Abstract: An increasing body of empirical evidence has documented trends to risen concentration, profits, markups, and market power in many industries across the world since the 1980s. Several factors – such as globalisation, digitisation, the increased role of intangible assets and sunk costs, as well as M&A activity and the (under)enforcement of merger control– have been
Abstract: I derive an optimal benefit-based corporate tax rate formula as a function of the public input elasticity of profits and the (net of) tax elasticity of profits. I argue that the existence of the corporate income tax should be justified by the benefit-based view of taxation: firms should pay tax according to the benefits they receive from the use of the public input. I argue that
Abstract: Antibiotic misuse due to prescribing under diagnostic uncertainty is a leading driver of antibiotic resistance. We investigate the magnitude and mechanisms by which machine learning predictions can enable policies that reduce antibiotic misuse. Building on predictions from administrative data on urinary tract infections in Denmark, we evaluate counterfactual policies that replace
Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of ownership changes of drug candidates in one of the most important current pharma markets —the market for diabetes. We in particular look at how do the competitive circumstances, progress in clinical development and radicalness of the drug candidates matter in these decisions. We use newly constructed, very granular dataset tracking
This study investigates the payout policy of state-owned municipal firms. Based on insights from agency theory we derive an empirically testable model based on Lintner's corporate dividend policy model accounting for the characteristics of state-owned firms in terms of corporate governance and ownership structure. Exploiting a large and new panel dataset on German firms from the years 2003 to 20
Abstract: Antitrust authorities try to detect and sanction existing cartels and hinder the formation of new ones. Firms nevertheless try to collude while avoiding sanctions, for example by colluding tacitly instead of explicitly forming a cartel. In this paper, we focus on differences in the communication of firms that either form an explicit cartel or try to collude tacitly. The latter may still
Abstract: We examine experimentally the impact of corporate social responsibility techniques on individuals’ performance and willingness to compete. Our baseline treatment adopts the Niederle-Vesterlund (2007) paradigm whereby individuals perform a task under piece-rate and tournament incentives, followed by an opportunity to determine which of the two payment schemes they prefer. In our
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