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PRODID:https://www.diw.de/de/diw_01.c.806339.de/veranstaltungen.html
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UID:diw_01.c.532874.en
LOCATION:Eleanor-Dulles-Raum,DIW Berlin im Quartier 110,5.2.010,Anton-Wilhelm-Amo-Straße 58,10117 Berlin
SUMMARY:Income and the Utilization of Long-Term Care: Evidence from Short-Term Income Shocks
DESCRIPTION:12:30 - 13:30 // Ex post moral hazard poses a concern to private insurers and to policymakers considering the expansion of publicly subsidized health insurance.  This is especially true of private long-term care insurance markets in the United States, which are small and have been contracting in recent years.  A significant publicly administered option was passed as part of the Affordable Care Act but then repealed.  Long-term care thus constitutes the largest out-of-pocket health care expense facing the elderly in the United States today.  In formulating policy to mitigate this risk, it is important to distinguish moral hazard arising from price effects, which may be considered socially inefficient spending, from moral hazard arising from income effects, which may represent a socially efficient increase in access to care.  Little evidence exists, however, on the effects of income on utilization of long-term care services.  In this paper, we examine the purchase of long-term care services following plausibly exogenous positive shocks to income.  We find that positive income shocks lead to a greater probability of purchase of home-based long-term care but not of nursing home care.(joint with Daifeng He, Jing Dong and John Nyman)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20160504
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20160504
DTSTAMP:20160501T220000Z
URL:https://www.diw.de/en/diw_01.c.532874.en/events/income_and_the_utilization_of_long_term_care_evidence_from_short_term_income_shocks.html
ORGANIZER;CN=Georg Camehl:mailto:gcamehl@diw.de
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