We consider a model with two firms operating their individual networks. Each firm can choose its price as well as its investment to build up its network. Assuming a skewed distribution of consumers, our model leads to an asymmetric market structure with one firm choosing higher investments. While access regulation imposed on the dominant firm leads to lower prices, positive welfare effects are diminished ...
On 1 May 2004 eight former socialist countries - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia - joined the European Union. In the accession year the new EU member states have experienced powerful macroeconomic dynamics, and convergence of per capita income within the new EU-25 was progressing. However, it is remarkable that, for the accession ...
This paper investigates the degree of integration of natural gas markets in Europe, North America and Japan in the time period between the early 1990s and 2004. The relationship between international gas market prices and their relation to the oil price are explored through principal components analysis and Johansen likelihood-based cointegration procedure. Both of them show a high level of natural ...
Firms in socialist and transitional economies are often obliged to provide social goods at the same time that they are competing with private firms. This paper analyzes the impact of such bundling on the provision of private and social goods focussing on the inability of politicians to commit not to bail out firms experiencing financial trouble. This soft budget constraint problem results in firms ...
This paper argues that - in contrast to an often expressed view - the formation of larger and more powerful buyers need not reduce welfare by stifling suppliers' incentives. If contracts are determined in bilateral negotiations, the presence of larger buyers may both increase suppliers' incentives for product improvement and induce suppliers to choose a more efficient technology. The paper also isolates ...