Optimal Discounts in Green Public Procurement

Referierte Aufsätze Web of Science

Olga Chiappinelli, Gyula Seres

In: Economics Letters 238 (2024),111705, 4 S.

Abstract

We provide an auction-theoretical analysis of Green Public Procurement (GPP) as a preferential program aimed at stimulating investment in green technologies. We find that GPP incentivizes more competitive firms to invest. We also show that GPP can be an optimal mechanism for a procurer who cares about minimizing the purchasing price while triggering green investment.

Topics: Environmental markets, Resource markets, Business cycles

JEL-Classification: D44;H57;Q58;Q55
Keywords: Public procurement, Environmental policy, Auctions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111705