The Artist as a Secret Agent: Liberalism Against Populism

by

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Abstract: 
This paper discusses the contest between the conflicting principles of liberalism and populism with respect to the Cold War cultural policy. The policy was jointly designed by the cultural Ivy League elite represented by Nelson Rockefeller’s Museum of Modern Art and the CIA and succeeded in making Abstract Expressionist painting the dominating Western aesthetic culture despite substantial resistance by US politicians and unfriendly comments from behind the Iron Curtain. In this project, government policy was secondary because of successful private initiative, secret action, and obfuscation.

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1. Introduction

Art is the laboratory of great emotions, deep thoughts, intense beliefs, and new ideas. If this is so, it would seem appropriate to look for the effects and impacts of rational obfuscation and transparency in art when it meets politics. The Cold War period provides ample material on this issue. In order to illustrate the interplay of rational obfuscation and transparency in politics, I have propose that during the Cold War the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) supported art, more specifically, Abstract Expressionist painting in becoming the dominating Western aesthetic culture. “In the world of art, Abstract Expressionism constituted the ideal style for these propaganda activities. I was the perfect contrast to ‘the regimented, traditional, and narrow’ nature of ‘socialist realism’” (Cockroft, 1974, p.40).

This example seems appropriate to discuss the issue of obfuscation in politics because it is not at all obvious that the CIA’s secret cultural policy was a “bad thing” while its more or less transparent counterpart at the government level was the better alternative. For example, “America’s pre-eminent liberal historian,” Arthur Schlesinger, maintained that the CIA’s influence was not “always, or often, reactionary and sinister.” Schlesinger saw its leadership as politically enlightened and sophisticated. In his study of *The Cultural Cold War*, Frances Saunders (2000, p.3) concludes that “this view of the CIA as a haven of liberalism acted as a powerful inducement to collaborate with it, or, if not this, at least to acquiesce to the myth that it was well motivated”.

As we shall see, the CIA gave, directly and indirectly, financial and logistic support to modern art. Abstract Expressionism became the vehicle for America’s imperial burden and this vehicle needed fuel. However, why did support of modern art and, more generally, cultural policy depend on covert fuel? President Harry Truman did not think much of modern art and even less of the artists who produced it. This evaluation was shared by many politicians, at least, when they talked in public. George Dondero, a Republican Congressman from Michigan, attacked modern art as an instrument of Communist subversion and declared that “modernism to be quite simply part of a worldwide conspiracy to weaken American resolve” (Saunders, 2000, p.253). Modern art became emblematic of “un-Americanism” – “in short, cultural heresy” (de Hart Matthews, 1976, p.763).

George Dondero succeeded to force the withdrawal of a State Department exhibition called “Advancing American Art”. It was shown with great success at Paris and Prague. In the Congress, however, it was denounced as subversive and “un-American”. The State

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1 See Saunders (2000, p.3).
2 Eva Cockroft (1974, p.41) and Jane de Hart Mathews (1976) relate George Dondero with Michigan while Frances Saunders relates him with Missouri.
Department issued a directive ordering that in the future no American artist with Communist or fellow-traveling associations be exhibited at government expense. In the period of McCarthy witch-hunts this meant that politicians who, in principle, looked benevolently at modern art hesitated to become officially involved. It was the rich, well-educated, venturous, liberal east-cost elite who had (a) the insight that Abstract Expressionism could be excellent weapon in the Cold War, (b) they had the financial means and the social connections to do this on their own account, and (c) some of them, Nelson Rockefeller for instance, had strong personal connections to the CIA, partly as a result of earlier wartime intelligence work. In addition this group had the conviction that they had to fight oppressive Russian communism in order to defend freedom – and that Abstract Expressionism is a most exiting art project, adequate to their liberal taste.

This sets the stage. On the one hand, we had the politicians, constrained by their desire for majority support and popular assistance; and the other, we had the East-Coast elite, determined to use modern art to defend American liberalism against the Russian communist threat, and, to some degree, also against the corruption of the political establishment and “red-neck” art theories advocated by Republicans from Michigan.

The scene very much looked like a contest of “liberalism against populism.” However, what looked like a fundamental conflict was solved through recourse to obfuscation and secrecy – private political action under public umbrella and state interventions in the costume of private organizations. Major players of this game were the CIA, the Museum of Modern Art, and the Congress of Cultural Freedom. In the next section, we will give a more detailed account of these institutions to clarify this relationship. Section 3 looks at the pawns of cultural warfare, the artists. It contains a brief introduction into Abstract Expressionism and its message of individualism and universalism which simultaneously enthused liberal Cold War strategists, alienated the American public, and discriminated against artists which were not part of the canon, i.e., non-white, female, homo-sexual and non-American artists. In Section 4, I will try to evaluate the result of the “undercover cultural policy”. The question here is not whether it was good or bad, but how it affected politics and cultural life. Section 5 contains an evolutionary model which discusses the effects of obfuscation policy to the implementation of social standards and dominating aesthetic culture. Section 6 applies the model of optimal obfuscation, proposed in Magee et al. (1989) to clarify political implications.

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3 See Hauptman (1973) for details on cultural policy during the McCarthy Decade.
4 This reflects the title of Riker (1982). Although Riker’s book has been motivated by theoretical results of social choice theory, it refers to the same basic dilemma which was already discussed in Alexis de Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America” (1956 [1835 and 1940]).
in terms of votes gained from campaign contributions and votes lost from distortion effects. This expanded to incorporate the experience of covert policymaking and privatization of the public domain. Optimal obfuscation turns into a radical obfuscation as cultural politics is no longer identified with politicians and democratic control. An afterward concludes the paper.

2. Major Players

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship of the intermediate agents in the “American battle against Russian communism”: the CIA, the Museum of Modern Art, and the Congress of Cultural Freedom. The relationship was the result of historical ties, personal links, and ongoing collaboration.\(^5\)

**Figure 1: The Major Players**

The CIA was created by the National Security Act of 26 July 1947 in order to coordinate military and diplomatic intelligence. Although the Agency was not explicitly authorized to collect intelligence or intervene secretly in the affairs of other nations, the Act mentioned “services of common concerned” which was used to move it into espionage, covert action, paramilitary operations, and technical intelligence collection. Frances Saunders (2000, p.32f) points out that “the terms under which the Agency was established institutionalized the concepts of ‘the necessary lie’ and ‘plausible deniability’ as legitimate peacetime strategies”. The CIA’s officers were dedicated to the mission to save “western freedom from Communist darkness.” This was the result of a training in solid Christian morality, the principles of a robust intellect which most of them enjoyed at some Ivy League school, and a spirit of the Declaration of Independence which they had inhaled in their social environment. Some of them had already experienced intelligence work for the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) during wartime. OSS collected family members of the Vanderbilt, DuPont, Archbold, Weil and Whitney in its ranks. A son of Ernest Hemingway and the two sons of J.P. Morgan worked for the OSS. To some OSS members, the Service was an exiting adventure. In any case, it offered a possibility to enhance reputation and another network to combine with the old school tie. Some of OSS and most of its spirit carried over to the newly created CIA. Young Ivy Leaguers flocked in the Agency to fight the threat of communism and to enjoy the privileges of power and secret brotherhood.
The CIA had substantial finances at its disposal to be spent with minimum of bureaucratic control; and it used various institutions to make it difficult to trace its transactions and the financial support it gave to other organizations and cooperating individuals through private donations. In 1967, for instance, Whitney’s charity trust was exposed as a CIA conduit (see Cockroft, 1974.) In 1949, the US Congress passed an Act which allowed the Director of the CIA to spend funds without having to account for disbursement. Some of this money was spent to support the Congress of Cultural Freedom.

At end June 1950, more than 4000 intellectuals of the “free world” gathered in Berlin. They all were invited to stand up and to be counted. The invitation committee included Berlin’s Mayer Ernst Reuter and several prominent German academics. Reuter delivered an opening speech in which the word “freedom” appeared with high frequency. During four days, participants moved from one panel session to the next and discussed issues such as “good” and “bad” atom bombs. The actor Robert Montgomery declared that “there is no neutral corner in the Freedom’s room!”

Not everyone subscribed to this rhetorical crusade against neutrality or a the option of a middle way between Russia and America. Some wondered about the independence of the meeting and about the substantial financial resources that made the event and their participation possible. Others received covert benefaction via the Information Research Department of the Foreign Office. In an interview in 1994, Tom Braden, OSS officer in his youth and former head of the IOD, the greatest single concentration of covert political and propaganda activities of the CIA, reflected on the financing of the event at Berlin: “We’ve got to remember that when we’re speaking of those years that Europe was broke … There wasn’t any money. So they naturally looked to the United States for money”7 Simple common sense was enough to find out who was behind the Berlin Congress. Delegates who speculated about who was footing the bill concluded that this was not quite the spontaneous event its organizers claimed.

Despite some irritations, the Berlin Congress was a celebrated by US government officials and the CIA as a success. The Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF) became institutionalized. It became a precious instrument of the CIA tool box. Its principle task was: the winning over the waivers. “It was not to be a centre of agitation, but a beachhead in western Europe from which the advance of Communist ideas could be halted. It was to

5The following “portrait” of the three organization is a summarizes the corresponding material in Saunders (2000). In parts, the description is very close to Saunders’s text and quotation marks could be adequate.
6The IOD, the International Organizations Division of the CIA, aimed at uniting the intellectuals of the “free world” against what was being offered in the Soviet Union.
7Quoted after Saunders (2000, p.82).
engage in a widespread and cohesive campaign of peer pressure to persuade intellectuals to
dissociate themselves from Communist fronts or fellow traveling organizations. It was to
courage the intelligentsia to develop theories and arguments which were directed not at a
mass audience, but at the small elite of pressure groups and statesmen who in turn determined
government policy. It was not an intelligence-gathering source, and agents in the other CIA
divisions were warned not to attempt to use it as such” (Saunders, 2000, p.98ff).

The CCF managers were answerable to Tom Braden, then head of the CIA’s
International Organizations Divisions (IOD). Its activities were either directly financed by
CIA’s Farfield Foundation or, indirectly, by one of the many foundations that were more than
willing to transfer CIA money to CCF officials or to contributors to CCF projects, e.g.,
museum directors, gallery owners, art critics, journalists or artists.8

Some contributors were supported by their own foundation, and thus did not depend
on CIA money. This did not hinder them in closely cooperating with the CCF. Most of the
1940s and 1950s, Nelson Rockefeller was the president of the Museum of Modern Art
(MoMA). His mother was one of the museum’s five founders in 1929. MoMA represented the
“enlightened rich,” the future of American culture.

During World War II, Nelson Rockefeller was in charge of all intelligence in Latin
America. His organization sponsored touring exhibitions of “contemporary American
painting” of which nineteen were contracted to MoMA. Rockefeller was not involved in OSS
but his close friendship with Allen Dulles, who was in charge of OSS wartimes operations in
Europe, younger brother to secretary of state John Foster Dulles and CIA’s director in the
period 1953-61, compensated for this shortcoming. Allen Dulles and Tom Braden delivered
briefings on covert activities of the CIA on a regular basis and, in 1954, Nelson Rockefeller
was appointed to Eisenhower’s special advisor on Cold War strategy. He was also chairman
of the Planning Coordination Group which controlled the National Security Council and
CIA’s covert operations.

The various engagements of William Burden,9 a great-great-grandson of Commodore
Vanderbilt, illustrates the connection between CIA, CCF and MoMA. During the war, he
worked for Nelson Rockefeller’s intelligence service. After the war, he became director of
CIA’s Farfield Foundation and thus decided on the financial support to CCF, sat as chairman

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8The CIA undercover activities were generously subsidies by Marshall Plan money. Recipient countries were
ask to deposit an amount equal to the US contribution in its central bank. 95 percent of the currency funds
remained the legal property of the recipient country’s government, while 5 per cent became the property of the
US government - and were made available as a war chest for the CIA (Saunders, 2000, p.1005f.).
9See Saunders (2000, p.137) for this short portrait and further details illustrating William Burden’s political and
cultural role.
of an advisory committee of the MoMA, and became MoMA’s president in 1956. Frances Saunders introduces several other high ranking officials to us who held similar links to at least two of these institutions. There are however also actions in which these institutions repeatedly collaborated. However, in the case of MoMA’s activities, “unlike those of CIA, it was not necessary to use subterfuge. Similar aims as those of CIA’s cultural operations could be pursued openly with the support of Nelson Rockefeller’s millions” (Cockroft, 1974, p.41).

By 1956, the International Program of MoMA had organized 33 exhibitions, including the US participation in the Venice Biennale. “The State Department refused to take the responsibility for U.S. representation at the Venice Biennale, perhaps the most important international-cultural-political art event, where all European countries including the Soviet Union competed for cultural honors. MoMA bought the U.S. pavilion in Venice and took the sole responsibility for the exhibitions from 1954 to 1962. This was the only case of privately owned (instead of government-owned) pavilion at the Venice Biennale.” (Cockroft, 1974, p.40). The Government’s difficulties in handling the delicate issues of free speech and free artistic expression, generated by the McCarthy hysteria of the early 1950s, made it necessary and convenient for MoMA to assume this role of international representation of the United States. This was consistent with the neo-liberal principle that there is nothing to prevent an individual from exerting as much influence through his work in a private foundation as he could through work in the government (Saunders, 2000, p.139). Moreover, it is a hallmark of the “artistic free enterprise” strategy identified with Abstract Expressionism.

When MoMA contracted to supply the art material for CCF’s 1952 Masterpieces festival in Paris, “it did so under the auspices of trustees who were fully cognizant of the CIA’s role in that organization” (Saunders, 2000, p.268) and of its propaganda value. On the other hand, the collaboration with the CCF brought MoMA and its favored Abstract Expressionism access to many of the most prestigious art institutions in Europe whose directors were sitting on the Arts Committee of the CCF.

During 1953-54, MoMA organized a tour of Europe, dedicated exclusively to Abstract Expressionism. The show, entitled “Twelve Contemporary American Painters and Sculptures”, had its opening at the Musée National d’Art Moderne at Paris. This was achieved with the help of the American Embassy at Paris (which acted as a quiet liaison between MoMA and its French hosts) and with the financial support of the Nelson Rockefeller Fund which was partly conducted through the Association Francaise d’Action Artistique. This association was a donor to the CCF and its director, Philippe Erlanger, was a designated CIA contact at the French Foreign Office (Saunders, 2000, p.270).
In a 1974 piece, Eva Cockroft discussed the relationship of CIA’s cultural apparatus and MoMA’s international program. The functions of both institutions were similar and “mutually supportive”. Frances Saunders (2000, p.264) concludes that “there is no *prima facie* evidence for any formal agreement between the CIA and the Museum of Modern Art. The fact is, it simply wasn’t necessary.” The motivations of both institutions, being at least functionally divergent, converged in the support for the Abstract Expressionism and its advance throughout the “free world” and to some dissident circles behind the Iron Curtain. Why Abstract Expressionism? Was it not that precisely the form of expression that had been rejected by America’s silent majority and by some of its very out-spoken politicians?

### 3. Individualism and Universalism

If the CIA, the Museum of Modern Art, and the Congress of Cultural Freedom were major players in the cultural warfare game, then the Abstract Expressionist artists were the pawns. In fact, the major players did not really care about the individual artists but focused on their work and the ideology behind their work. This was, in a sense, paradoxical because individualism was one of the cornerstones of Abstract Expressionism and a major reason why this art was supported as an alternative to the “collectivistic art of socialism”. The art works showed substantial variety, but the variation among the artists seemed even larger and “most of them were people who had very little respect for the government in particular and certainly not for the CIA”, said Donald Jameson in an interview in Washington in June 1994. Jackson Pollock was a drunk and was killed in a car crash. Mark Rothko and Adolph Gottlieb were committed anti-Communists. Barnett Newman was painting for America while Robert Motherwell and Willem de Kooning, born Dutch, did not think highly of a national context for their work. Ad Reinhardt participated in the March on Washington for black rights in August 1963. It seems that nothing remarkable has been said about Clyfford Still’s life and political orientation. There were times when he refused to be co-opted by the museums and the critical establishment, directed by a Clement Greenberg, but he still wished to be perceived as a spiritual leader of the Abstract Expressionist movement. To some extent, he was the mentor of color-field painters such as Barnett Newman and Mark Rothko and,

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11 However, he “…clung throughout his life to the independent anarchistic views he had formulated in youth” and even “…wrote a foreword to a new edition of Kropotkin’s memoirs” (Golding, 2003, p.32).
different from Pollock, Motherwell and de Kooning, rejected Freud and Surrealism and “all
cultural opiates, past and present” (Cox, 1083, p.51).

These artists formed the “essential eight” of Abstract Expressionism. Others who were
added to this group are William Baziotes, Arshil Gorky (who hanged himself), Philip Guston,
Hans Hofmann, Fritz Kline, Richard Pousette-Dart, Mark Tobey, and Bradley Walker Tomlin
(see Gibson, 1997, p.xx). However, instead of going deeper into the individual history and
political beliefs of these people, I will follow the strategy of the three major players and focus
on the ideology of art which made Abstract Expressionism.

Danto (1999, p.75) summarizes the essence of Abstract Expressionism, “with its
celebration of the self, of the inner states that painting allegedly made objective, and of paint
itself as the medium par excellence through which this inner states were externally
transcribed. In a certain sense, abstract expressionist painting was a kind of private pictorial
language, a turning away from the public and the political in the interest of producing an art
that was, in the words of Robert Motherwell, ‘plastic, mysterious, and sublime’. ” The focus
on color instead of form or narrative expressions represented the abstract dimension. The
discovery of the Unconscious with the help of color contained the expressionist dimension.
The two dimensions met in automatic drawing and painting, doodling, gesture and action
painting, and Jackson Pollock’ dripping method. The “fluid space, lack of closed shapes, a
deliberately unfinished quality, and an ‘overall’ composition that diffused any notion of
focus” of Abstract Expressionist work - complex, cosmopolitan, and ever-changing – “was
intrinsically at odds with the need for certitude and control” (de Hart Mathews, 1976, p.785)
strongly looked for by many Americans in the times of Cold War.

“Marxism gave way to psychiatry” (Guilbaut, 1983, p.165). Several Abstract
Expressionist artists had political roots in the Marxism of the 1930s, and their analysis of the
new political situation and their own position in it bore the imprint of the Marxist tradition.
However, in the 1940s, there was an important shift away from critical studies of the social
and political environment, alienation in the capitalist society, etc. Gottlieb and Rothko were
dedicated readers of Freud and Jung. This concurred with the focus on creativity (or
originality) as one of the core principles of Abstract Expressionism. “Originality, like
abstraction, was an important way predicated on the denial of politics” (Gibson, 1997, p.
xxviii). Alienation became a purely individualistic (psychological) phenomenon which,
according to Clement Greenberg, self-appointed prophet and spokesman of Abstract

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12March 1948, art critic Clement Greenberg was the first to declare that New York had achieved international
status as a cultural centre and even replaced Paris as the cultural symbol of the Western world: American art was
the foremost in the world.
Expressionism, made the American artist the “most modern” of all artists and enabled him to express the modern age. However, Abstract Expressionists rejected machine imagery and industrial and urban landscape, they “entered into a pastoral word that was primitive and elemental” (Cox, 1983, p.48). On the other hand, abstraction made it possible to lead into an active dialogue with the age and private material could be treated as a public declaration. However, to art historian Serge Gilbaut (1983, p.197), “the freedom of expression and existential violence that leap to the eye in the work of abstract expressionists were in fact products of fear and the impossibility of representation, of the need to avoid the literary expression…”

“The American problem,” Robert Motherwell emphasized, “was to find a creative principle that was not a style, not stylistic, not an imposed aesthetic.”13 Many Abstract Expressionist artists were followers of Carl Jung. As Jungians they believed that the collective unconscious was universal and “self-identical” in all human beings (Gibson, 1997, p.48). The function of art was considered as the invention of codes to transpose universal, rather than local, meaning into visual form. “Turning … to private visions, insights, and most especially the subconscious, the abstract expressionists plumbed the depths of their own experience for metaphors and symbols that would somehow possess universal meaning” (de Hart Mathews, 1976, p.783). This was the spiritual-intellectual basis for the claim on universalism and the discharge of the isolationist spirit of pre-war America – a pre-condition for applying art to cultural warfare.

Paradoxically, to some extent Abstract Expressionism contained a turning away from the market. Before it was discovered as an instrument of Cold War its main representatives were not very much of a success on the art market. By the simple fact that this art often used immense formats – different from its European predecessors – it necessitated museums and other public spaces which was only made available in the course of Cold War cultural policy. In principle, this conflicted with the private pictorial language of Abstract Expressionism, its “artistic free enterprise” strategy and non-political attitude, and made its dissemination dependent on semi-public (political) entrepreneurship as developed by the CIA, MoMA, and CCF.

There are many paradoxes embedded in Abstract Expressionism; some are embedded to the inconsistency of its claim of individualism and freedom, on the one hand, and its policy effects which focus on dominance of ideas, ideology, and power on the other. Eva Cockcroft (1974, p.41) concludes that “attempts to claim that styles of art are politically neutral when

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there is no overt political subject matter are as simplistic as Dondero-ish attacks on all abstract art as ‘subversive’.”

Paradoxically, the discriminatory edge of Abstract Expressionism was its claim for universalism. And it was this claim, together with its individualistic ideology that made this style and the artists a canon of interest to Cold War strategists. Does not Communism also make a universalist claim?

To Eva Cockroft (1974, p.41), it is evident that “rich and powerful patrons of the art, men like Rockefeller and Whitney, who control the museums and help oversee foreign policy, also recognize the value of culture in the political arena. The artist creates freely. But his work is promoted and used by others for their own purposes. Rockefeller, through Barr and others at the Museum his mother founded and the family controlled, consciously used Abstract Expressionism, ‘the symbol of political freedom,’ for political ends.”

4. Basic Questions

Frances Saunders (2000, p.5) raised a number of questions which could serve as a starting point for evaluating the CIA’s engagement in the cultural warfare. The first question addresses the issue of freedom. “Clearly, by camouflaging its investment, the CIA acted on the supposition that its blandishments would be refused if offered openly. What kind of freedom can be advanced by such deception?” Of course, this question was relevant for the Free World and its frontier states towards the Soviet Empire. However, it was also of interest to the political, economic and social life within the borders of the USA. A preliminary answer to this question is: a liberal freedom controlled by an elite and the elite’s principle. For instance, with respect to the contribution of MoMA and the various private foundations which supported the cultural warfare, Liberalism implies that there is nothing to prevent an individual from exerting as much influence through his work in a private foundation as he could through work in the government.

The Founding Fathers, and more specifically James Madison, wanted to refine the voice of people in government, not replicate it. They proposed various restraints to majority voting which were thought to shelter the governing elite from direct popular impact. Voting was considered a method of controlling officials by subjecting their tenure to periodic electoral tests, but not a method for citizens to participate directly in making law, supposedly the “Will of the People.” To create and to use a policy frame which is independent of parliamentary support is a natural consequence of this principle of American liberalism as
soon as the elite finds the elected representatives too narrow-minded, and too close to popular values, to collaborate in the pursuit of the grand scheme.

More specifically, Frances Saunders (2000, p.5) asks: “Did financial aid distort the process by which intellectuals and artists were advanced? – Were reputations secured or enhanced by membership of the CIA’s cultural consortium?” Ex-post one can conclude that most of the writers, film makers and artists selected by the CIA sponsorship were of extremely high quality. The Abstract Expressionists such as Jackson Pollock, Willem de Kooning, and Mark Rothko have defined the world art of their period and are still prominent contributors to museums of modern art around the globe. (See Marc Rothko’s room at Tate Modern.) But it seems impossible to answer whether they could have done this without the support which they derived, directly or indirectly, from the resources which the CIA invested in the secret cultural warfare.\(^\text{14}\) We have to see that Abstract Expressionism entails a high degree of exclusiveness and of cartelization so that its support had a substantial discriminating effect on American art – with precarious consequences for those who were not members of the cartel. Abstract Expressionism “was sealed inside a belljar and protected from infection by any unwanted Germs, from intrusion by any outsider who might disturb the cherished harmony” (Guilbaut, 1983, p.10). There was no (gallery) space left for Byron Browne, Carl Holty, Karl Knath, and Charles Seliger, painters who were successful before the Abstract Expressionists conquered the stage: their works were too European, too close to Paris, and too un-American – to become enlisted by governmental agencies and private organizations in the fight against the expansion of Communism\(^\text{15}\).

Ann Eden Gibson (1997, p. xxxi) summarizes: “To the extent that the work of an artist who is not in the canon looks like that of one who is, the noncanonical artist’s work is derivative. To the extent that the noncanonical work does not resemble that in the canon, the contending work is not Abstract Expressionist”. Paradoxically, the discriminating effect resulted from the focus on universality. This excluded artists whose identity did not generalize “in a postwar society whose standards were racist, misogynist, and homophobic” (Gibson, 1997, xxii). The mechanism of this society functioned to reinforce the power of European, male and heterosexual identity and discriminated against artists who did not fit in this pattern. The CIA was grateful for this pre-selection of artists and their work; it made it

\(^{14}\text{However, “there is ..... incontrovertible evidence that the CIA was an active component in the machinery which promoted Abstract Expressionism” (Saunders, 2000, p.273).}\)

\(^{15}\text{On February 25, 1948, Czechoslovakia went over to the Soviet bloc after the Czech Communist succeeded in out-maneuvering the divided Social Democratic Party.}\)
less cumbersome to transfer Western values to the rest of the world. The standards of the postwar society were racist, misogynist, and homophobic not only in America.

However, “was there any real justification for assuming that the principles of western democracy couldn’t be revived in post-war Europe according to some internal mechanism? Or for not assuming that democracy could be more complex than was implied by the lauding of American liberalism?” (Saunders, 2000, p.5) Indeed, democracy is a complex concept. Left to the internal mechanism it is not obvious that a democratic equilibrium evolves. From a theoretical point of view, coordination on a democratic equilibrium seems to be easily solvable by the implementation of American liberalism – and the American way of life as the focal point. However, when it comes to modern art as a vehicle to disseminate American liberalism, it faced, as we have seen, popular resistance from inside. Undercover operations was a way to circumvent this problem. This violates the majority principle of democracy but not necessarily the liberal perspective of it. As Gordon Wood, author of *The American Revolution: A History* writes “What really counts in maintaining democracy are the liberties protected by the Bill of Rights and the underlying conditions of the country – its culture, its social arrangements, its economic well-being, and the political experience of its citizens and their leaders” (Wood, 2002, p.21).

If the financing were done openly, the liberal elite would see itself in conflict with the political sector which (a) relies on majorities and thus depends on popularity, and (b) whose members are, in general, not as well equipped to enjoy modern art as the members of the elite. Moreover, it seems that some participants of the Berlin Congress and affiliates to the CCF did not know that they were, directly or indirectly, financed by the CIA. Had they known they would left the projects it supported or publicly distanced themselves from their donor. In both cases the effect would have probably been negative.

Other participants claimed that they did not know that they were financed by the CIA. They needed this umbrella to (a) keep up social respect, (b) be acceptable for the cultural or political community, and (c) avoid political or social resistance and concomitant backlashes about their work. Secrecy was helpful and, to some extent, necessary for the conquest of the Western art community through sponsored exhibitions and gallery work. Were the shows which finally installed Abstract Expressionism in Western Europe during the post-war period openly financed by the US government, their impact is likely to have been much reduced: the success of America’s Cold War program depended on its ability to appear independent from government, to seem to represent the spontaneous convictions of freedom loving individuals. This was the credo of Allen Dulles, younger brother to secretary of state John Foster Dulles,
close friend of Nelson Rockefeller and director of CIA in the period 1953-61, who was already in charge of covert operations in Europe during World War II (Saunders, 2000, p.130).

5. The Model Analysis

Georges Duby claims that “the most startling discoveries that remain to be made, I think, will come from the attempt to find out what was left out of the discourse, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, to determine what was hidden, consciously or unconsciously.”16 Naturally, a lot is left out when politics makes use of obfuscation and secrecy. Duby concludes “What we need are new scholarly tools, tools better adapted than those we now have to bringing out the negative in what we are shown, to laying bare the things that men deliberately cover up. At times these suddenly reveal themselves quite by accident, but most of the time they must be carefully deciphered between the lines of what is actually said.”17

Game theory is often applied to model and analyze counter-factual or, in more popular terms, the paradoxical events and thus seems an adequate instrument to lay bare the things that “men” cover up. Of course, game theoretic models are highly stylized, but this unavoidable if we want to analyze complex phenomena. The stylizations and simplifications help us in uncovering general principles, defining relevant problems, and find new questions.

5.1. The Wickström Model

The model that will be applied here has been used by Holler and Wickström (1999) to analyze the use of scandals in the progress of society. Here, we will analyze the impact of secrecy on social dynamics. In the model we assume that there are many players in society who randomly encounter one another. At each encounter one has to behave according to one of two conventions, I and II (the strategies I and II). Such a convention could be on which side of the street to travel or which language to speak, or whether we like avant-garde art or whether we prefer a more traditional alternative. If two players, $i$ and $j$, encounter one another and adopt the same convention, the payoffs are positive for both: $\left( v_i, v_j \right)$ for

16Quotation taken from Guilbaut (1983, p.6).
17Quotation taken from Guilbaut (1983, p.6).
convention I and \( (w_i, w_j) \) for convention II. If they adopt different conventions the payoff is zero for both players.

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  i, j & I & II \\
  \hline
  I & v_i, v_j & 0,0 \\
  II & 0,0 & w_i, w_j \\
\end{array}
\]

**Figure 2: Game of Conventions**

Now, let us assume that the status quo is characterized by convention I. That means everyone adopts this convention if they encounter another player. If player \( i \) chooses convention I, then the expected payoff for player \( i \) from an encounter with \( j \) :

\[
u_i(I) = 1 \cdot v_i + 0 \cdot 0 = v_i
\]

because \( i \) adheres to convention I with probability one. Applying the same logic to convention II, if individual \( i \) chooses convention II, his expected payoff is:

\[
u_i(II) = 1 \cdot 0 + 0 \cdot w_i = 0.
\]

It is clear that the player will adhere to convention I. In fact, everyone will adhere to convention I because everyone else adheres to it. A single player in a large population cannot make a difference; the society is locked into convention I. Only the concerted effort of a large number of individuals could change this. In adopting convention II, a single player can only cause his own misery and that of others who adhere to convention I.

This situation could change through a concerted effort of several individuals. In fact, there exists for each individual \( i \) a smallest fraction of the population that would have to use convention II for it to be rational for individual \( i \) to also adopt convention II. This fraction of the population is known as the *critical mass* for player \( i \).

Note that this measure of critical mass is related to an individual player while the concept of critical mass as applied in network theory (see, e.g., Peters (1997)) is defined respect to the population or subgroups of the population. However, we will see that the two concepts coincide for the critical mass equilibrium.
It is straightforward to find the critical mass for an individual $i$. Denoting the proportion of the population adhering to convention II by $\delta$, we can again find the expected payoffs of individual $i$ which are given by:

$$u_i(\text{I}) = (1 - \delta)v_i + \delta \cdot 0$$
$$u_i(\text{II}) = (1 - \delta) \cdot 0 + \delta w_i$$

Obviously, individual $i$ will prefer convention II to convention I if $u_i(\text{II}) > u_i(\text{I})$. This is the case if

$$\delta > \frac{1}{1 + \frac{w_i}{v_i}} = \frac{1}{1 + \mu_i} \Rightarrow \delta_i$$

where we have defined $m_i$ as player $i$'s \textit{revolutionary propensity}, i.e., the player’s valuation of a society adhering to convention II in comparison to one adhering to convention I. The parameter $\delta_i$ is player $i$’s critical mass.

The revolutionary propensity is greater than 1 for players who would prefer convention II to be the norm; and it is smaller than 1 for people who prefer convention I. Similarly, the critical mass for a player who prefers status quo is greater than 0.5. For those who prefer a new norm the critical mass is less than 0.5.

We can now order the individuals according to their critical mass, i.e. in reverse according to their revolutionary propensities. We further denote by $\Theta(\delta)$ the fraction of the total population with a critical mass $\delta = \delta$ or smaller. That is, $\Theta(\delta)$ is the fraction of the population that would adopt convention II if at least a fraction $\delta$ has already done so. Figure 3 illustrates a possible function $\Theta(\delta)$.

\textbf{Figure 3: Critical Mass Function}

The critical mass of the most revolutionary member of society is denoted by $\delta_m$, and that of the most reactionary by $\delta^M$. If we assume, as in Figure 3, that the function $\Theta$ is increasing at a rate larger than 1, then it has only one point intersecting a 45° line (the dotted line), that is, a point where $\Theta(\delta) = \delta$. This point is denoted by $\delta = \delta^*$. In the figure and is known as a \textit{fixed
point. The important property of this fixed point is that it is the “true” critical mass of the society as a whole: $\delta^*$ represents a critical mass equilibrium.

If a fraction slightly larger than $\delta^*$ adopts convention II, then there is even a greater fraction $\theta$ that finds it advantageous to adopt convention II. After they have done so, even more would like to do so, and the bandwagon starts rolling and does not stop until all individuals have adopted convention II. In other words, the fixed point of our evolutionary process does not represent a stable equilibrium for the critical mass function $\theta(\delta_i)$ in Figure 3. Hence, in order to arrive at a change in convention, it is necessary to coordinate at least a fraction $d^*$ consisting of the most revolutionary individuals in the society to take the first step. Needless to say that coordinating on convention II is no problem, irrespective of the revolutionary propensity of $j$, if the meeting game is sequential and $i$ is a first mover to propose convention II. If, however, players choose their convention strategies simultaneously, i.e., without knowing the choice of the other, then the decision situation is more complex: (a) The individual members do in general not know the distribution of individual critical mass measures, i.e., the function $\theta(\delta_i)$. (b) Even if player $i$ knows $\theta(\delta_i)$ and also knows that a sufficient number of players know $\theta(\delta_i)$, then there is still no guarantee for $i$, choosing convention II, to encounter a second player who chooses convention II. However, if $\delta > \delta^*$, then an player $i$ with $\delta_i < \delta^*$ has a large enough revolutionary propensity $\mu_i$ to propose convention II in a meeting with $j$. But how will the players come to know the function $\theta(\delta_i)$? If encounters occur repeatedly then a player can obtain an estimate of $\theta(\delta_i)$ from experience, e.g., applying the Bayesian rule for updating his a priori assumption on relevant values of $\theta(\delta_i)$. If you think that a sufficient share of members of a society, $\delta > \delta^*$, shake hands, and you want to follow this convention, but in every encounter you offer your hand is ignored, you will revise your estimate of $\delta$ and choose another convention as soon as $\delta < \delta_i$.

In general, there is also exogenous information – created by events or delivered by external players – from which players can derive updates of their beliefs on $\theta(\delta_i)$. Holler and Wickström (1999) suggested that the mobilization and coordination can be achieved through a scandal. In this paper we will argue that the prominence of the evolutionary elements has been organized and enhanced by the CIA and private players, such as MoMA, who shared the value and methods of its Cold War cultural policy.

5.2 Interpretation
There were two alternatives which specified the status quo characterizing American art in the early 1940s. First, the already mentioned Byron Browne, Carl Holty, Karl Knath, and Charles Seliger painted in European style, i.e., by and large, they followed the art program which was popular in Paris. In fact, in his early paintings, Arshil Gorky also borrowed from Paris, however, he succeeded in becoming accepted as member of the second layer of Abstract Expressionists. \(^{18}\) The work of a second group of painters such as Edward Hopper, Georgia O’Keefe, Mark Tobey and Stuart Davis was identified as truly American but the art industry considered their example “too parochial in coloration, and thus too ‘unmodern’ to provide models for mainstream work” (Kozloff, 1973, 43). Their work was not abstract and as such it was representative of what middle-class Americans called modern art.

The two alternatives operated on segmented markets which were clearly identified. There was no coordination problem and it did not happen very often that the participant of one market – buyer, gallery, artist, art critic – was trapped into the other. The balance was washed away when Abstract Expressionism entered the scene. From one day to the other, the influential Kootz Gallery at New York no longer exhibited works of Browne, Holty (see Guilbaut, 19983, p.178f.) and Hopper. \(^{19}\) What has happened?

**Figure 4: Bi-polar Expectations and Political Salience**

Alfred Barr’s support of Abstract Expressionist artists played an influential role in their success. In addition to his role at MOMA, Barr was an artistic advisor to Peggy Guggenheim, whose Surrealist-oriented *Art of This Century* gallery gave some of these artists their first shows in the mid-1940s. For example, in her East River gallery, Peggy Guggenheim offered one-man shows to Jackson Pollock in 1943, 1945, 1947, Hans Hofmann in 1944, Robert Motherwell in 1944, and Mark Rothko in 1945. On the occasion of his solo show in May and June 1943, Pollock sold nothing but Peggy Guggenheim offered him another show, together with the painter Matta in November 1943 and an annual contract of US$1,800 a year for his entire output (Russell, 2002).

\(^{18}\) One could also argue that there is a very strong link from Picassos *Demoiselles d’Avignon* of 1906, which is part of the permanent collection of MoMA, to Adolph Gottlieb’s adaptations of primitive concepts. However, Gottlieb was a member of the “essential eight” of Abstract Expressionism.

\(^{19}\) Later, in 1952, “some fifty American artists, including Edward Hopper, Charles Burchfield, Yasuo Kuniyoshi and Jack Levine, attacked MoMA, in what came to be known as the ‘Reality Manifest’, for ‘coming to be more and more identified in the public eye with abstract and non-objective art’, a ‘dogma’ which they felt stemmed ‘very largely from the Modern Museum and its unquestionable influence throughout the country’” (Saunders, 1999, p.265).
Figure 4 shows two prominent types of players. The first one is characterized by $\delta^+$, a group of players who will choose the convention II even if nobody else is choosing this convention. Such an autonomous change $\delta^+$ can be attributed to the MoMA and its friends and supporters, represented by Nelson Rockefeller. The other group of prominent players is described by $\delta^0 < 1$, the upper level of $\delta$ for $\delta < 1$. The Donderos will only accept Abstract Expressionism if all players accept this style of art, including themselves. However, since the Donderos are not prepared to accept this style at any costs, $\delta^0$ expresses the upper level of $\delta$. If $\delta^P$ represents the “amount of players” necessary to make Abstract Expressionism politically salient so that it defines the style of the Free World, then $\delta^P$ has to satisfy the inequality $\delta^P < \delta^0$. Otherwise $\delta^P$ cannot be achieved.

Obviously, the “amount of players” is not well defined in this context where the social relevance of the various players and peer group behavior matter; not all players are of equal weight in a liberal society. Different weights can be expressed through nonmarginal steps in the $\theta(\delta_i)$ function. However, $\theta(\delta_i)$ assumes that players form identical expectations with respect to the contributions of the various players to satisfy the critical masses $\delta_i$: the expectations on $\theta(\delta_i)$ are identical for all players, only the $\delta_i$ values differ. Needless to say that the assumption of identical expectations is rather heroic, but convenient for the lucidity of the analysis.

In Andreozzi (2002), player $i$ will switch to convention II “only if at least fraction $\delta^+$ of the entire population has already switched.” (p.201) However, as it is assumed that the entire population initially plays convention I, all players will stick to this convention in the situation described in Figure 4. That is, players do not form expectations but simply imitate observed behavior. Perhaps it seems more realistic to assume players having identical observations than having identical expectations, but even in the case of observations different players may assign different social weights to players. If so, then the assumption of a unique function $\theta(\delta_i)$ is inconsistent. That is: the simplifying assumption a unique function $\theta(\delta_i)$ implies that every $i$ has the same expectation with respect to the distribution of critical mass values.

20 Binmore (1998) discusses the evolutionary determination of social weights in the context of fairness norm. In principle, these weights could be applied here as a measure of the social relevance of agents. However, the Binmore’s evolutionary model is not conclusive (see Holler and Napel, 2001).

21 Andreozzi (2002) endogenizes the differentiation in critical masses by assuming that players get a higher payoff out of a specific strategy the more experienced they get in playing this strategy. It does not seem obvious that this principle can be applied to the distribution of $\delta_i$, i.e., to Abstract Expressionism. Political history teaches us that the simple left-right dimension, possibly structured with age, does not always apply to the appreciation of modern art as the latter is generally detested by both the extreme right and the extreme left.
If players react to observed changes from convention I to convention II, then the fraction $\delta^+$ changes in the situation of Figure 4. Under the assumption that players form expectations, an additional fraction $\delta^* - \delta^+$ will be motivated by the autonomous change and a fraction $\delta = \delta^+$ will follow convention II. However, if $\delta^* < \delta^+$, as illustrated in Figure 4, then political salience has not been achieved. If decisions are based on expectations, player who are interested in political salience have the option to augment expectations, by, for instance choosing a larger autonomous change, increasing the social weight of players with a high revolutionary propensity and thus a low $\delta_i$ – a likely implication of liberal policy – or influencing the learning process by manipulating the a priori beliefs. If the a priori $\delta$ is large then many players are willing to choose convention II, and then it is more likely that a player will meet another who has chosen convention II.

**Figure 5: Shaping Expectations**

The interaction of MoMA, CIA, and CCF offered a tool box of instruments to manipulate $\theta(\delta_i)$ so that, in the end, $\delta^* > \delta^+$ was satisfied. In Figure 5, alternative $\theta(\delta_i)$ functions are represented. Curve A illustrates the choice of larger autonomous change while B illustrates successful manipulation of $\theta(\delta_i)$. Both curves leave the expectations of the Donderos “intact.” Curve C represents the “without manipulation” curve of Figure 4. Curves A and B are drawn such that the critical value $\delta^*$ is identical for both distributions. Of course, this is not necessarily the case. As long as $\delta > \delta_i$ and agents behave in accordance with their expectations $d$ will grow. If $\delta = \delta^* = \delta_i$, MoMA has to organize an extra exhibition to overcome this (instable) rest point.

Of course, there are many alternatives how the manipulated expectations of curve B can be explained. What we know so far of the interaction of MoMA, CIA and CCF offers rich material for speculation. For example, the success which Abstract Expressionism had in Europe due to Cold War policy seems to be an important factor to explain the recognition it gained by the U.S. middle class in the 1950s. Another important fact was the overnight change in *Life* magazine’s policy towards Jackson Pollok and the Abstract Expressionism, “transforming the alienated avant-garde artist into a cultural hero” (Guilbaut, 1983, p.193). It was Alfred Barr of MoMA who “persuaded Henry Luce of *Time-Life* to change his editorial policy toward the new art, telling him in a letter that it should be especially protected, not criticized as in the Soviet Union, because this, after all, was ‘artistic free enterprise’. Thus it was Luce – who held the phrase ‘American’s intellectual health’ permanently on the end of
his tongue who won over to Barr’s and MoMA’s interests. In August 1949, *Life* magazine gave its centre-page spread to Jackson Pollock, landing the artist and his work on every coffee table in America” (Saunders, 2000, p.267).

6. Radical Obfuscation

The cooperation of CIA, MoMA and CCF added an additional dimension to the model of *optimal obfuscation* suggested by Magee et al. (1989) and applied, for example, in Magee (1997) and Hojman (2002). The public component of this cooperation, the CIA and its share in CCF activities, was secret, at least before it was gradually unveiled in later years, while the rather active private component, represented by MoMA, was outside the range for which voters will sanction government for its policy. If we map this additional dimension into the two-dimensional diagram proposed in Magee et al. (1989, p.261) to illustrate their theory we get Figure 6.

**Figure 6: Optimal and Radical Obfuscation**

The G-curve illustrates the “votes gained from campaign contributions” while the L-curve represents “votes lost from distribution effects”. The standard hypothesis is that interest groups are less inclined to support the governing party the more difficult it is to see who benefits from its policy. By definition, an increase of obfuscation decreases “visibility”. This explains the decreasing shape of the G-curve. The shape of the L-curve derives from the fact that increasing social waste related to greater obfuscation becomes less recognizable to voters. Magee et al. (1989) illustrate the curves in Figure 6 with the example of an economically inefficient tariff policy. If the government wants to gain the votes of labor and thus support labor-intensive industry, then a labor subsidy would be, economically, the most efficient policy. Labor unions are likely to honor this policy through campaign contributions; non-labor voters will, however, tend not to vote for the government party because of its obvious partisanship which is it not in their favor. Social choice theory says that whenever policy boils down to the redistribution of a constant sum, and voters are aware of it, the government runs into the problem of cyclical majority and the opposition, being second move to issue its election platform, can always propose a distribution scheme which guarantees a majority of votes. This is just another way to say that the core of the voting game is empty or, alternatively, a Condorcet winner does not exist for this game. If, however, the government
avoids the distribution issue, it is unlikely to gain substantial campaign contributions. Moreover, most policy problems have redistributive implications. Obfuscation seems to be a natural way out of this dilemma. The redistributive effects of tariffs on imports of labor-intensive goods seems to be less obvious than the redistributive effects of labor subsidies. As a consequence, labor union are less inclined to honor this policy in form of campaign contributions while more non-labor voters are likely to support the government. The redistributive effects of quotas on imports of labor-intensive goods seems even less obvious, and the redistributive effects of so-called voluntary export restraint agreements (VER) by foreign suppliers of labor-intensive goods seem to be the least obvious in the chain of alternative trade barriers so far developed to favor the vote clientele of a party.

Needless to say that corresponding instruments are available to gain support of capital-intensive industry and its major stakeholders. Starting with direct subsidies and ending with VER, the obfuscation will increase and economic policy will be more an more distorted with the result of increasing social waste. The L-curve reflects, in addition to the redistribution effect, the evaluation of the distortion as experienced by the voters. However, as better informed voters are expected to punish government for economic inefficiency, parties tend to increase obfuscation. Magee et al. (1989, p. 263) observe a voter information paradox: If voters tend to be better informed, parties increase obfuscation, and more economic inefficiency results. The change from tariffs to VERs illustrates this argument.

Obviously, in Figure 6, an obfuscation optimum (i.e. optimal obfuscation) exists for the range between no obfuscation and total obfuscation. It is determined by the degree of obfuscation for which the distance of the two curves is maximal, i.e. where the “marginal votes gained from campaign contributions” equal “marginal votes lost from distortion effects”. In this example, total obfuscation is not optimal as a comparison of the distances XY and EH shows. Of course, this marginalistic interpretation assumes a cardinality for the obfuscation scale which is difficult to justify.

In the case of CIA’s Cold War cultural policy, obfuscation was not only total but radical: voters did not relate the emergence of Abstract Expressionism to the government. On the contrary, the government’s preferences were reflected in President Truman’s verdict and Congressman Dondero’s preventive actions. When Eisenhower became President, the official cultural climate became, perhaps, less hostile towards Abstract Expressionism but active public support was still not visible. The public abstention on this issue marks a point which is outside the range defined by the interval between no obfuscation and total obfuscation. If it is somewhere on the scale of obfuscation then it has to be to the right of total obfuscation. (See
Figure 6.) Of course, both the G-curve and the L-curve have to be redefined for the cooperation of CIA, MoMA, and CCF on Cold War cultural policy. The G-curve reflects the votes gained from the supporting the Dondero-ish position which decrease if support becomes more and more obfuscated. The L-curve illustrates votes lost by those who were alienated by the statements on art and culture by the political establishment. Here we have to observe that an obvious difference between government officials and the opposition party on this issue did not exist.

There are redistributive effects of cultural policy, however, in general, they do not define majority interests. Non-singlepeakedness of preferences seem to be a more serious problem which politicians face who try to win an election. Often politicians are very hesitant to be explicit in this arena. In the case of Abstract Expressionism, however, preferences seemed to be single-peaked with a median at the Dondero-ish position. Correspondingly, the optimal obfuscation equilibrium is close to its left extreme. But the fast popularity gains of Abstract Expressionism in the second half of the 1940s and in the early 1950s show that these preferences were not stable; or at any rate where easy to destabilize by policies which relied on the evolutionary changes.

If the distance $X'Z'$ is larger than $EH$, then Figure 6 indicates a corner optimum for the government related to radical obfuscation and the difference between the two measures expresses the benefits of secrecy as compared to optimal obfuscation. The G-curve shows vote gains which are identical to the vote gains of total obfuscation. In fact, we could even think that the vote gains for radical obfuscation are identical to the vote gains for the case of no obfuscation as the position of the government is not obfuscated. However, if government policy is only verbal, and hardly active, as in the case of Cold War cultural policy, many voters will decide on the basis of a different issue on allocating their votes. If so, then the government’s vote gains out of cultural policy should be close to what it gains in case of total obfuscation. What really makes the difference between total obfuscation and radical obfuscation, is that government is not held responsible for developing the culture sector. Thus the L-curve should have a minimum with radical obfuscation. Of course, to accept the abstention of the government in active cultural policy presupposes that culture is foremost a private issue. This position is widely shared in the American society when culture is reduced to art.

7. Afterward
In 1966, a series of articles was published in the New York times on the CIA’s covert operations. Amidst reports on political assassinations and ruthless political intervention came details about the support which the CIA gave to the cultural sector. The upshot was that the moral authority which the intellectuals enjoyed during the height of the Cold War was “seriously undermined and frequently mocked” (Saunders, 200, p.6). Was this intended? Or, was it just the consequence of a change in art style: from Jackson Pollock’s *drippings* to Andy Warhols *Brillo Box* and his *Campbell’s Soup Cans*, the latter perhaps more appropriate to reflect the consumerism of capitalism than the worship of color and celebration of the lonely hero of the former.
References


Figure 1: The Major Players

Liberalism
Elite in business, culture and politics, Ivy Leaguers

Populism
President and Congress

MoMA CCF CIA

Free World and World behind the Iron Curtain
Figure 3: The Distribution of Expectations
$\delta^p = \text{minimal political salience}$
Figure 5: Shaping Expectations
Figure 6: Optimal and Radical Obfuscation