


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Is the rental brake also a housing construction brake?*

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Abstract

This study investigates the causal effect of Germany’s second-generation rent control policy — the *Mietpreisbremse* (rental brake) — on residential housing construction. Using administrative data covering nearly 11,000 German municipalities from 2010 to 2024, we employ staggered difference-in-differences estimators to address methodological biases of conventional two-way fixed effects models in settings with staggered treatment adoption. Our analysis examines multiple outcomes: total housing completions, completions of dwellings in multi-family houses (a proxy for rental housing supply), completions per capita, and net completions per housing stock. Results show that the rental brake has a statistically significant negative impact on housing construction, with stronger effects for multi-family dwellings. These findings remain robust to excluding major metropolitan areas, smaller municipalities, and municipalities with high homeownership rates, and persist even when the analysis is restricted to neighboring municipalities. This study contributes to the international literature on rent regulation by providing causal evidence from Germany’s staggered policy rollout, suggesting that even second-generation rent controls — which explicitly exempt new construction — can dampen housing supply. This likely occurs through increased regulatory uncertainty, higher risk premia demanded by investors, and reduced rental revenues available to finance residential investment.

Keywords: rent control; rental brake; housing construction; Germany.

JEL codes: R31, R38, C23.

*We thank Inga Jensen and the other members of the Mietrechtskommission (Tenancy Law Commission) of the German Federal Ministry for Justice for fruitful discussions that ultimately motivated us to undertake this research. The authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable comments received from participants at the 6th Workshop on Rent Control and Other Housing Policies, where this paper was presented on June 23, 2026.

1. Introduction

Rent controls have a long history and are extensively employed as a housing policy instrument in various countries, particularly in the period following the First World War (Kholodilin, 2026b). Historical experience shows, however, that they hardly solved the underlying problems in the housing markets: although they often succeeded in curbing short-term rent growth, this frequently came at a massive cost to investments in the existing housing stock as well as in new construction. As comprehensively documented in the literature, restrictive first-generation rent controls fail to create any incentives for the construction of new housing (Turner and Malpezzi, 2003).

Based on these historical experiences, the design of housing policy interventions has evolved. Policymakers have relaxed the restrictions and developed so-called second-generation rent controls. These models no longer aim for a strict rent freeze, but merely for a deceleration of rent growth. An important element of these more modern regulations are targeted exemptions for new construction, which are intended to ensure that the housing supply can continue to grow despite the regulatory intervention.¹

Examples of such second-generation regulations are found worldwide, including in the USA. In California, rents have only been allowed to increase by 5% annually plus the rate of inflation since 1995, with a 15-year grace period applying to newly constructed buildings (Diamond et al., 2019). Subsequently both Oregon (2019) and Washington (2024) implemented similar legislation, where annual rent growth is capped at the inflation rate plus 7 and 10%, respectively, with grace periods for new construction. In Europe, in some cases, regulations are even more restrictive. Here, it is often not only rent increases for existing tenancies that are limited, but also the absolute rent levels when concluding new contracts. However, European systems also mostly incorporate mechanisms to spare new construction: in Spain, for instance, new builds are initially exempt from the established reference rent, but fall under the regular restrictions for rent increases after a five year period. The heavily regulated market in The Netherlands also grants specific exemptions for high-quality new building projects.

The exemptions for new construction are, however, particularly extensive under the German

¹Strictly speaking, exemptions for newly built housing often also existed under first-generation rent control.

“Mietpreisbremse” (rental brake). Although rents for new contracts in the affected areas may generally not exceed the local comparative rent by more than 10%, all buildings constructed after the law’s introduction (built from 2014 onwards) are completely and permanently excluded from the rental brake. The local reference rent represents the average rent for comparable dwellings in a municipality, derived from rents agreed or modified within the last six years for properties with similar characteristics regarding location, size, condition, age, and equipment.

Against this background, the German example is particularly instructive for analyzing whether, and to what extent, rent controls exert negative repercussions on new construction activity despite comprehensive exemptions. As outlined in Section 2, previous empirical literature has examined this question on several occasions and predominantly found negative effects on new construction — suggesting that exemptions often have only limited effectiveness in practice. However, since the exemptions in Germany are unusually far-reaching, this market represents a highly relevant case for investigation.

The present study exploits the regional heterogeneity of the German legislation, as the rental brake does not apply nationwide, but only in specific municipalities defined by the federal states. This variation allows the causal effect of the regulation on new construction to be tested with empirical precision. The analysis is conducted using the staggered difference-in-differences estimators following [Callaway and Sant’Anna \(2021\)](#), [Sun and Abraham \(2021\)](#), and [Gardner \(2022\)](#).

The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the state of empirical literature on the impact of rent control on housing construction. Section 3 presents the legal framework concerning the rental brake in Germany. Section 4 describes the data and econometric methodology. Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.

2. Rent control and construction

Depending on its design and the market environment, rent regulations have very different effects on the housing markets. In addition to the intended stabilization or reduction of rent growth, they can also have unintended consequences, particularly on housing supply, which is the focus of this article. The identified supply effects are discussed in the context of the empirical literature ([Kholodilin, 2025, 2026a](#)). Thus, the aim is to contribute to an informed

discussion. Further effects, such as a decline in the quality of rental housing and reduced mobility in the housing market, are not addressed in detail here.

In the international economic literature, there has been a long and extensive debate regarding the various forms of rent regulation and their effects on the housing market. Typically, a distinction is made between first- and second-generation rent controls ([Kholodilin, 2025](#)): First-generation rent controls involve a rent freeze or even a reduction in rents. Such measures include, for example, Berlin’s rent freeze (*Mietendeckel*), which was in effect for a short time in 2020 and 2021. Second-generation models include approaches that aim to flatten rent growth and generally exclude new construction. These include the rental brake (*Mietpreisbremse*), which has been in effect in most German federal states since 2015 and was extended from 2025 to 2029. Other international examples are noted in the introduction.

When it comes to quantitative supply effects, a distinction can generally be made between the impact on new construction supply and the impact on the supply of existing rental housing. Rent controls can depress new housing construction by constraining the long-term profitability of real estate investments. This adverse effect may persist even when newly built properties are explicitly exempted from the regulation upon its enactment. Several mechanisms can explain this phenomenon. First, if an exemption is only temporary, investors must anticipate flatter rent trajectories in the future. To compensate, they may necessitate higher initial rent levels, which, in turn, limits market absorption and reduces the financial viability of construction projects. Second, rent controls on the existing stock artificially widen the price differential between new and existing housing. This growing disparity can weaken market demand for unconstrained new properties, thereby reducing the probability of successful sales or initial lettings. Finally, the political credibility of the exemption itself may be subject to doubt. If investors anticipate future policy reversals, they will demand a higher risk premium, thus further deterring capital allocation toward new construction.

The German case illustrates this regulatory uncertainty well. Since the inception of the *Mietpreisbremse* (rental brake), the exemption for new construction has been the subject of continuous political debate. For instance, a previous government proposed narrowing the exemption exclusively to dwellings built after 2018; however, this legislative amendment was ultimately abandoned following a general election and a protest by the real estate industry. Furthermore,


beyond the restrictive effects on new development, rent controls can induce substitution effects within the existing housing stock. Landlords may attempt to circumvent regulations by shifting towards alternative, unregulated tenancy models — such as short-term holiday lets — or by withdrawing properties from the rental market entirely to sell them to owner-occupiers [Breidenbach et al. \(2022\)](#).

Figure 1 illustrates the effects of rent control implemented internationally. This figure is based on 34 studies that examined various countries and time periods. It distinguishes between first-generation and second-generation rent controls, as well as between effects on existing housing stock and new construction.

It is clear that the majority of authors view rent controls as having negative effects on the supply of existing and new housing, although the effects on new construction are somewhat weaker (for more on this, see [Kholodilin 2024](#)). About 88% of the studies show a negative effect between first-generation rent controls (i.e., rent freezes) and the supply of rental housing in the existing stock; for second-generation measures, the figure is slightly lower at 67%. The negative correlation between supply in the rental housing market and rent controls is interpreted as a consequence of reduced rental income and returns, which create incentives to sell to owner-occupiers or pursue other uses, such as short-term rentals. The effects on new construction are somewhat more moderate, though still significant when it comes to first-generation rent controls: 75% of the studies show a negative effect. In contrast, this figure stands at only 45% for second-generation measures. This is primarily because, in many cases, newly built dwellings have been exempted from rent control by lawmakers — either permanently (e.g., in Germany) or for a specific period (e.g., five years in Spain). It is hoped that these exemptions will maintain incentives for investors. However, in light of the study’s findings, it appears that these exceptions can only prevent a negative impact on new construction to a limited extent.

As of 2026, when this study was prepared, the authors were aware of only five studies that intensively analyzed the impact of rent controls and housing supply for Germany. These studies are listed in Table 1. The first column lists the respective empirical study. The second column specifies the location and time period of the study. Column 3 describes the data and their sources, distinguishing between microdata (at the level of individual households or dwellings) and macrodata (at the regional level). Column 4 indicates the direction of the effect:

Figure 1: Effects of the first- and second-generation rent control on construction



Source: own construction.

Note: Analysis of a total of 34 studies on the effects of first- and second-generation rent controls on the existing housing stock and new construction. The number of studies examining each specific effect varies, as indicated by the different sizes of the bars.

1 represents an increase in supply, while -1 indicates a dampening effect on supply. Almost all studies focus on the supply of existing rental housing, which is why no distinction is made between new construction and the existing housing stock. The last column shows the form of rent control, i.e., whether it is the rental brake (MPB) or the Berlin rental freeze (MD).

Table 1: Empirical studies on the supply effects of rent control in Germany

Study	Location and area	Data type	Direction of effect	Type of policy
Dolls et al. (2021)	Berlin, 2017–2021	micro: data on housing prices and rents from Immowelt.de	-1	MD
Hahn et al. (2024)	Berlin, 2018–2021	micro: asking prices and rents from Value AG and Immobilienscout24	-1	MD
Mense et al. (2018)	German municipalities, 2011–2016; Bavarian municipalities in the years 2010–2016; German municipalities, 2008–2016	micro: Internet advertisements; macro: sales of developed vacant plots of land, Demolition and Conversion Statistics	1	MPB
Sagner and Voigtländer (2023)	Berlin, 2016–2020	micro: rental and purchase asking price data on a dwelling level by Value AG	-1	MD
Thomschke (2019)	Berlin, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Munich, 2012–2017	micro: advertisements of empirica-systeme	-1	MPB

Note: MD denotes Berlin’s Mietendeckel (rent freeze), MPB stands for Mietpreisbremse (rental brake).

Three examine the effects of the rent freeze, while the other two analyze the effects of the rental brake. All three studies on the rent freeze show that freezing rent prices led to a reduction in supply, at least in the short term. In the case of the rental brake, the effects vary, as the two studies individually point in different directions of impact. Yet, [Mense et al. \(2018\)](#), who found a positive effect of the rental brake, merely demonstrate that the demolition of single- and two-family homes with the aim of constructing new buildings on the sites has increased. This is interpreted as an indication of potentially rising construction activity at a later date. This finding is also confirmed in the follow-up study ([Mense et al., 2023](#)). However, the existing

literature ultimately does not provide clear evidence of a positive effect on new construction.

3. Legal framework

The rental brake was introduced in 2015 as a region-specific regulation ([Kholodilin, 2017](#)). Federal states may designate areas with a tight housing market (*angespannter Wohnungsmarkt*) as a place where the rental brake is to be applied for a maximum of five years. The relevant areas are typically municipalities or parts thereof.

The designation of a municipality as a tight housing market is based on four criteria: (1) local rent growth exceeds the national average; (2) the local average rent-to-income ratio is significantly higher than the national average; (3) population grows while new housing construction does not create sufficient additional dwellings; or (4) the vacancy rate is low despite high demand. Yet, federal states have some leeway in applying the rental brake.


The rental brake limits the rent level for new contracts. Two main exceptions apply: newly constructed dwellings (completed after October 1, 2014) for all subsequent contracts, and substantially modernized dwellings for the first contract after modernization. For all other dwellings, the newly negotiated rent may not exceed the typical local rent—defined as the rent paid for dwellings of comparable type, size, equipment, quality, and location—by more than 10%.

As of April 2026, the rental brake applies in 13 federal states; see [Table A1](#) in the Appendix for the complete list of legal acts concerning rental brake. Only Saarland, Saxony-Anhalt, and Schleswig-Holstein have not. In fact, Schleswig-Holstein implemented the rental brake in 12 municipalities in December 2015, yet it was prematurely revoked in December 2019. Overall, 166 municipalities across seven federal states revoked the rental brake between 2015 and 2024 ([Table A2](#)). In 20 cases—exclusively in Bavaria and Brandenburg—the policy was subsequently reintroduced. For the majority of these 20 municipalities, reintroduction took place six or seven years following the initial removal.

[Figure 2](#) illustrates the dynamics of rental brake adoption over time. Municipalities subject to the rental brake vary considerably in population size. The smallest affected municipality is Chiemsee (Bavaria), with fewer than 200 inhabitants as of 2022, while the largest is Berlin, with approximately 3.8 million inhabitants. Given this substantial heterogeneity, we do not

simply plot the number of municipalities with an active rental brake. Instead, we show the proportion of the population living in such municipalities.

Figure 2: Share of population living in municipalities with rental brake



Source: own construction.


Note: The gray-shaded area indicates the period during which the rental brake is forecast to remain in effect.

Initially, the rental brake was set to expire in 2020. However, it has since been extended twice, most recently in July 2025 (Figure 2). Already in 2015, more than 15% of Germany's population lived in municipalities subject to the rental brake. Over the following ten years, additional municipalities were brought under the scope of rent control regulations. By 2025, the number of municipalities with an active rental brake had nearly doubled. However, because these newly added municipalities are mostly relatively small in population size, the proportion

of the population subject to the rental brake increased by only 5 percentage points.

Figure 3 shows the map of German municipalities and *Kreise* with and without a rental brake as of 2024. The year is chosen because it is the last year in the sample, given availability of the construction data.

Figure 3: Spatial distribution of municipalities with rental brake in 2024



Source: own construction.

Apart from the rental brake, the German private rental sector is subject to another regulation—the capping limit—which restricts rent increases within existing rental contracts. First introduced in 1982, the capping limit applied equally to all rental contracts. Initially, it allowed a maximum rent increase of 30% over three years. In 1993, the limit was lowered to 20% over the same period. Finally, in 2013, federal states were empowered to designate areas where a

sufficient supply of rental housing under reasonable conditions is particularly endangered. In such areas, the capping limit could be further reduced to 15% over three years. This created the possibility of region-specific capping limits, as two different caps could apply depending on how each federal state government perceives the tightness of the housing market across municipalities. Theoretically, we could assess the impact of the capping limit. However, in practice, the lists of municipalities where the rental brake applies and where the capping limit applies largely coincide. In addition, the offence of excessive rent charging ("rent gouging") under Section 5 of the German Economic Offences Act (WiStrG) exists, although it plays only a minor role in practice

4. Empirical approach

4.1. Econometric methodology

In the modern econometric literature, the effects of a policy introduction are typically investigated using the difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology. In the classic setup, we have two groups (treatment group T , control group C) and two time periods (pre-treatment $t = 0$, post-treatment $t = 1$). In our context, the treatment group includes municipalities *Gemeinden* with a rental brake, while the control group includes municipalities *Gemeinden* without a rental brake. The pre-treatment period precedes the introduction of rental brake, while post-treatment period starts with the introduction of rental brake. The regression is:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \gamma \cdot \text{Treat}_i + \lambda \cdot \text{Post}_t + \beta \cdot (\text{Treat}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where y_{it} is the variable of interest, or the outcome variable (in our case it is the logarithm of dwelling completions); $\text{Treat}_i = 1$ if unit i belongs to the treatment group, 0 otherwise; $\text{Post}_t = 1$ if $t = 1$ (post-treatment), 0 if $t = 0$ (pre-treatment).

The coefficient of interest that measures the potential impact of the policy is β . It is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). It quantifies the difference in the outcome

change from pre to post between the treatment and control groups:

$$\beta = \left(E[y \mid \text{Treat} = 1, \text{Post} = 1] - E[y \mid \text{Treat} = 1, \text{Post} = 0] \right) - \left(E[y \mid \text{Treat} = 0, \text{Post} = 1] - E[y \mid \text{Treat} = 0, \text{Post} = 0] \right) \quad (2)$$

where $E[y \mid \text{Treat} = 1, \text{Post} = 1]$ is the conditional mean of the outcome variable, given that we consider treatment group in the post-treatment period; whereas $E[y \mid \text{Treat} = 1, \text{Post} = 0]$ is the conditional mean of the outcome variable, given that we consider treatment group in the pre-treatment period.

Thus, β is the difference-in-differences of mean outcomes. Under the parallel trends assumption, β captures the causal effect of the treatment. Let us break it down.

The first difference (within the treatment group). We compute how the outcome changes for the treatment group from before ($\text{Post} = 0$) to after ($\text{Post} = 1$) treatment:

$$\Delta_T = E[y \mid \text{Treat} = 1, \text{Post} = 1] - E[y \mid \text{Treat} = 1, \text{Post} = 0] \quad (3)$$

This is the observed change for the treated units. However, this change could be due to the treatment or to a general time trend (e.g., macroeconomic improvement).

The second difference (within the control group). We compute the same change for the control group (which did not receive treatment):

$$\Delta_C = E[y \mid \text{Treat} = 0, \text{Post} = 1] - E[y \mid \text{Treat} = 0, \text{Post} = 0] \quad (4)$$

This captures the pure time trend — how outcomes would have changed over time without any treatment.

The difference of the two differences. Finally, we subtract the control group's change from the treatment group's change:

$$\beta = \Delta_T - \Delta_C \quad (5)$$

This is the difference-in-differences estimator. It removes the common time trend, leaving behind the effect that is unique to the treated group.

This classical difference-in-differences design compares outcomes between a single treatment

group and a single control group over two periods (pre- and post-treatment). However, many modern applications feature *staggered treatment adoption*: units (e.g., regions or dwellings) receive treatment at different points in time and, once treated, remain treated.

A common approach to tackle multiple introductions of a policy is to estimate a two-way fixed effects (TWFE) regression:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \beta D_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (6)$$

where α_i stands for unit fixed effects (replaces $\gamma \cdot \text{Treat}_i$ in equation 1); λ_t denotes time fixed effects (replaces $\lambda \cdot \text{Post}_t$); and D_{it} is treatment indicator (replaces $\text{Treat}_i \times \text{Post}_t$).

In the two-period, two-group case, the TWFE coefficient β is mathematically identical to the canonical DiD estimator. Thus, TWFE generalizes canonical DiD by allowing multiple time periods, multiple groups, and variation in treatment timing. This corresponds precisely to the German context, in which municipalities are designated as rent pressure zones at different points in time, leading to staggered application of the rental brake.

TWFE was originally designed for (and is still perfectly valid for) settings with a single treatment event where some units are treated and others are not, observed over many pre- and post-periods. For example, a national law passed in 2015, with some states exempt (control) and others subject (treated). TWFE has been widely applied to staggered introduction (e.g., policy rolled out across states at different years). However, recent literature shows that β is a weighted average of all possible 2×2 DiD comparisons, but some comparisons receive *negative weights* (Goodman-Bacon, 2021).

In a staggered setting, the TWFE estimator computes many 2×2 DiD comparisons and averages them. These include: 1) clean comparisons: Later-treated vs. not-yet-treated; 2) clean comparisons: Treated vs. never-treated; and 3) problematic comparisons: Earlier-treated vs. later-treated (using earlier-treated units as controls for later-treated ones). The problematic comparisons (type 3) receive negative weights in the TWFE average. If treatment effects grow over time, these negative weights can flip the sign of β , producing a negative estimate even when all true effects are positive. Thus, TWFE leads to biased estimates when treatment effects are heterogeneous across time or cohorts (De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille, 2020). Hence,

a dedicated *staggered DiD* framework is required.

Let G_i be the period when unit i first receives treatment ($G_i = \infty$ for never-treated units). The average treatment effect for units treated at time g at a given event time k (e.g., k periods after adoption) is:

$$\text{ATT}(g, k) = E[y_{it}(1) - y_{it}(0) \mid G_i = g], \quad t = g + k \quad (7)$$

The key insight is to construct clean 2×2 DiD comparisons that never use already-treated units as controls. Two widely adopted estimators are:

[Callaway and Sant'Anna \(2021\)](#) proposed to compute group-time ATTs via outcome regression or matching:

$$\text{ATT}(g, t) = E[y_t - y_{g-1} \mid G = g] - E[y_t - y_{g-1} \mid C], \quad (8)$$

where C is either a not yet treated or never treated control group. These are then aggregated into overall event-study or summary parameters.

[Sun and Abraham \(2021\)](#) suggested to interact treatment cohort indicators with relative time dummies, omitting “forbidden” comparisons:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \sum_{k \neq -1} \beta_{g,k} \cdot (\mathbf{1}\{G_i = g\} \cdot \mathbf{1}\{K_{it} = k\}) + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (9)$$

where $K_{it} = t - G_i$ for treated units and $k = -1$ is the baseline period.

[Gardner \(2022\)](#) proposed a two-stage approach that directly estimates and removes the bias from treatment effects. In the first stage, the regression is estimated using only untreated observations (not-yet-treated and never-treated units):

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (10)$$

which yields clean estimates of unit and time fixed effects uncontaminated by treatment effects. In the second stage, the outcome variable is adjusted by subtracting the estimated fixed effects, and the treatment effect is estimated from the residualized outcome:

$$\tilde{y}_{it} = y_{it} - \hat{\alpha}_i - \hat{\lambda}_t = \beta D_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (11)$$

where $\tilde{y}_{it}$ is the residualized outcome. This approach avoids negative weighting altogether because treated units never serve as controls for other treated units. The Gardner estimator is computationally efficient and scales well to large datasets with many time periods and treatment cohorts.

The identifying assumption behind this methodology is the parallel trend based on cohort and timing. In other words, for each adoption cohort g and each post-treatment time $t \geq g$, the untreated potential outcome of cohort g evolves in parallel to that of a valid control group (e.g., never-treated or not-yet-treated by time t), conditional on covariates if needed.

Among the three staggered DiD estimators discussed here, the [Gardner \(2022\)](#) two-stage estimator is the most suited for settings where the intervention may be removed after its initial introduction. Unlike the [Callaway and Sant’Anna \(2021\)](#) and [Sun and Abraham \(2021\)](#) estimators, which rely on the “absorbing treatment” assumption (i.e., once treated, a unit remains treated for all subsequent periods), the Gardner approach residualizes the outcome variable using unit and time fixed effects estimated solely from untreated observations, and then regresses the cleaned outcome on a flexibly defined treatment indicator. This two-stage procedure allows the researcher to code the treatment variable D_{it} as turning “off” during periods when the policy is no longer in effect, thereby accommodating treatment reversal. Consequently, while the other three estimators are designed for permanent staggered adoption, the Gardner estimator provides a viable path for estimating causal effects when policies are both introduced and subsequently removed across different units and time periods.

4.2. Data

Rental brake is introduced at the municipal level. As of 2022, there were 10,786 municipalities in Germany, their territory and population sizes varying widely.


In Germany, two primary indicators capture construction activity: building permits and completed housing units. We focus on dwelling completions because these represent the actual amount of housing being built and not just the intentions to build. In addition, given that there are many observations with zero dwellings built, especially in small municipalities, we transform our dependent variable using the log-plus-one transformation:

$$\tilde{y}_{it} = \log(y_{it} + 1) \tag{12}$$

where y_{it} is the number of dwellings completed in municipality i in year t . Adding ones allows for handling zeros. The estimated coefficients, $\hat{\beta}$, can be interpreted as follows: The rental brake leads to a change in housing completions by approximately $100 \times (e^{\hat{\beta}} - 1)\%$.

A more disaggregated measure focuses on dwellings in multi-family houses (MFH) — buildings containing three or more units. This distinction is important because the share of dwellings in MFH is strongly correlated with the proportion of tenants in a municipality as Figure 4 shows.

Figure 4: Share of dwellings in MFH vs. tenant rate in German municipalities



Source: Population and Housing Census 2022 and own construction.

Note: The size of each dot is proportional to the housing stock of the region. The names of cities with a population exceeding one million are shown, along with the city that has the highest tenant rate.

The municipalities with the highest share of dwellings in multi-family housing also have the highest tenant rates — that is, the proportion of dwellings occupied by tenants. Hence, MFH

completions serve as a useful proxy for rental housing supply. Since the rental brake is a policy explicitly designed to protect tenants, its impact on the construction of rental housing is of central policy relevance.

Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the alternative measures of residential construction that we focus on in this study: number of completions of dwellings in residential buildings (Completions), number of completions of dwellings in multi-family residential buildings (Completions_MFH), number of completions of dwellings in residential buildings per 1000 inhabitants (Comple2Pop), and an indicator that relates the number of new dwellings in residential and non-residential buildings to the existing stock of dwellings in residential and non-residential buildings, with the resulting ratio multiplied by 1,000 (New_dwell2HStock). In addition, various transformations of the “raw” variables are considered: logarithm of completions (LCompletions and LCompletions_MFH), log-plus-one transformation (LP1Completions and LP1Completions_MFH), and percentage growth rates of completions (DLCompletions and DLCompletions_MFH).

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of construction measures

Variable	Mini- mum	Mean	Maxi- mum	Standard devia- tion	Number of obser- vations	Number of munici- palities
Completions	0	26.6	16,769	188.4	125,218	10,782
LP1Completions	0	2.1	9.7	1.3	125,218	10,782
LCompletions	0	2.0	9.7	1.5	120,312	10,613
DLCompletions	-566.3	1.8	590.0	94.9	97,474	9,834
Completions_MFH	0	21.0	15,376	195.6	88,446	10,733
LP1Completions_MFH	0	1.2	9.6	1.6	88,446	10,733
LCompletions_MFH	0	2.7	9.6	1.2	38,837	6,608
DLCompletions_MFH	-462.2	4.5	446.2	108.1	23,595	3,943
Comple2Pop	0	3.4	624.2	4.7	123,509	10,751
New_dwell2HStock	-133.7	7.0	597.6	8.4	156,740	10,752

It can be seen that the minimum number of completions is zero, while the maximum reaches 16,769 for all dwellings and 15,376 for dwellings in multi-family houses. The logarithm and

the log-plus-one transformation of completions yield quite similar results, though the latter retains more observations, particularly for MFH dwellings. The variable `New_dwell2HStock` has negative values because in some cases more dwellings are demolished than built. Descriptive statistics for growth rates are reported only for comparative purposes, to help understand the potential scale of the rental brake’s impact on housing completions.

Table 3 presents a comparison of municipalities with and without a rental brake based on data from the 2022 Population and Housing Census. For each group, the table reports average values of several important housing market characteristics.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics of key housing market characteristics in regions with and without rental brake


Variable	Without rental brake	With rental brake
Housing stock, housing units	5,103.6	11,178.3
Dwelling completions, housing units	30.6	76.3
Vacancy rate, %	5.3	3.4
Homeownership rate, %	59.8	50.9
Share of dwellings built before 2000, %	84.6	80.4
Share of dwellings owned by private persons, %	74.7	60.5
Floor area, m^2	109.0	102.7
Share of dwellings in MFH, %	35.3	50.6

Substantial differences exist between regions with and without a rental brake. Regions with a rental brake are characterized by a significantly larger housing stock, a greater number of dwelling completions, and a higher proportion of dwellings in multi-family houses. By contrast, municipalities without a rental brake exhibit markedly higher vacancy rates, homeownership rates, and shares of dwellings owned by private individuals. Although these regions also have larger and older housing stock, the differences along these dimensions are comparatively modest.

Our dataset covers 10733 municipalities for total completions and 10782 municipalities for completions of dwellings in MFH between 2010 and 2024. Figure 5 compares the dynamics of housing completions in regions with and without the rental brake. The analysis uses a

balanced panel of 335 *Kreise*, of which 148 have a rental brake in place.² For each group (with and without the rental brake), the total amount of construction is calculated and then converted into an index with 2014 as the base year.

Figure 5: Construction activity in regions with and without rental brake



Source: Destatis and own construction.

A common feature of all these graphs is that, two years after the introduction of the national rental brake law, the number of permits and completions in regions with the rental brake began

²For this figure, we employ data at the *Kreis* (county) level rather than the municipal level. This choice is driven by data availability: only 790 of Germany's approximately 11,000 municipalities have complete time series on housing completions spanning the entire study period. Restricting the sample to these 790 municipalities would likely yield a non-representative sample, as larger and more urban municipalities are overrepresented in the available data. Thus, we aggregate to the *Kreis* level to preserve a more balanced and comprehensive geographic coverage.

to stagnate. By contrast, they continued to increase in regions without a rental brake. In 2022, when energy prices and interest rates rose dramatically, building permits in both groups of regions dropped substantially.

5. Discussion of results

5.1. Basic results


We estimate treatment effects using the [Callaway and Sant’Anna \(2021\)](#) methodology as implemented in the **R** package *did* ([Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2021](#)). Standard errors are clustered at the *Kreise* (district) level and computed via the bootstrap. In Germany, there are 401 *Kreise*, which correspond to the NUTS 2 level of administrative division. We employ the dynamic specification to recover event-study coefficients.

To visualize the dynamics of treatment effects, we aggregate the estimated group-time average treatment effects (ATT) into event time (i.e., periods relative to treatment adoption); see, for example, Figure 6 for housing completions. The horizontal axis represents event time $e = t - g$, where g is the treatment adoption period of a given cohort (group of municipalities) and t is calendar year. Negative values denote pre-treatment periods, $e = 0$ marks the treatment period, and positive values indicate post-treatment periods.


The vertical axis shows the estimated average treatment effect for each event time, computed as a weighted average of $ATT(g, g + e)$ across all cohorts for which $g + e$ is observed. Pre-treatment coefficients ($e < 0$) serve as a test for parallel trends: under the identifying assumption, they should be close to zero and statistically insignificant. Post-treatment coefficients ($e \geq 0$) capture the dynamic causal effects of the policy, revealing whether the treatment effect emerges gradually, jumps immediately, or fades over time. Point estimates are shown with 95% confidence intervals based on the bootstrap, clustered at the *Kreise* level. Thus, this event-study plot provides both a diagnostic for pre-existing trends and a flexible description of treatment effect dynamics in a staggered DiD design.

Figure 6 presents event-study estimates of the dynamic effect of rental brake adoption on the log-plus-one transformation of housing completions in German municipalities. The upper panel reports results of all models for the total number of housing completions, while the lower panel reports results for the housing completions in multi-family housing.


Figure 6: Average treatment effects for total housing completions and completions of dwellings in MFH




(a): All completions: model of Callaway-Sant'Anna, control group: not yet treated




(b): All completions: model of Sun-Abraham




(c): All completions: model of Gardner



(d): Completions in MFH: model of Callaway-Sant'Anna, control group: not yet treated



(e): Completions in MFH: model of Sun-Abraham



(f): Completions in MFH: model of Gardner

In case of all housing completions and completions of dwellings in MFH, most post-introduction average treatment effects are negative and statistically significant. In case of completed dwellings in MFH, all models produce negative effects, but only the model of Sun-Abraham finds statistically significant event-study effects. Nevertheless, the overall ATTs are negative and statistically significant at least at 5% level as seen in Table 4. Although none of the individual post-event average treatment effects (ATTs) can be statistically significant on its own, the overall summary ATT can still be significant because it pools information across all post-treatment periods, thereby increasing statistical power. This is especially likely when effects are consistently positive or negative over time, even if each period’s estimate is too imprecise to reach significance individually. Thus, the significant overall ATT reflects a small but persistent average treatment effect that period-specific estimates are not sufficiently powered to detect.

Some pre-introduction effects, especially in the case of the Sun-Abraham model, turn out to be statistically significant. However, these pre-treatment effects are small in magnitude. Such isolated, small-magnitude significant effects do not violate the parallel trends assumption because the assumption requires parallel paths, not perfect point equality in every period. Small pre-trend deviations are unlikely to bias the post-treatment estimates meaningfully.


The empirical implication for our findings is straightforward. The significant positive pre-treatment coefficients produced by the Sun-Abraham estimator are unlikely to represent genuine violations of the parallel trends assumption. A more plausible interpretation is that they reflect mild contamination from post-treatment effect dynamics, combined with the estimator’s lower sampling variability, which renders such contamination statistically detectable. The Callaway-Sant’Anna estimator, by virtue of its more stringent construction and larger standard errors, correctly fails to classify these modest pre-period fluctuations as statistically significant. In the context of pre-trend testing, the Callaway-Sant’Anna results should be afforded greater weight, as its higher variance serves a conservative function: it reduces the risk of Type I errors (falsely rejecting parallel trends when they hold).

All three approaches produce statistically significant negative coefficients in the post-treatment period following the introduction of the rental brake, implying that the rental brake appears to lead to a deceleration in dwelling completions.


Figure 7 displays empirical estimates of the potential effect of the rental brake on the

completions of dwellings per 1000 inhabitants and net completions per 1000 dwellings in housing stock.


Figure 7: Average treatment effects for housing completions per 1000 inhabitants and net housing completions per 1000 dwellings in housing stock




(a): Completions per 1000 inhabitants: model of Callaway-Sant'Anna, control group: never treated




(b): Completions per 1000 inhabitants: model of Sun-Abraham




(c): Completions per 1000 inhabitants: model of Gardner



(d): Net completions per 1000 dwellings: model of Callaway-Sant'Anna, control group: never treated



(e): Net completions per 1000 dwellings: model of Sun-Abraham



(f): Net completions per 1000 dwellings: model of Gardner

The results are similar to those presented in Figure 6. All post-intervention event-study coefficients are negative. Under the [Callaway and Sant'Anna \(2021\)](#) model, neither the event-study ATTs nor the overall ATTs are statistically significant. By contrast, for the Sun-Abraham and Gardner models, both (at least some) event-study coefficients and the overall ATTs are statistically significant.

5.2. Robustness checks

As Table 3 shows, the control and treatment groups differ substantially in terms of their housing market characteristics. This heterogeneity may raise concerns about the reliability of our baseline results. Therefore, in this section, we consider alternative sample definitions to achieve greater homogeneity and reduce excessive volatility.

Exclusion of big cities. Regions subject to the rental brake are considerably larger and have a higher proportion of multi-family housing. To address this issue, we exclude metropolises. Specifically, we consider three alternative specifications: (1) excluding only Berlin, which, in addition to the rental brake, implemented a rental freeze during 2020–2021 (Hahn et al., 2024); (2) excluding seven major metropolises (Berlin, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt/Main, Hamburg, Munich, and Stuttgart); and (3) excluding all cities with a population exceeding 500,000 inhabitants. All three specifications produce qualitatively similar results. In what follows, we report only the results obtained for the third specification.


Figure 8 shows the municipalities split into four groups: 1) big cities with rental brake (light red); 2) smaller regions with rental brake (red); 3) big cities without rental brake (light gray); and 4) smaller regions without rental brake (gray).

Very few regions without rental brake have populations exceeding half a million. The number of metropolises with a rental brake is much larger.

Neighbors of regions with rental brake. Another way to test the robustness of the baseline estimation results is to focus only on the municipalities with rental brake and their immediate neighbors. The underlying assumption is that neighboring regions are more similar to those with a rental brake than regions farther away, making them more comparable. There are two main ways to define neighbors: 1) regions that share a common border with rental-brake regions, and the k nearest neighbors based on the distance between regional centroids. Figure 9 shows the municipalities with a rental brake and their neighbors determined based on five nearest neighbors approach. The rental-brake regions are shown in red, their neighbors in yellow, and all remaining regions (municipalities without a rental brake that are not neighbors) in gray.

We chose seven because a larger k would leave very few or no non-rental-brake regions as neighbors, while a smaller k risks omitting some true neighbors from the control group.


Figure 8: German municipalities with excluded big cities



Source: own construction.

Figure 9: German municipalities with a rental brake and their neighbors without rental brake

- Municipalities with rental brake
- Their neighbors
- Other municipalities



Source: own construction.

We also estimated a specification using neighbors defined as municipalities sharing a common border with rental-brake municipalities. The results were very similar to those based on the seven nearest neighbors and are therefore omitted for brevity.

Exclusion of municipalities with high homeownership rate. An important characteristic of the housing market is the homeownership rate. As shown in Figure 4, the tenant rate is strongly correlated with the proportion of dwellings in multi-family houses, which are more common in urban areas. Therefore, by focusing on municipalities with a relatively low homeownership rate (e.g., below 60%), we can concentrate on a more homogeneous group of municipalities that are more urban in nature. Figure 10 illustrates municipalities with and without rental brakes, additionally split into those with high and low homeownership rates.

Indeed, by imposing the restriction of a relatively low HOR, we exclude many rural areas, particularly those without a rental brake. In contrast, the number of municipalities with a rental brake and a low HOR is rather limited.


Exclusion of smaller municipalities. The exclusion of less populous municipalities serves to reduce volatility, as smaller municipalities tend to show sharp relative fluctuations in housing completion numbers from year to year. Figure 11 shows the differentiation between small and larger municipalities with and without a rental brake. A small municipality is defined as one with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants.

After excluding small municipalities, relatively few municipalities remain in our subsample.

Altogether, we analyze five different subsamples of municipalities: (1) the whole sample; (2) municipalities excluding cities with 500,000 inhabitants or more; (3) municipalities with a rental brake and their neighboring municipalities without a rental brake; (4) municipalities with low homeownership rates; and (5) municipalities with a population above 50,000.

Given that we use three estimators (Callaway-Sant’Anna, Sun-Abraham, and Gardner), four outcome variables of interest (total dwelling completions and completions of dwellings in multi-family houses, completions per 1000 inhabitants, and net completions per housing stock), and five samples, we estimated 60 different models. To save space, we report only the estimated overall average treatment effects in Table 4 and do not show the event-study graphs. These graphs are available upon request.


Figure 10: German municipalities with low and high homeownership rate



Source: own construction.

Figure 11: Small German municipalities with and without rental brake

- Municipalities with rental brake
- Small municipalities with rental brake
- Municipalities without rental brake
- Small municipalities without rental brake



Source: own construction.

Table 4: Estimation results of staggered DiD models for municipal data: overall average treatment effect on the treated

Model specification	Log-plus-one transformation of completions of dwellings	Log-plus-one transformation of completions of dwellings in MFH	Completions per 1000 inhabitants	Net completions per 1000 dwellings in stock
Callaway-SantAnna (control group: never treated)				
whole sample	-0.475***	-0.917**	-1.107	-2.043
without metropolises (population exceeding half million)	-0.476***	-0.916***	-1.114	-2.051
neighbors only (7 nearest neighbors)	-0.137**	-0.503***	-0.489*	-0.830*
municipalities with low HOR (below 60%)	-0.312***	-0.698***	-0.618**	-1.015*
without small municipalities (population less than 50000)	-0.460***	-0.819***	-1.061***	-1.924**
Sun-Abraham				
whole sample	-0.296***	-0.633***	-1.330***	-2.092***
without metropolises (population exceeding half million)	-0.298***	-0.623***	-1.335***	-2.100***
neighbors only (7 nearest neighbors)	-0.109***	-0.486***	-0.490***	-0.692**
municipalities with low HOR (below 60%)	-0.194***	-0.487***	-0.753***	-1.130***
without small municipalities (population less than 50000)	-0.291***	-0.525***	-1.290***	-1.990***
Gardner				
whole sample	-0.109**	-0.408**	-0.471**	-1.564**
without metropolises (population exceeding half million)	-0.115**	-0.402**	-0.479**	-1.784**
neighbors only (7 nearest neighbors)	-0.039**	-0.313**	-0.219**	-0.630**
municipalities with low HOR (below 60%)	-0.104**	-0.377**	-0.306**	-0.853**
without small municipalities (population less than 50000)	-0.133**	-0.379**	-0.515**	-1.645**

Note: ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

All in all, average treatment effects are negative and most are statistically significant. Only certain specifications of the Callaway-Sant’Anna method for ratios of completions to population and housing stock yield statistically insignificant results. The effects of the rental brake on completions of apartments appear to be stronger than those on total completions across different models and specifications. This may be related to the higher volatility of construction in multi-family housing. It may also serve as a warning to policymakers, since the vast majority of apartments are homes for tenants — the very group rent control is intended to protect.

The smallest ATTs are found for the subsample that includes only municipalities with rent control and their immediate neighbors as the control group. Due to their geographical proximity, these regions are likely more similar to one another, offering a better control group. This suggests that such conservative estimates may be the most accurate. For this specification, the ATTs for total completions range from -0.039 to -0.137, corresponding to a reduction in construction of 3.8% to 12.8%. For completions of flats, the ATTs range from -0.313 to -0.503 (26.9% to 39.5% reduction). In terms of ratios, the effects vary from -0.219 to -0.490 dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants for completions relative to population, and from -0.630 to -0.830 dwellings (newly built minus demolished) per 1,000 dwellings in the housing stock. In a city with 100,000 inhabitants, this corresponds to an annual decline in completions of 219–490 units and 315–415 units, respectively.

6. Conclusion

This study examines the impact of Germany’s rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) on residential housing construction, employing staggered difference-in-differences methodologies to address the challenges posed by the policy’s phased introduction across municipalities between 2015 and 2025. Our analysis yields several important findings.

First, using the [Callaway and Sant’Anna \(2021\)](#), [Sun and Abraham \(2021\)](#), and [Gardner \(2022\)](#) estimators, we find consistent evidence that the introduction of the rental brake significantly reduced housing completions in German municipalities. Across multiple estimators, the overall average treatment effects on the treated are negative and statistically significant, with total completions declining by 4% to 13% and completions in multi-family housing falling

by 27% to 40%. The effects are particularly pronounced for apartments, which constitute the majority of rental housing, raising potential concerns about unintended consequences for the very tenants the policy aims to protect. Although the estimated magnitudes vary considerably across methods, the direction of the effect is unambiguous: the rental brake appears to have slowed new housing construction in treated municipalities.

Second, our robustness checks confirm that the results are not driven by Germany’s largest metropolitan areas, including Berlin—which simultaneously experienced a temporal first-generation rent freeze—nor by the inherent differences between treated and untreated regions. Restricting the analysis to neighbors of rental-brake districts or excluding cities with homeownership rate exceeding 60% yields qualitatively similar findings. Municipal-level analyses, while noisier due to higher data volatility, largely corroborate the district-level results, particularly under the Sun–Abraham specification.

Third, the finding that second-generation rent controls—designed explicitly to exempt new construction —nevertheless exert a negative influence on housing supply has important policy implications. The most plausible mechanism is not direct rent restriction on new buildings (which remain exempt) but rather increased regulatory uncertainty. The heated political debate surrounding the extension of the rental brake and proposed changes to the exemption cutoff year (from 2014 to 2019) signaled to investors that exemptions cannot be taken as permanent. Forward-looking investors consequently demand higher risk premia, rendering some projects unprofitable and reducing the likelihood of new construction. This interpretation aligns with the delayed effect pattern observed in our event studies. Another explanation would be that the rental brakes caused a widening gap between rents in new and existing buildings, thereby reducing the likelihood of finding tenants for newly built apartments. Consequently, construction activity is dampened and focuses on buildings with high quality standards, as these high quality standards do not compete with existing stock.

Fourth, our findings contribute to the broader international literature on rent regulation. While meta-analyses have shown that approximately 45% of studies on second-generation rent controls find negative construction effects, our causal evidence from Germany strengthens the case that even well-designed rent regulations with new-construction exemptions can have unintended supply-side consequences. The German experience suggests that the credibility of the

exemption — both its duration and its political stability — is as important as the exemption’s nominal scope.

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A. Appendix

Table A1: Legal acts regulating rental brake in Germany

Date	Title of legal act	Source	Application sphere	Description of regulation
2015-04-21	Gesetz zur Dämpfung des Miethanstiegs auf angespannten Wohnungsmärkten und zur Stärkung des Bestellerprinzips bei der Wohnungsvermittlung (MietNovG)	BGBI, 610	Region: Germany. Exceptions: 1) not applicable if dwellings are used and let for the first time after October 1, 2014; 2) not applicable for the first letting after an extensive modernization.	Introduction of rental brake. Setting: the rent for a dwelling located in an area with a tight housing market (angespannter Wohnungsmarkt) can be at most 10% higher than the typical local rent. Federal states are empowered to establish such areas for a period of at most 5 years. Criteria for tight market: 1) local rents grow faster than at the national level; 2) local average rent-to-income ratio is significantly higher than the national average; 3) population grows, whereas new housing construction does not create enough dwellings; or 4) vacancy rate is small, while demand is high. Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2015-04-28	Verordnung zur zulässigen Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn gemäß § 556d Absatz 2 BGB	Berlin GVBl. 2015, 101	Region: Berlin.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2015-06-23	Verordnung über die Einführung einer Mietpreisbegrenzung nach § 556d des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs	HmbGVBl. 2015, 122	Region: Hamburg.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2015-06-23	Verordnung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Mietpreisbegrenzung vom 23. Juni 2015	GV. NRW., 489	Region: North Rhine-Westphalia. Settlements: 22 municipalities. Validity: This regulation enters into force on July 1, 2015. It expires on June 30, 2020.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2015-07-14	Mietpreisbremsverordnung vom 14. Juli 2015	GVBl. Bayern 2015, 250	Region: Bavaria. Settlements: 144 municipalities. Validity: This regulation takes effect on August 1, 2015.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2015-09-28	Landesverordnung über die Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Mietpreisbegrenzung nach § 556 d des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs vom 28. September 2015	GVBl. für das Land Rheinland-Pfalz 2015, 264	Region: Rhineland-Palatinate. Settlements: 3 municipalities: Landau in der Pfalz, Mainz, and Trier. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on the day following its promulgation and shall expire on October 7, 2020.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2015-09-29	Verordnung der Landesregierung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Begrenzung der zulässigen Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn vom 29. September 2015	Gesetzblatt für Baden-Württemberg, 2015, Nr. 18, 852	Region: Baden-Württemberg. Settlements: 68 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on the first day of the month following its promulgation. It shall expire after five years.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2015-11-10	Verordnung zur Festlegung des Anwendungsbereichs bundesrechtlicher Mieterschutzvorschriften vom 10. November 2015	GVBl. Bayern 2015, 398	Region: Bavaria. Settlements: 144 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on January 1, 2016, and shall expire on July 31, 2020.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) extension. Capping limit (Kappungsgrenze) extension.
2015-11-11	Landesverordnung über die zulässige Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn	GVOBl. Schl.-H. S. 402	Region: Schleswig-Holstein. Settlements: 12 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on the first day of the month following its promulgation. It shall expire on November 30, 2020.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2015-11-17	Verordnung über die zulässige Miethöhe gemäß § 556d Absatz 2 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs	GVBl., 512	Region: Bremen.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2015-11-17	Hessische Verordnung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit angespannten Wohnungsmärkten im Sinne des § 556d Abs. 2 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs	GVBl. für das Land Hessen, 397	Region: Hesse. Settlements: 16 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on the day following its promulgation. It shall expire on June 30, 2019.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.

Table A1: continued...

Date	Title of legal act	Source	Application sphere	Description of regulation
2015-12-08	Verordnung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Mietpreisbegrenzung vom 8. Dezember 2015	GVBl. für das Land Brandenburg II, Nr. 65	Region: Brandenburg. Settlements: 31 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on January 1, 2016, and shall expire on December 31, 2020.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2016-03-10	Thüringer Verordnung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Mietpreisbegrenzung nach § 556d BGB vom 10. März 2016	GVBl. für den Freistaat Thüringen 2016, 166	Region: Thuringia. Settlements: Erfurt and Jena.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2016-11-08	Verordnung zur Festlegung des Anwendungsbereichs bundesrechtlicher Mieterschutzvorschriften vom 8. November 2016	Nds. GVBl. Nr. 17/2016	Region: Lower Saxony. Settlements for rental brake, capping limit, and eviction term: 19 municipalities. Validity: enacted on Dec. 1, 2016 and ends on Nov. 30, 2021.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction. Capping limit (Kappungsgrenze) introduction.
2018-06-23	Verordnung über die Einführung einer Mietpreisbegrenzung nach § 556d des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs vom 23. Juni 2020	HmbGVBl. 2020, S. 341	Region: Hamburg. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on July 1, 2020, and shall expire on June 30, 2025.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2018-09-13	Landesverordnung zur Bestimmung von Gebieten nach § 556d und § 558 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches vom 13. September 2018	GVOBl. M-V 2018, 359	Region: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Settlements for rental brake and capping limit: Rostock and Greifswald. Validity: This regulation enters into force on October 1, 2018, and expires on September 30, 2023.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction. Capping limit (Kappungsgrenze) introduction.
2019-03-28	Verordnung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Mietpreisbegrenzung vom 28. März 2019	GVBl. für das Land Brandenburg II/19, [Nr. 25]	Region: Brandenburg. Settlements: 31 municipalities. Validity: This ordinance shall enter into force on January 1, 2016, and shall expire on December 31, 2020. At the same time, the Mietpreisbegrenzungsverordnung vom 8. Dezember 2015 (GVBl. II Nr. 65) shall expire.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) re-introduction.
2019-06-11	Hessische Verordnung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit angespannten Wohnungsmärkten im Sinne des § 556d Abs. 2 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs vom 11. Juni 2019	Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für das Land Hessen, S. 78	Region: Hesse. Settlements: 31 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on the day following its promulgation. It shall expire at the end of November 26, 2020.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2019-07-16	Verordnung zur Festlegung des Anwendungsbereichs bundesrechtlicher Mieterschutzvorschriften vom 16. Juli 2019	GVBl. S. 458, 552 / BayRS 400-6-J	Region: Bavaria. Settlements: 163 municipalities for rental brake, capping limit, and extended eviction term. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on August 7, 2019 and shall expire on December 31, 2021.	Rental brake (Kappungsgrenze) prolongation. Capping limit (Kappungsgrenze) prolongation.
2019-09-19	Landesverordnung über die Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Mietpreisbegrenzung nach § 556 d des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs vom 19. September 2019	GVBl. für das Land Rheinland-Pfalz 2019, 283	Region: Rhineland-Palatinate. Settlements: 4 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on the day following its promulgation and shall expire on October 7, 2020.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2019-11-11	Landesverordnung zur Aufhebung der Mietpreisverordnung Schleswig-Holstein vom 11. November 2019	GVOBl. Schl.-H. S. 528	Region: Schleswig-Holstein. Validity: This regulation enters into force on December 1, 2019.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) revocation.
2020-03-19	Gesetz zur Verlängerung und Verbesserung der Regelungen über die zulässige Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn	BGBI, 540	Region: Germany. Validity: MietNovG of 2015 prolonged until Dec. 31, 2025.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.

Table A1: continued...

Date	Title of legal act	Source	Application sphere	Description of regulation
2020-05-19	Verordnung zur zulässigen Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn gemäß § 556d Absatz 2 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs	Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt Berlin 2020, 24, 343	Region: Berlin. Validity: This regulation enters into force on June 1, 2020, and expires on May 31, 2025.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2020-05-26	Verordnung der Landesregierung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Begrenzung der zulässigen Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn vom 26. Mai 2020	Gesetzblatt für Baden-Württemberg, 2020, Nr. 17	Region: Baden-Württemberg. Settlements: 89 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on the day following its promulgation. At the same time, the Mietpreisbegrenzungsverordnung Baden-Württemberg vom 29. September 2015 (GBl. 2015, S. 852) shall be repealed. This regulation shall expire on October 31, 2020.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2020-06-09	Verordnung zur Festlegung des Anwendungsbereichs bundesrechtlicher Mieterschutzvorschriften im Land Nordrhein-Westfalen	Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt (GV. NRW.) 2020 Nr. 26 vom 30.6.2020 Seite 455 bis 512	Region: North Rhine-Westphalia. Settlements for rental brake, capping limit, and eviction term: 18 municipalities. Validity: This regulation enters into force on July 1, 2020, and expires on June 30, 2025.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2020-08-18	Landesverordnung über die Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Mietpreisbegrenzung nach § 556 d des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs vom 18. August 2020	GVBl. für das Land Rheinland-Pfalz 2020, 357	Region: Rhineland-Palatinate. Settlements: 5 municipalities. Validity: This regulation enters into force on October 8, 2020, and expires on October 7, 2025.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2020-10-06	Verordnung der Landesregierung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Begrenzung der zulässigen Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn vom 6. Oktober 2020	GBl. 2020, 803	Region: Baden-Württemberg. Settlements: 89 municipalities.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2020-11-03	Verordnung über die zulässige Miethöhe gemäß § 556d Absatz 2 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs vom 3. November 2020	Brem.GBl. 2020, S. 1335	Region: Bremen. Validity: This regulation enters into force on December 1, 2020. This regulation expires at the end of November 30, 2025.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2020-11-18	Verordnung zur Bestimmung des Geltungsbereichs der bundesrechtlichen Mieterschutzvorschriften vom 18. November 2020	GVBl. Hessen 2020, 802	Region: Hesse. Settlements: 49 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on the day following its promulgation. It shall expire at the end of November 25, 2026.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2020-12-22	Verordnung zur Festlegung des Anwendungsbereichs bundesrechtlicher Mieterschutzvorschriften vom 22. Dezember 2020	Nds. GVBl. Nr. 49/2020	Region: Lower Saxony. Settlements for rental brake, capping limit, and eviction term: 18 municipalities. Validity: enacted on January 1, 2021 and ends on December 31, 2025.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2021-01-14	Thüringer Verordnung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Mietpreisbegrenzung nach § 556d BGB vom 14. Januar 2021	GVBl. für den Freistaat Thüringen 2021, 13	Region: Thuringia. Settlements: Erfurt and Jena. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on February 1, 2021, and shall expire on December 31, 2025.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.

Table A1: continued...

Date	Title of legal act	Source	Application sphere	Description of regulation
2021-06-08	Verordnung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Mietpreisbegrenzung	Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für das Land Brandenburg II — 2021, Nr. 32	Region: Brandenburg. Settlements: 19 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on January 1, 2021, and shall expire on December 31, 2025.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2021-12-14	Verordnung zur Festlegung des Anwendungsbereichs bundesrechtlicher Mieterschutzvorschriften vom 14. Dezember 2021	BayMBL. 2021 Nr. 944 vom 22.12.2021, GVBl. 2021, 674	Region: Bavaria. Settlements: 203 municipalities for rental brake, capping limit, and eviction term.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse), capping limit (Kappungsgrenze), and eviction term (Kündigungssperrfrist) extension.
2022-05-31	Verordnung der Sächsischen Staatsregierung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Begrenzung der zulässigen Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn	SächsGVBl. 2022, 398	Region: Saxony. Settlements: Dresden and Leipzig. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on the day following its promulgation and shall expire on December 31, 2025.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2022-06-08	Landesverordnung über die Bestimmung von Gebieten mit angespanntem Wohnungsmarkt nach § 201a des Baugesetzbuchs vom 8. Juni 2022	GVBl. für das Land Rheinland-Pfalz 2022, 224	Region: Rhineland-Palatinate. Settlements: 5 municipalities. This regulation shall enter into force on the day following its promulgation and shall expire on December 31, 2026.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) introduction.
2023-08-26	Landesverordnung zur Bestimmung von Gebieten nach § 556d und § 558 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs vom 26. August 2023	GVOBl. M-V 2023, 723	Region: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Settlements: Rostock and Greifswald. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on October 1, 2023, and shall expire on September 30, 2028.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) and capping limit (Kappungsgrenze) prolongation.
2024-12-20	Verordnung zur Festlegung des Anwendungsbereichs bundesrechtlicher Mieterschutzvorschriften vom 20. Dezember 2024	Niedersächsisches Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt Nr. 122	Region: Lower Saxony. Settlements for rental brake 58 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on January 1, 2025. It shall expire on December 31, 2031.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) and capping limit (Kappungsgrenze) prolongation.
2025-01-28	Verordnung zur Festlegung des Anwendungsbereiches bundesrechtlicher Mieterschutzvorschriften im Land Nordrhein-Westfalen vom 28. Januar 2025	GV. NRW. S. 111	Region: North Rhine-Westphalia. Settlements: 57 municipalities. Validity: This ordinance shall enter into force on March 1, 2025. At the same time, the Mieterschutzverordnung vom 9. Juni 2020 (GV. NRW. S. 465) shall be repealed. In all other respects, this ordinance shall expire on February 28, 2030.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2025-07-17	Gesetz zur Änderung der Regelungen über die zulässige Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn und zur Änderung anderer Gesetze vom 17. Juli 2025	BGBI Teil I 2025 Nr. 163	Region: Germany. Validity: This law shall take effect on the day following its promulgation. MietNovG of 2015 prolonged until December 31, 2029.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2025-06-10	Verordnung zur zulässigen Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn gemäß § 556d Absatz 2 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs	HmbGVBl. 2025, 21	Region: Hamburg. This regulation shall enter into force on July 1, 2025, and shall expire on December 31, 2025.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2025-06-24	Verordnung der Landesregierung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Begrenzung der zulässigen Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn vom 24. Juni 2025	Gesetzblatt für Baden-Württemberg, 2025, Nr. 55	Region: Baden-Württemberg. Settlements: 89 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on July 1, 2025, and shall expire on December 31, 2025.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2025-09-16	Landesverordnung über die Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Mietpreisbegrenzung nach § 556d des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs vom 16. September 2025	GVBl. für das Land Rheinland-Pfalz 2025, 538	Region: Rhineland-Palatinate. Settlements: 7 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on October 8, 2025, and shall expire on December 31, 2029.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.

Table A1: continued...

Date	Title of legal act	Source	Application sphere	Description of regulation
2025-11-11	Verordnung zur zulässigen Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn gemäß § 556d Absatz 2 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs	Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für Berlin Nr. 34 vom 28. November 2025	Region: Berlin. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on October 8, 2025, and shall expire on December 31, 2029.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2025-11-18	Verordnung über die zulässige Miethöhe gemäß § 556d Absatz 2 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs	Gesetzblatt der Freien Hansestadt Bremen Nr. 127	Region: Bremen. Settlements: city of Bremen. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on December 1, 2025. This regulation shall expire on December 31, 2029.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2025-11-25	Verordnung zur zulässigen Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn nach § 556d des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs vom 18. November 2025	HmbGVBl. 2025, 41	Region: Hamburg. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on January 1, 2026, and shall expire on December 31, 2029.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2025-12-02	Mietpreisbegrenzungs-verordnung vom 2. Dezember 2025	SächsGVBl. 2025 S. 454	Region: Saxony. Settlements: Dresden and Leipzig. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on January 1, 2026. This regulation shall expire on June 30, 2027.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2025-12-03	Verordnung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Mietpreisbegrenzung gemäß § 556d Absatz 2 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs	Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für das Land Brandenburg II — 2025, Nr. 95	Region: Brandenburg. Settlements: 36 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on January 1, 2026, and shall expire on December 31, 2029.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2025-12-09	Erste Verordnung zur Änderung der Thüringer Mietpreisbegrenzungsverordnung vom 9. Dezember 2025	Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für den Freistaat Thüringen Nr. 14	Region: Thuringia. Validity: until December 31, 2027.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2025-12-16	Verordnung der Landesregierung zur Bestimmung der Gebiete mit Begrenzung der zulässigen Miethöhe bei Mietbeginn	Gesetzblatt für Baden-Württemberg, 2025, Nr. 144	Region: Baden-Württemberg. Settlements: 130 municipalities. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on January 1, 2026, and shall expire on December 31, 2026.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) prolongation.
2025-12-16	Verordnung zur Festlegung des Anwendungsbereichs bundesrechtlicher Mieterschutzvorschriften vom 16. Dezember 2025	BayMBI. 2025 Nr. 24, 718	Region: Bavaria. Settlements: 285 municipalities for rental brake, capping limit, and eviction term. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on January 1, 2026, and shall expire on December 31, 2029.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) and capping limit (Kappungsgrenze) prolongation and extension.
2026-02-28	Landesverordnung zur Bestimmung von Gebieten nach § 556d und § 558 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches in der Küstenregion Mecklenburg-Vorpommerns vom 28. Februar 2026	GVOBl. M-V 2026, 142	Region: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Settlements: 8 municipalities for rental brake and capping limit. Validity: This regulation shall enter into force on the day following its promulgation. This regulation shall expire at the end of March 18, 2031.	Rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) and capping limit (Kappungsgrenze) prolongation and extension.

Table A2: Municipalities where the rental brake was removed

Municipality	Code	Federal state	Date of removal	Number of regime changes
Altbach	081165006004	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Asperg	081180003	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Bad Säckingen	083375005096	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Baienfurt	084365005011	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Brühl	082260009	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Dossenheim	082260012	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Durmersheim	082165003009	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Edingen-Neckarhausen	082260105	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen	082150102	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Eppelheim	082260018	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Freiberg am Neckar	081185004078	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Heitersheim	083155006050	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Hemsbach	082265003031	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Iffezheim	082165005023	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Kirchentellinsfurt	084160022	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Leimen	082260041	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Linkenheim-Hochstetten	082150105	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Neuhausen auf den Fildern	081160047	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Pfinztal	082150101	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Plochingen	081165006056	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Rastatt	08216043	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Ravensburg	084365005064	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Remchingen	082360071	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Renningen	081150041	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Rheinstetten	082150108	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Rielasingen-Worblingen	083355005100	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Sandhausen	082260076	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Steinen	083360084	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Stutensee	082150109	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Teningen	083165003043	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Tettnang	084355006057	Baden-Württemberg	2020-06-04	2
Bad Heilbrunn	091730111	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Greiling	091735109127	Bavaria	2016-01-01	2
Icking	091730130	Bavaria	2016-01-01	3
Ainring	091720111	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Bayerisch Gmain	091720115	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Freilassing	091720118	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Piding	091720128	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Hilgertshausen-Tandern	091740147	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Schwabhausen	091740143	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Weichs	091740151	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Moosach	091755114128	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Großmehring	091760129	Bavaria	2016-01-01	2
Lenting	091760143	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Allershausen	091785127113	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Fahrenzhausen	091780123	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Haag a.d.Amper	091785130129	Bavaria	2016-01-01	2
Kranzberg	091780137	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Langenbach	091780138	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Marzling	091780140	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Moosburg a.d.Isar	091780143	Bavaria	2016-01-01	3
Wolfersdorf	091785130156	Bavaria	2016-01-01	2
Zolling	091785130	Bavaria	2016-01-01	3
Egenhofen	091790117	Bavaria	2016-01-01	2
Schöngesing	091795132147	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Türkenfeld	091790149	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2

Table A2: continued...

Municipality	Code	Federal state	Date of removal	Number of regime changes
Eresing	091815144118	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Valley	091820133	Bavaria	2016-01-01	2
Waakirchen	091820134	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Waldkraiburg	091830148	Bavaria	2016-01-01	2
Reichertshofen	091865158	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Chiemsee	091875160123	Bavaria	2016-01-01	2
Surberg	091890148	Bavaria	2016-01-01	2
Bernried am Starnberger See	091900115	Bavaria	2016-01-01	2
Altdorf	092740113	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Neutraubling	093750174	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Bayreuth	09462	Bavaria	2016-01-01	3
Buckenhof	095725514120	Bavaria	2016-01-01	2
Goldbach	096710121	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Gerbrunn	096790136	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Oberstauften	097800132	Bavaria	2016-01-01	2
Erdweg	091740118	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Neuching	091775124131	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Oberding	091775123	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Zirndorf	095730134	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Hebertshausen	091740122	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Röhrmoos	091740141	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Vierkirchen	091740150	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Nassenfels	091765118149	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Finsing	091770118	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Emmering	091790119	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Garmisch-Partenkirchen	091800117	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Oberammergau	091800125	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Spatzenhausen	091805137133	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Bergen	091895166113	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Deggendorf	092710119	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Dingolfing	092790112	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Elsendorf	092735219163	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Kirchdorf	092735218139	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Gerzen	092745223135	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Bergtheim	096795645117	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Kleinrinderfeld	096790155	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Kürnach	096790156	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Uettingen	096795649196	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Unterpleichfeld	096790201	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Waldbrunn	096790204	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Kaufbeuren	09762	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Hopferau	097775756135	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Bad Wörishofen	097780116	Bavaria	2022-01-01	2
Potsdam	12054	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Ahrensfelde	120600005	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Bernau bei Berlin	120600020	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Panketal	120600181	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Werneuchen	120600280	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Eichwalde	120610112	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Königs Wusterhausen	120610260	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Schönefeld	120610433	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Schulzendorf	120610444	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Wildau	120610540	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Zeuthen	120610572	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Dallgow-Döberitz	120630056	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Falkensee	120630080	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3

Table A2: continued...

Municipality	Code	Federal state	Date of removal	Number of regime changes
Hoppegarten	120640227	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Neuenhagen bei Berlin	120640336	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Petershagen/Eggersdorf	120640380	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Birkenwerder	120650036	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Glienicke/Nordbahn	120650096	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Hennigsdorf	120650136	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Hohen Neuendorf	120650144	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Mühlenbecker Land	120650225	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Oranienburg	120650256	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Velten	120650332	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Erkner	120670124	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Schöneiche bei Berlin	120670440	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Kleinmachnow	120690304	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Nuthetal	120690454	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Teltow	120690616	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Blankenfelde-Mahlow	120720017	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Großbeeren	120720120	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	3
Rangsdorf	120720340	Brandenburg	2021-01-01	2
Hattersheim am Main	064360005	Hesse	2020-11-26	2
Kassel	06611	Hesse	2020-11-26	2
Kronberg im Taunus	064340006	Hesse	2019-07-01	2
Oberursel (Taunus)	064340008	Hesse	2020-11-26	2
Hofheim am Taunus	064360007	Hesse	2020-11-26	2
Leer (Ostfriesland)	034570013	Lower Saxony	2021-01-01	2
Vechta	034600009	Lower Saxony	2021-01-01	2
Aachen	053340002	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Bielefeld	05711	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Bocholt	055540008	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Brühl	053620012	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Erkrath	051580004	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Frechen	053620024	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Hürth	053620028	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Kleve	051540036	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Langenfeld (Rhld.)	051580020	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Leverkusen	05316	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Meerbusch	051620022	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Monheim am Rhein	051580026	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Neuss	051620024	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Paderborn	057740032	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Ratingen	051580028	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Sankt Augustin	053820056	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Troisdorf	053820068	North Rhine-Westphalia	2020-07-01	2
Barsbüttel	010620009	Schleswig-Holstein	2019-12-02	2
Glinde	010620018	Schleswig-Holstein	2019-12-02	2
Halstenbek	010560018	Schleswig-Holstein	2019-12-02	2
Hörnum	010545439046	Schleswig-Holstein	2019-12-02	2
Kampen	010545439061	Schleswig-Holstein	2019-12-02	2
Kiel	01002	Schleswig-Holstein	2019-12-02	2
List	010545439078	Schleswig-Holstein	2019-12-02	2
Norderstedt	010600063	Schleswig-Holstein	2019-12-02	2
Sylt	010540168	Schleswig-Holstein	2019-12-02	2
Wennigstedt-Braderup	010545439149	Schleswig-Holstein	2019-12-02	2
Wentorf bei Hamburg	010530129	Schleswig-Holstein	2019-12-02	2
Wyk auf Föhr	010545488164	Schleswig-Holstein	2019-12-02	2