



Determinants of Global Oil Production –
Empirical Evidence for more than short
run Cartel Rent Maximization

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- 1. Introduction
- 2. Data and Methodology
- 3. Results and Discussion
- 4. Conclusions



Motivation

- Crude oil production and prices are key economic variables, but understanding of their interaction over time and for different producers is incomplete
- We analyze the dynamic response of crude oil output to past prices and other important control variables
- Disentangle determinants of global oil production by major country groups and on individual country level
 - OPEC, OECD and non-OECD/non-OPEC production
 - Individual country analysis
- Address methodological issues in the literature
- Isolate price effect more clearly than the literature does



State of the Literature

- Two major streams: models evaluating consequences of physical attributes/exhaustibility and tests of strategic producer behavior
- Physical attributes:
 - Hotelling (1931): resource exhaustibility
 - Hubbard (1956): oil depletion
 - Results are sensitive to assumptions
- Strategic behavior:
 - Griffin (1985): empirical testing of popular hypotheses: Cartel behavior, competitive behavior, revenue targeting
 - No thorough dynamic analysis exists
 - Methodological issues call into question validity of results
- We analyze the determinants of output, without specifically testing hypotheses



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


Data

- Comprehensive country-level dataset at (mostly) monthly frequency
 - Global oil production
 - WTI oil price
 - Real economic activity/aggregate global demand
 - Baltic Dry Index (monthly averages of daily data)
 - Investment in oil production capacity
 - Rig count (Baker Hughes Inc.)
 - Institutional quality
 - Six indicators from World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
 - Voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption



Descriptive Analysis



OECD: stable and slightly declining trend, with sharp movements

OPEC: appears to mirror development in oil price, with a certain delay

Non-OECD/non-OPEC: smoothly increasing, broadly in line with trend in price

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1:

Crude oil output responds to prices and other control variables over a range of lags from the short to the long term.

Hypothesis 2:

The response is heterogeneous among the three main groups of countries, OPEC, OECD and non-OECD/non-OPEC, as well as on the level of individual countries.



Methodology

- Address stationarity issue by applying Hodrick-Prescott-Filter (HP) to all variables
- Two-step estimation strategy:
 - 1. Auxiliary regressions of real activity and rig count on prices
 - Purge price effect from proxies for investment and real activity

$$RIG_{t,i} = \alpha_i + \sum_{s=0}^{S} \beta_{s,i}WTI_{t-s} + \varepsilon_{t,i}$$

$$BDI_t = \varphi + \sum_{s=0}^{S} \gamma_s WTI_{t-s} + \mu_t$$

2. Main regression using residuals from auxiliary regressions

$$Q_{t,i} = \omega_i + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \delta_{k,i} WTI_{t-k} + \sum_{l=1}^{L} \theta_{l,i} \overline{I}_{t-k,i} + \sum_{m=1}^{M} \tau_{m,i} \overline{REAL}_{t-m} + \Psi_i INST_{t,i} + \eta_{t,i}$$

Clearer identification of effect of prices on quantities



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


Role of Prices: Group Level

			No controls	S		All control	s	- -
		(1)	(2)	(3) non-OECD/	(4)	(5)	(6) non-OECD/	
		OPEC	OECD	non-OPEC	OPEC	OECD	non-OPEC	
	Real WTI Price, monthly average (-1)	-0.0253*	-0.0189	-0.00508	0.00543	-0.000294	-0.00119	_
		(0.039)	(0.081)	(0.354)	(0.607)	(0.975)	(0.856)	
	Real WTI Price, monthly average (-2)	0.0507**	-0.00157	-0.00222	0.0801*	-0.0122	-0.00974	
		(0.004)	(0.941)	(0.748)	(0.018)	(0.169)	(0.316)	
	Real WTI Price, quarterly average (-1)	0.000891	-0.00372	0.00878*	0.0389	-0.0777**	0.0225	
		(0.963)	(0.676)	(0.016)	(0.247)	(0.002)	(0.082)	
	Real WTI Price, quarterly average (-2)	-0.0472	0.0391***	-0.0136*	0.0623	0.0618*	-0.0155	
	5 1 TYPE 5 1 (A)	(0.069)	(0.001)	(0.033)	(0.393)	(0.020)	(0.601)	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Revenue 4	Real WTI Price, quarterly average (-3)	0.0473***	-0.0157	0.00255	0.0716	-0.0557	0.0197*	Competitive
ive veline		(0.001) -0.186***	(0.265) 0.0715**	(0.815) -0.0211	(0.222)	(0.061)	(0.020)	•
targeting	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-1)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.079)	0.379 (0.297)	0.00130 (0.993)	0.0503 (0.419)	
targeting	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-2)	-0.419***	0.0974**	-0.0585***	0.357	-0.157	0.0131	
	Real W II I fice, yearly average (-2)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.202)	(0.263)	(0.875)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-3)	-0.288***	0.179***	-0.0650***	0.404	-0.448	-0.140	
	ical Willing, yearly average (3)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.222)	(0.099)	(0.167)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-4)	-0.355***	0.153***	-0.0613**	-0.0537	-0.602*	-0.261	
	··, y, ug- (·/	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.780)	(0.035)	(0.333)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-5)	-0.103*	0.146***	-0.0164	-0.0489	-0.778 [*]	-0.201	
		(0.043)	(0.000)	(0.393)	(0.858)	(0.041)	(0.335)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-6)	-0.0238	0.0411	0.0302	-0.740*	-0.905**	-0.492	
		(0.674)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.032)	(0.008)	(0.098)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-7)	0.188**	0.0572*	0.0806***	-0.398	-0.770*	0.00326	
		(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.000)	(0.053)	(0.025)	(0.981)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-8)	0.213***	-0.0875*	0.113***	-0.467**	-0.329	-0.158	
	D INTER 1 (0)	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.082)	(0.137)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-9)	0.0601**	-0.0232	0.0998***	-0.0513	-0.227*	0.0542	
	Constant	(0.001) -0.0148***	(0.282) 0.0077 0 ***	(0.000) -0.00198	(0.605) -0.0870*	(0.010) 0.0933**ı	(0.381) -0.00812	
	Constant	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.172)	(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.649)	
	Observations	165	165	165	109	109	109	_
			*			•		
		Com	petitive	27	Rev	enue ta	araetina	

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Role of Prices: Country Level



Role of Global Real Economic Activity: Group Level

Counter-cyclical:
consistent with
OPEC stabilization
objective

	All controls			
(1)	(2)	(3)		
		non-OECD/		
OPEC	OECD	non-OPEC		
-0.301	0.190***	-0.000325		
(0.151)	(0.000)	(0.990)		
0.320*	0.373***	-0.00655		
(0.038)		(0.868)		
-0.436		-0.0820		
(0.105)	(0.000)	(0.174)		
-0.330***	0.446**	-0.0280		
(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.767)		
-0.0300	0.273***	0.128		
(0.688)	(0.000)	(0.055)		
-0.0654	0.216**	-0.0269		
(0.539)	(0.007)	(0.804)		
0.0551	0.107	0.137		
(0.774)	(0.165)	(0.261)		
-0.145	0.260**	0.268*		
(0.079)	(0.004)	(0.036)		
-0.0144	0.277**	0.219*		
(0.818)	(0.004)	(0.017)		
-0.0870*	0.0933**	-0.00812		
(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.649)		
109 ´	109	109		
	OPEC -0.301 (0.151) -0.320* (0.038) -0.436 (0.105) -0.330*** (0.001) -0.0300 (0.688) -0.0654 (0.539) 0.0551 (0.774) -0.145 (0.079) -0.0144 (0.818) -0.0870* (0.028)	(1) (2) OPEC OECD -0.301 (0.000) (0.151) (0.000) -0.320* (0.000) -0.436 (0.596*** (0.105) (0.000) -0.330*** (0.001) -0.0300 (0.273*** (0.688) (0.000) -0.0654 (0.216** (0.539) (0.007) 0.0551 (0.107 (0.774) (0.165) -0.145 (0.079) (0.004) -0.0144 (0.277** (0.818) (0.004) -0.0870* (0.0933** (0.028) (0.005)		

Pro-cyclical: consistent with competitive oil supply

Role of Global Real Economic Activity: Country Level

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	OPEC			OECD	Non-OECD/non-OPEC		
	United Arab			United			
	Saudi Arab	ia Emirates	Norway	Kingdom	United States	China	Russia
Deal DDI reciduals wearly systems (4)	0.0405	0.500*	0.877***	0.967***	0.0050	0.0400	0.0740
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-1)	-0.0495	0.589*			0.0658	0.0408	-0.0712
Ocal DDI reciduale manufu average (2)	(0.656)	(0.023)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.457)	(0.094)	(0.092)
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-2)	-0.166	0.586	0.282	1.491***	0.0994	0.0481	-0.0789**
Over I DDI vosti I relevant de la comerció (O)	(0.122)	(0.055)	(0.438)	(0.000)	(0.399)	(0.110)	(0.004)
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-3)	-0.154	0.848**	0.355**	1.097***	0.526***	0.0461	-0.0988***
	(0.072)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.350)	(0.000)
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-4)	-0.0801	-0.0275	0.208	1.577***	0.252	-0.0420	-0.155***
	(0.582)	(0.777)	(0.475)	(0.000)	(0.227)	(0.457)	(0.000)
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-5)	-0.157***	-0.132	0.555*	0.881***	0.367**	-0.120***	-0.0987***
	(0.000)	(0.073)	(0.024)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-6)	-0.354	-0.0429	0.664**	0.692*	0.0985	0.0103	-0.0795**
	(0.155)	(0.779)	(0.001)	(0.031)	(0.438)	(0.821)	(0.007)
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-7)	-0.113	0.439**	0.708	1.242***	-0.186	0.0844	-0.0474
	(0.706)	(0.005)	(0.051)	(0.000)	(0.259)	(0.120)	(0.233)
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-8)	-0.0353	0.0439	0.490	1.973***	0.107	0.00426	0.00457
	(0.798)	(0.783)	(0.301)	(0.000)	(0.171)	(0.957)	(0.836)
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-9)	0.135	-0.0166	-0.111	1.332***	0.341	-0.0138	-0.00190
	(0.159)	(0.867)	(0.712)	(0.000)	(0.094)	(0.864)	(0.915)
Constant	-0.0727	0.212***	-0.0200	0.117**	0.108	0.0141**	-0.00626
	(0.138)	(0.001)	(0.756)	(0.005)	(0.086)	(0.007)	(0.074)
Observations	109	109	109 /	109	109	134	134

Consistent with macro stabilization

Competitive

Contradicts competitive behavior



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Conclusions

- Dynamic structure of our main model is important
 - We find significant responses across all lags
 - Static models may only capture part of the effect
 - In some cases the signs switch along the lag spectrum
 - Static models may be misleading since net effect may differ
- Substantial heterogeneity across both country groups and individual countries
 - Some countries resemble countries from other groups more than from their own groups
- Next steps:
 - Net output effects
 - SVAR







Thank you for your attention!

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