INTERGOVERNMENTAL EQUALIZATION GRANTS: SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

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I. Introduction

What are intergovernmental equalization grants? The literature on their efficiency is large, but far from consistent in the matter of what they are and what they (should?) do. In the pages that follow, we suggest an approach to these payments – transfers made by one government usually located at one jurisdictional tier to governments inhabiting another – that has something to say on whether they improve or worsen the overall allocation of resources while departing from more standard or conventional approaches. In the last analysis, the view one adopts vis-à-vis equalization grants – vis-à-vis what they are (or should be?) designed to achieve – is very much determined by the model, explicit or implicit, of government one embraces and by one's priors concerning the nature of federalism.

In what follows, we begin by suggesting a particular model of government – one which, we believe, accounts for the historical and current observable patterns of production and supply of goods and services (including redistribution and regulation) by modern democratic governments. Later, we make clear what are our priors concerning the nature of decentralization and federalism.

The views of economists regarding the efficiency of governmental production and supply of goods and services range over the entire panorama of possibilities. This dispersion of views is, once more, a consequence of the priors held regarding the nature of democratic governments. We will suggest a hypothesis about efficiency that is consistent with the model of government we will be outlining. Following this, and before examining some consequences of what could be called a mis specification of terms regarding equalization payments, we consider by way of a comparative exercise the effects of economic globalization on the efficiency of governments and of intergovernmental transfers.
In the next section, therefore, we propose a model of government, followed in Section III by a discussion of efficiency in governments and in the economy at large. Then, in Section IV, we suggest a role for intergovernmental transfers. Section V is devoted to economic globalization and its effects on public sector efficiency. In Section VI, we look at how equalization can be "faultily" designed and at some of the consequences of these failures. Section VII concludes the paper.

II. Modelling Governments

There are many theories of government even if we restrict ourselves to the economic literature broadly defined. In *Competitive Governments* (1996), Breton attempted a classification and a brief summary followed by a critique of many of these theories. All of them are still in circulation. It would serve no purpose to review those models and their use. Instead, we will briefly outline the approach to government Breton proposed and defended in his 1996 monograph.

The evidence, we suggest, is consistent with the hypothesis that modern democratic governments are compound structures made up of a large number of autonomous or semi-autonomous elected and non-elected centres of power. We can go beyond this observation to the view that the evidence is consistent with the proposition that even if the production of goods and services by public sector bodies requires and involves coordination among centres of power, these centres compete with each other. Before defending that view, we acknowledge that there are from time to time attempts at collusion between centres of power that are sometimes successful. Still, not anymore than in the marketplace, do successful collusions in particular instances point to the absence of competition generally.

It is best to conceive of competition among centres of power the way Joseph Schumpeter (1911; 1942) understood competition in the market economy: a process of creative destruction in
which new processes, products, sources of supply, etc. replace old ones. We know from the work of Paul Samuelson (1943; 1982) that neo-classical economic price-quantity adjustments play a background role in Schumpeterian competition, even though the observed process and its manifestations as described by Schumpeter pay little attention to these underlying background forces. It is relatively easy to relate the fundamental mechanisms of Schumpeterian competition to those underlying the working of check and balances between centres of power in politics – a notion that has been around, both as normative injunction and as positive reference point for over 2000 years (see Panagopoulos, 1985). Indeed, the way Schumpeterian competition and checks and balances work are remarkably similar (see Breton, 1996, Chapter 3).

But there is more to competition in politics than intra-governmental competition – competition between centres of power in compound governments. There is growing acceptance of the idea that governments in a given society compete with each other. The mechanism that motivates that manifestation of competition, which years ago Breton (1987) labeled the Salmon mechanism,¹ is different from that underlying checks and balances, but is a competitive mechanism nonetheless. It is an application of the theory of labour tournaments introduced in economics by Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981). Pierre Salmon (1987a; 1987b) was able to show that governing and opposition parties are led to compete with each other when citizens can compare the performance of their government with that of governments in other jurisdiction. That in itself will lead to intergovernmental competition. Moreover, the Salmon mechanism, initially crafted to explain horizontal competition – competition among governments inhabiting a given jurisdictional level – can be applied, with one important modification (see below), to vertical competition – competition among governments located at different tiers (see Breton and Fraschini, 2003).

¹ Salmon's first paper on the subject was published in 1987, but was delivered at a seminar on federalism in 1984.
The initial formulation of the Salmon mechanism assumed that citizens compared the performance of their own government to that of a benchmark government in terms of the "levels and qualities of services, of levels of taxes or of more general economic and social indicators" (Salmon, 1987b, 32). However, as argued by Breton (1996), competition in governmental systems compels all centers of power to forge wicksellian connections (defined in the next two paragraphs) so as to be granted the consent (vote) of citizens. In the light of this result, we suggest that citizens evaluate the relative performance of governments in terms of the tightness of wicksellian connections – both for horizontal and vertical competition. In other words, if there are centers of power indexed and if we let be a measure of the tightness of the wicksellian connection generated by center of power , with normalized so that , citizens will rank the centers of power that make up compound governments in terms of .

What are wicksellian connections and why is it an improvement to articulate the Salmon mechanism on them rather than on the vector of goods, services, taxes, and other indicators on which the mechanism has hitherto been expressed? A wicksellian connection is a link between the quantity of a particular good or service supplied by centers of power and the taxprice that citizens pay for that good or service. Knut Wicksell (1896) and Erik Lindahl (1919) showed that if decisions regarding public expenditures and their financing were taken simultaneously and under a rule of (quasi) unanimity, a perfectly tight nexus between the two variables would emerge. Breton (1996) argued that competition between centers of power, if it was perfect and not distorted by informational problems, would also generate completely tight wicksellian connections. In the real world, competition is, of course, never perfect and informational problems abound and, as a

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2 For a defence of that assumption, see Breton (1996, 48-57). See also the literature on probabilistic voting in, for example, Calvert (1986).
consequence, wicksellian connections are less than perfectly tight. Still, as long as some competition exists, there will be wicksellian connections.

The virtue of a Salmon mechanism expressed in terms of wicksellian connections is that a given citizen can carry out comparisons of performance in terms of a common standardized variable, whether the benchmark government inhabits the same or a different jurisdictional level from that in which the citizen dwells. A variable that serves that purpose well is the size of the utility losses inflicted on citizens whenever the volume of goods and services provided by centers of power differs from the volume desired at given taxprices. Put differently, citizens experience the same kind of utility losses from decisions made by governments whatever the jurisdictional tier the governments inhabit. The goods and services supplied can differ, but the efforts to achieve tightness in wicksellian connections will not. Indeed, the ability to compare performance horizontally is likely to reinforce the ability to execute vertical comparisons and \textit{vice versa}.

There is still resistance to the idea of intragovernmental and intergovernmental competition. But this resistance sometimes turns to hostility when students of public sector adjustments are confronted with the notion that governments compete with families, churches, charitable organizations, cooperatives, and other bodies which supply goods and services that are close substitutes for some of the goods and services supplied by governments. Among these, the most obvious are day care, health and nursing, old age security, unemployment insurance, and a host of others. In addition, governments sometimes compete in markets in the provision of certain goods and services such as transportation, broadcasting, education, insurance, car production, oil exploration, and so on. The interdependence of the public and private sectors is all pervasive.
III. Efficiency

To simplify the presentation of what we wish to propose regarding efficiency, let us assume to begin that competition rules everywhere in the economy, including the public sector. Given the interdependence just noted, the resulting general equilibrium configuration of resource allocation is one which, if subjected to an exogenous shock, will register changes in both the private and public sectors, irrespective of the origin of the disturbance. For example, given the interconnectedness, an external disturbance in one or more markets may not require adjustments only in other markets, but in some parts of the public sector as well.

The idea of some behavioral interaction between the public and private sectors has already been examined in, for example, the theory of "unbalanced growth" (Baumol, 1967) – a dynamic form of interaction. The interdependence we have in mind is more static in character: it is the interdependence we find in standard Walrasian general equilibrium theory. In that framework, efficiency in the (overall) allocation of resources is the product of competition which insures that resources are channeled toward the alternatives in which their yield is a maximum. When competition breaks down, either because of collusion or monopolization or when it is distorted by ad hoc interventions, efficiency in resource allocation is reduced. In the conventional approach to (static) efficiency, the prime ad hoc distortive interventions are taxes, subsidies, and other like policies. However, in a frame of reference in which governments are competitive, taxes and subsidies are in the nature of taxprices – positive or negative – paid per unit of good and/ or service provided. They are user fees, like the price paid for a newspaper.

In Competitive Governments (1996), Breton used Knut Wicksell's (1896) approach to the provision of goods and services by public bodies to argue that competition creates the conditions

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3 As in the tournament model suggested by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), the comparison of performance will be more precise if the random disturbances affecting performance are common to all centres of power instead of being
that lead to the satisfaction of the two conditions which he showed were necessary and sufficient to
the formation of links between quantities demanded and their unit prices and thus to efficient
supply. He labeled these links *wicksellian connections*. These, he noted, are not all or nothing
relationships, but can be normalized to vary between zero and one. In other words, wicksellian
connections can be tight or loose.

The point is not that in the real world there are no significant departures from competitive
allocations as a result of distortions (collusions, monopolizations, corruption, and a host of other
factors) in the private and/or public sectors. There are. However, we are suggesting that we can
better understand the meaning of these barriers to competition in a framework in which it is
recognized that there is intragovernmental, intergovernmental, and extragovernmental competition
and in which the allocation of resources is seen to take place in a general equilibrium framework in
which the private and public sectors are organically interdependent.

**IV. Intergovernmental Transfers**

We now come to intergovernmental transfers. We begin by arguing that their purpose cannot be to cause a change in the interpersonal distribution of income — that is, to deal with an equity issue. That done, we offer a rationale for these grants that is consistent with the hypothesis suggested in the foregoing paragraphs regarding the nature of government and of efficiency in a general (private markets and public bodies) equilibrium framework.

There are many analytical traditions in the economic literature on intergovernmental grants. There is, for example, an interjurisdictional spillover tradition (Breton, 1965; Oates, 1972), an income redistribution tradition (Buchanan, 1952; Scott, 1952), a fiscal imbalance tradition (Musgrave, 1961), and an "inefficient" mobility of labour tradition (Flatters, Henderson and idiosyncratic to each.
Mieszkowski, 1974; Boadway and Flatters, 1982). These are still not integrated and unified in any meaningful sense and, in all likelihood, cannot and never will be. The theoretical work in these various traditions has, however, one assumption in common: it treats provincial or state governments\(^4\) – the recipients of money from central governments – as conduits for transfers to individuals and/or firms for the purpose of achieving pre-stated objectives (the sources of the various traditions just noted): internalization of spillovers, redistribution of net fiscal benefits, etc.

Sometimes the provincial government-as-conduit assumption is camouflaged by a prior supposition that all citizens have identical preferences. But even in these cases, the province-as-conduit assumption delivers its pay-load. To understand the meaning of the assumption, it suffices to recognize that all the objectives that are assigned to transfer programmes can be more efficiently achieved by an interpersonal than by an intergovernmental transfer system. Indeed, one can probably make the case that, as a matter of historical fact, to the extent that governments have been preoccupied with the objectives which grant theorists impute to them and to the extent that they have used grants to achieve these objectives, they have resorted to interpersonal grants, namely to grants made to persons (families) and/or firms, but sometimes "mediated" by, or effected through, more junior governments\(^5\). In this connection, it is well to recall that in most societies income redistribution policy is embodied in a variety of 'welfare' programmes based on the age, the employment situation, the family status, the health conditions and on other characteristics of the individuals, families and groups that are recipients. Proposals to 'streamline' these programmes have often been made by academics, royal commissioners, and others on the basis of little-known research which shows, one presumes, that existing programmes are inefficient. George Akerlof

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\(^4\) Henceforth we use the words province and provincial for regional, state, and other equivalent governments.

\(^5\) For example, to make effective the right of all youth to benefit from primary and secondary education, the Italian central government transfers funds to the regions that, in turn, hands the funds over to the municipalities. These then proceed to award grants to families in support of scholastic expenditures.
(1978) has shown, however, that a strong case can be made that the patchwork of programmes that form the income redistribution policy of societies is more efficient than some proposed 'streamlined' systems would be, because for any given volume of redistribution the excess-burden of the revenues needed to pay for it is smaller in the patchwork than in the streamlined system. What Akerlof calls "tagging", namely the use of certain characteristics to identify the individuals and groups in need, is simply a device that insures that resources are not transferred to those who are not in need.

On the basis of the foregoing, one would have to conclude that from an income redistribution point of view, intergovernmental transfers are inefficient because the governments of some jurisdictions in which rich and poor citizens reside receive funds, whereas the governments of other jurisdictions in which rich and poor citizens also reside do not receive any funds as a result of the fact that average per capita income (say) is lower in the first than in the second jurisdiction. Intergovernmental transfers, in other words, are inconsistent with "tagging" and, therefore, with efficient redistribution.

If interpersonal are more efficient than intergovernmental grants, why do central governments sometimes use the second type of grants? Is it that central governments are not pursuing, through these grants, the objectives that analysts think they ought to be pursuing? Is it possible, in other words, that the objectives which central governments are pursuing require intergovernmental grants programmes in addition to the interpersonal grants programmes they are implementing? Our answer to this query is in the affirmative. Intergovernmental grants are needed to stabilize the outcomes of competition among provincial governments. This does not mean that these transfers do not have effects on income distribution, on mobility, on the expenditure patterns of recipient governments, and on other variables, but it means that grants programmes should be analyzed and
evaluated in terms of their contribution to the stability of horizontal intergovernmental competitive outcomes, not on some other basis.

How do intergovernmental grants contribute to competitive stability? Simply by allowing all provincial governments to compete with each other on a more equal footing than they could without them. If the grants were interpersonal instead of intergovernmental, the relative positions of provincial governments would be unchanged by grants, even if that of their constituents was, unless of course the provincial tax rates were such as to fully recapture, province by province, the sums granted by central governments. If it is recalled that the jurisdictions in which governments are recipients of grants are made up, like those from which the funds are derived, of rich and poor persons, a tax recapture scheme would, of necessity, be quite complicated and not obviously constitutional in democratic states.

To be able to compete on a more equal footing is not the same thing as providing the citizens of every province with the same bundle of governmentally supplied goods and services: the same schooling facilities and programmes, the same health services, the same number and quality of public libraries, the same number of hectares of public parks, and so on. That would amount to a denial of the very nature of decentralization and federalism. For a government to be able to compete on a more equal footing means to be capable of providing a volume and quality of goods and services that yield to its citizens a level of utility reasonably comparable to those provided in other jurisdictions without having to resort to unduly burdensome levels of taxation again relative to the levels collected elsewhere.

That view of equalization payments can be profitably contrasted to that of the school of thought that can be called the Queen's University (Kingston, Ontario) conception of federalism (see Flatters, Henderson, and Mieszkowski, 1974; Boadway and Flatters, 1982). In that view, if the
province of Alberta (say) benefits from large oil royalties following a rise in the price of crude, it is the duty of Ottawa to tax these provincial revenues to prevent "inefficient" in-migration of labour into Alberta. If that argument is granted, it would seem reasonable to argue that Ottawa should grant resources to the provincial government of Quebec (or to any other province) to prevent "inefficient" out-migration from the province if some Quebeckers adopt a destructive separatist agenda. We are led to ask: is it the central government's function in a true federation to incessantly undo what is done at the periphery? It is hardly surprising that those who have adhered to the Queen's model have come to think of federalism as second (or worse) best compared to a strictly unitary and fully centralized state.

In *Competitive Governments* (1996), Breton examined a variety of empirical economic, sociological, and political science literatures which tell stories that he interpreted as manifestations or indications of the workings of intergovernmental competition. One of these stories describes the rate of diffusion of policies over provinces after an initial introduction by one provincial government. To visualize how an intergovernmental grants programme can help stabilize competition, consider how it would affect the operation of that diffusion process. Assume, therefore, that a province innovates by introducing a new policy that receives support not only in the province in which it is implemented, and henceforth serves as a Salmon benchmark. The expected response within the competitive paradigm is for other provinces to follow. But what if one or more other provinces cannot follow because they lack the necessary resources to do so? Presumably, labour, capital and/or technology will leave these jurisdictions, worsening their position relative to the pre-innovation one, while improving that of the host provinces. That describes instability and it is apparent that an intergovernmental grants programme can prevent this from happening.
Intergovernmental payments designed to stabilize competition among provinces were invented, it seems, by the famed (but seldom – ever? – read) Report (1940) of the Rowell-Sirois Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations in Canada. The Report imputed the failure of junior administrations in some Canadian provinces in the 1930's to meet their financial obligations to competitive instability, while recognizing that bankruptcy – the market's solution for underperformance – was not an alternative. The Rowell-Sirois analysis of competitive instability in the Canada of the 30's remains precise, profound, and, in our judgement, correct.

Viewing intergovernmental grants programmes as an instrument to stabilize horizontal competition not only provides us with a rationale for their existence as intergovernmental grants, it also helps explain their perdurance in many governmental systems decades after decades. In addition, it allows us to do away with the idea that those who designed these programmes and who supported them over long periods were either ignorant of the dictates of Welfare Economics, moved by imperatives which were less than honourable, or that they were simply irrational. Decision-makers who opt for transfers to promote competitive stability can and often will choose intergovernmental grants. Finally, the recognition that intergovernmental transfers are only one in a series of possible instruments that can be used to stabilize competitive outcomes leads us to expect that grant systems will vary considerably from one governmental system to another both in terms of importance and in terms of design. It is even possible for some governmental systems not to have any grant programme because other instruments serve to achieve sufficient competitive stability.\(^6\)

\(^6\) We cannot examine here the various instruments that can be used as substitutes to stabilize intergovernmental competition. It is, however, impossible to resist the temptation to note that the provision placed in the Constitution of Argentina which requires that the central government absorb the deficits of the provincial governments, which as far as we can ascertain was conceived as a stabilization measure (it would reduce the weight of Buenos Aires – city and province – and of Cordoba and help the poorer units) is not such a substitute. It is simply a badly thought-through measure that effectively destabilizes intergovernmental competition in that country.
In concluding this section, we insist that these grants must be unconditional. To see this it suffices to note that if they were conditional and if the conditions were set by central governments, as they would have to be, the grants programmes would simply suppress competition. Central governments may want to do this in certain circumstances or in respect of specific policy areas, but if they did this on a broad front, it would simply extinguish the decentralized and/or federal character of the governmental system itself. Conditional grants can be seen as equivalent to a centralization of constitutional powers.

V. Globalization

We now engage in a simple comparative statical exercise. For that purpose, we focus on economic globalization\(^7\) and assume that this phenomenon is a consequence of the operation of the following three factors: 1) the virtual elimination of all restrictions on the free movement of capital made possible by the removal of quantitative and non-quantitative barriers to trade; 2) the harmonization and standardization of the rules that govern trade, investment, employment, property rights, environmental policies, and so on; and 3) as a consequence of (2), that is, as a consequence of the adoption of common standardized rules regarding investments – rules that necessarily tend to reflect the practices prevailing in the dominant economies of the world where at present more or less all assets are traded or tradable – the elimination of impediments to the private ownership of all physical assets.

\(^7\) The word globalization should not be used without an epithet. Economic globalization, cultural globalization, technological globalization, human rights globalization, etc., though sometimes closely related are different from each other. Indeed, as recent history has documented, some countries support (indeed promote) economic globalization while seeking, at the same time, to curtail human rights globalization. We are concerned with economic globalization only.
Globalization is still only incipient. It is, however, sufficiently present to produce observable results. In respect of governments and governmental systems, globalization's main consequence is to undermine wicksellian connections.

It does this in the following way. The capital of large corporations being increasingly mobile as trade in goods and services becomes freer, corporations can threaten to leave a jurisdiction unless the government of that jurisdiction provides the public services they demand. Corporate enterprises make similar threats to put downward pressure on the tax rates that apply to the income they earn. That by itself undermines wicksellian connections. But that is only the first step. The necessity to provide goods and services to corporate capital at taxprices that are not high enough to cover the jurisdiction's unit costs of production and delivery implies that goods and services will be provided to the citizenry in general at taxprices that are higher than unit costs. That finishes the job of undermining wicksellian connections.

The foregoing can be given a more analytical twist. An increase in the degree of economic globalization increases the market power of business corporations because globalization increases the mobility of capital. As a result, a government that chooses to attract capital or decides to hold onto capital already in its jurisdiction will accept to provide goods and services demanded by corporate interests at lower taxprices and/or in greater quantity or quality than it would if capital was less mobile. The greater mobility of capital, in other words, will have made corporations into more effective oligopsonists in their purchases of governmentally supplied goods and services and, as a consequence, will benefit from larger oligopsonistic rents – rents that will inflict a deadweight cost on society. The "transfer" to oligopsonists means that citizens would have to pay more for the goods and services provided them, assuming, as we must, no change in the government's budget constraint. The quantity of publicly supplied goods and services demanded by citizens will
therefore decline. Citizens will search for alternative suppliers. The proposition that globalization undermines wicksellian connections therefore means that in the new equilibrium, corporate interests benefit from larger oligopsonistic rents while the citizenry at large demands fewer governmentally provided goods and services. The increment in globalization will then have been accompanied by a transfer of supply from public to private institutions.\(^8\) In the process, globalization changes the distribution of political power in society in favour of corporate capital against the institutions that have responsibility for the general welfare of the citizenry. The special treatment of some groups in society – in this case corporate interests – that has been ascribed to capture or to rent-seeking, we impute to globalization.

However, globalization does not undermine wicksellian connections equally across all jurisdictions of governmental systems. It would seem reasonable to suppose that junior governments, whose inability to compete in a non-globalized (or in a less globalized) world was already a fact, would be particularly hard hit by economic globalization. If that is the case, the need for intergovernmental transfers would be greater following an increase in globalization.

The external disturbance that takes the form of an increase in economic globalization allows us to be more precise about the costs and benefits involved. The increment in intergovernmental grants that will make it possible for a "weak" government to compete with the other governments of a given polity will do so by, let us say, attracting capital, whether physical or human, that would otherwise have gone elsewhere. The intergovernmental grant, in other words, re-allocates capital from a higher to a lower yield opportunity. The difference between the two yields multiplied by the volume of displaced capital is a measure of the total cost of the intergovernmental transfer and a

\(^8\) Some countries are less affected by globalization. This will be the case if, for example, a large fraction of corporate interests are family owned and controlled. That ownership pattern will act as an impediment to the in- and out-flows of capital.
measure of the loss in economic efficiency in that economy.\textsuperscript{9} It is a trivial exercise, from there, to calculate the cost of any increment in economic globalization.

It is very important, however, not to bring the analysis to a close at this particular point. The intergovernmental grant also increases the capacity of the "weak" recipient government to compete and as such allows a closer link between taxprices and the goods and services supplied by that government to its citizens. It makes for tighter wicksellian connections. As we have argued, the tighter the wicksellian connections the smaller the utility losses suffered by citizens. In other words, intergovernmental transfers, by allowing for tighter wicksellian connections, improve the allocation of resources on the consumption side of the ledger and thus increase efficiency from that point of view.

The reduction in utility losses – the gain in consumer welfare – consequent on the transfers must be matched against the cost in terms of distortions in the capital market defined to include human as well as non-human capital. The optimal size of intergovernmental grants is one that equates the two margins.

\textit{VI. Deviations}

It is possible (easy?) to design intergovernmental equalization programmes in such a way that the marginal gains in utility from tighter wicksellian connections fall short of the marginal costs of distortions in the capital market. That is especially likely to be the case if equalization payments are rationalized as redistributive grants by those who design them. The tendency in that case is to configure the transfer system in such a way that the outcome is one that "harmonizes" the relationship between the governments of a polity by making them all essentially alike. That sort of

\textsuperscript{9} It may be asked whether there is not an additional excess-burden of collecting revenues to pay for the intergovernmental transfers. The answer is that as long as the revenues collected are exactly those needed to provide
harmonization reduces and ultimately suppresses intergovernmental competition and, in this way, makes utility gains from grants equal to zero, while leaving the cost side unaffected.

The evidence seems to indicate that both Australia and Germany have designed intergovernmental grants systems that equalize to such a degree the position of all governments in the federations that interstate and interländer competition has been, in fact, greatly reduced, possibly extinguished. The situation in these two federations raises a problem on which the foregoing has been silent. We have indeed been concerned only with the size of intergovernmental transfers without paying any attention to the arrangements from which they flow.

This problem is important because the arrangement – the formulae that select what counts and what does not count in setting the size of the grants – is crucial in determining their effectiveness as stabilizing agents. If we accept the view that intergovernmental grants, though they have redistributional consequences like any other economic activity, should not be designed as redistributive, but as stabilizing, then the "needs" side – what citizens in a jurisdiction 'need' by way of public services – should not enter the calculus that determines their size. Fiscal capacity and fiscal effort relative to some benchmark – relative to the average of \( x \) "representative" provinces (say) – are the only relevant variables. To put it differently, the transfers should be such that the government of each province is in a position to provide (is capable of providing) its citizens with a reasonably comparable level of basic services (as the benchmark) without having to resort to unduly burdensome levels of taxation. We suggest that as long as the definition of "basic services" is not too restrictive – it allows, for example, for the provision of training programmes that lead to stability grants, deadweight costs are zero. Departures from that exact sum will create excess-burdens.

\(^{10}\) In a recent communication, Paul Bernd Spahn of Goethe Universität was unsure as to whether interländer competition in Germany had been only reduced or completely extinguished.

\(^{11}\) In this connection, we note that the recent change to the Italian Constitution (Article 119 of Constitutional Law n. 3/2001 that modifies Title V, Second Part, of the Constitution), mandating that equalization be based on per capita fiscal capacity alone and no longer on "needs", is a significant improvement.
high-quality jobs or to the possibility of concert halls if that is the way the government wants to compete with other neighbourhood governments—a formula based on these principles would introduce minimal distortions in factor and product markets and permit tight wicksellian connections.

**VII. Conclusion**

We have argued that intergovernmental transfers, in a framework in which governments are assumed to be competitive, should be conceived as stabilizing, not as redistributive grants. Their function is to insure that all units in a federation—indeed, in any decentralized governmental system—are able to hold their own in the competitive struggle among units of government. Competition is not, however, pursued as an end in itself—a sort of panacea. Indeed, the virtue of competition is that it forges links between the taxprices paid by citizens and the units of goods and services they demand. The stronger the degree of competition, the tighter the links and the smaller the losses in utility suffered by citizens from the public provision of goods and services.
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