in France. This is true both for redistribution between households of different sizes and for redistribution between households with different incomes. The average burden on single individuals without children compared to other types ...
Intensive discussion is now underway on the tax reform concept put forward by Paul Kirchhof. Analyses based on extrapolations of individual tax return data from the income tax statistics show that ending the main tax concessions and allowances would not be enough to compensate for the loss of revenue from lowering the top rate of tax to 25%. Moreover, the importance of simplifying the tax system is ...
Die Abteilung Staat im DIW Berlin baut ein Konsumsteuer-Mikrosimulationsmodell auf, das auf repräsentativen Einzeldaten (scientific use files) der Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1998 und 2003 basiert. Damit lassen sich Simulationsrechnungen zur Mehrwertsteuerbelastung der privaten Haushalte nach geltendem Recht und für veränderte Steuersätze durchführen. Verhaltensanpassungen der Haushalte ...
In this paper, we consider fiscal competition between jurisdictions. Capital taxes are used to finance a public input and two public goods, one which benefits mobile skilled workers and one which benefits immobile unskilled workers. We derive the jurisdictions' reaction functions for different spending categories. We then estimate these reaction functions using data from German communities. Thereby ...