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SUMMARY:Sponsored Bids in Online Labor Markets
DESCRIPTION:11:30 - 12:30Ferdinand Friedensburg Room 2.3.001 // Advertising on e-commerce platforms, which enables third-party sellers to place their products as sponsored listings within organic results, is a widespread phenomenon, creating large revenues for online marketplaces. While economic theory suggests that advertising can serve as a signal for product quality, the empirical evidence is ambiguous. In this project, I collect data from a leading online labor market platform to analyze whether a sponsored bid improves a freelancer’s chance of getting hired for a project. Controlling for the position of sponsored bids and using a control function approach, I find heterogeneous effects depending on the type of project applied for. Preliminary results indicate positive effects in the context of “high-skill” jobs and insignificant effects for “low-skill” jobs. I argue that different degrees of information asymmetry could be a possible mechanism explaining these results.
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20221116
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20221116
DTSTAMP:20220928T220000Z
URL:https://www.diw.de/en/diw_01.c.855187.en/events/sponsored_bids_in_online_labor_markets.html
ORGANIZER;CN=Christina Stadler:mailto:cstadler@diw.de
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