Thema Wettbewerb und Regulierung

Clients Prefer Flat Fee Contracts: Ten Questions to Jo Seldeslachts

Die Ministererlaubnis für Edeka schadet den Verbrauchern

The Economic Impact of Enforcement of Competition Policies on the Functioning of EU Energy Markets: Non-technical Summary and Technical Report

Weak Investment Poses a Threat to Industry in Europe

The global industrial structure has been in a constant state of change for some time now. While China’s share has steadily grown, Western industrialised countries have mostly experienced losses in industrial market share. Within Europe, the fates of the established industrialised nations have all played out very differently. For example, France and the UK have suffered massive losses, while Germany ...

Market Power and Heterogeneous Pass-through in German Electricity Retail

We analyze the pass-through of cost changes to retail tariffs in the German electricity market over the 2007 to 2014 period. We find an average pass-through rate of around 60%, which significantly varies with demand factors: while the pass-through rate to baseline tariffs, where firms have higher market power, is only 50%, it increases to 70% in the competitive segment of the market. Although the pass-through ...

EU Competition Policy Enforcement Supports Investment in the Energy Sectors

Energy sectors—primarily power generation and gas production, but also energy transmission and distribution—require significant capital investment in infrastructure. Market structures as well as the degree of competition and regulation are key factors that determine firms’ incentive to invest. Yet the empirical research on the link between these factors and private investment is still quite scarce, ...

EU-Wettbewerbspolitik fördert Investitionen in den Energiesektoren

Der Energiesektor zeichnet sich durch den Bedarf an kapitalintensiven Investitionen in Infrastruktur aus – vor allem in der Stromerzeugung und der Gasgewinnung, aber auch in der Energieübertragung und -verteilung. Sowohl die Marktstrukturen als auch der Grad an Wettbewerb und Regulierung sind Schlüsselfaktoren bei der Bestimmung der Investitionsanreize für Unternehmen. Dennoch sind die empirischen ...

Regulation and Investment Incentives in Electricity Distribution: An Empirical Assessment

We analyze the effects of incentive regulation with revenue caps on the investment behaviors of 109 German electricity distribution companies. We hypothesize that with Germany's implementation of incentive regulation in 2009 firms increase their investments in the base year when the rate base is determined for the following regulatory period. We build a model that controls for both firm-specific heterogeneity ...

Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990–2009 period. Our empirical results suggest phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as—unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions—phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best ...

Operational Conditions in Regulatory Benchmarking Models: A Monte Carlo Analysis

Benchmarking methods are widely used in the regulation of firms in network industries working under heterogeneous exogenous environments. In this paper we compare three recently developed estimators, namely conditional DEA (Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007b), latent class SFA (Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004; Greene, 2005), and the StoNEZD approach (Johnson and Kuosmanen, 2011) by means of Monte Carlo simulation ...