# **DIW** BERLIN



Determinants of Global Oil Production –
Empirical Evidence for more than short
run Cartel Rent Maximization

8<sup>th</sup> Workshop GEE Student Chapter 7 May, 2010

Aleksandar Zaklan Georg Zachmann Anne Neumann

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Data and Methodology
- 3. Results and Discussion
- 4. Conclusions

#### **Motivation**

- Crude oil production and prices are key economic variables, but understanding of their interaction over time and for different producers is incomplete
- We analyze the dynamic response of crude oil output to past prices and other important control variables
- Disentangle determinants of global oil production by major country groups and on individual country level
  - OPEC, OECD and non-OECD/non-OPEC production
  - Individual country analysis
- Address methodological issues in the literature
- Isolate price effect more clearly than the literature does



#### **State of the Literature**

- Two major streams: models evaluating consequences of physical attributes/exhaustibility and tests of strategic producer behavior
- Physical attributes:
  - Hotelling (1931): resource exhaustibility
  - Hubbard (1956): oil depletion
    - Results are sensitive to assumptions
- Strategic behavior:
  - Griffin (1985): empirical testing of popular hypotheses: Cartel behavior, competitive behavior, revenue targeting
    - No thorough dynamic analysis exists
    - Methodological challenges call into question validity of results
- We analyze the determinants of output, without specifically testing hypotheses



- 1. Introduction
- 2. Data and Methodology
- 3. Results and Discussion
- 4. Conclusions




#### **Data**

- Comprehensive country-level dataset at (mostly) monthly frequency
  - Global oil production
  - WTI oil price
  - Real economic activity/aggregate global demand
    - Baltic Dry Index (monthly averages of daily data)
  - Investment in oil production capacity
    - Rig count (Baker Hughes Inc.)
  - Institutional quality
    - Six indicators from World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)



# **Descriptive Analysis**



OECD: stable and slightly declining trend, with sharp movements

OPEC: appears to mirror development in oil price, with a certain delay

Non-OECD/non-OPEC: smoothly increasing, broadly in line with trend in price



## **Hypotheses**

## **Hypothesis 1:**

Crude oil output responds to prices and other control variables over a range of lags from the short to the long term.

## **Hypothesis 2:**

The response is heterogeneous among the three main groups of countries, OPEC, OECD and non-OECD/non-OPEC, as well as on the level of individual countries.



## Methodology

- Address stationarity issue by applying Hodrick-Prescott-Filter (HP) to all variables
- Estimation strategy: Isolate effect of oil price in main regression
  - 1. Purge indirect oil price effects from proxies for investment and real activity
    - Auxiliary regressions

$$RIG_{t,i} = \alpha_i + \sum_{s=0}^{S} \beta_{s,i}WTI_{t-s} + \varepsilon_{t,i}$$

$$BDI_t = \varphi + \sum_{s=0}^{S} \gamma_sWTI_{t-s} + \mu_t$$

2. Main regression using residuals from auxiliary regressions

$$Q_{t,i} = \omega_i + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \delta_{k,i} WTI_{t-k} + \sum_{l=1}^{L} \theta_{l,i} \overline{I}_{t-l,i} + \sum_{m=1}^{M} \tau_{m,i} \overline{REAL}_{t-m} + \Psi_i INST_{t,i} + \eta_{t,i}$$




- 1. Introduction
- 2. Data and Methodology
- 3. Results and Discussion
- 4. Conclusions



# **Role of Prices: Group Level**

		No controls				All controls		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
				non-OECD/			non-OECD/	
		OPEC	OECD	non-OPEC	OPEC	OECD	non-OPEC	
	Real WTI Price, monthly average (-1)	-0.0253*	-0.0189	-0.00508	0.00543	-0.000294	-0.00119	
		(0.039)	(0.081)	(0.354)	(0.607)	(0.975)	(0.856)	
	Real WTI Price, monthly average (-2)	0.0507**	-0.00157	-0.00222	0.0801*	-0.0122	-0.00974	
	Deal WTI Dries avertarly every re (4)	(0.004)	(0.941)	(0.748)	(0.018)	(0.169)	(0.316)	
	Real WTI Price, quarterly average (-1)	0.000891 (0.963)	-0.00372 (0.676)	0.00878* (0.016)	0.0389 (0.247)	-0.0777** (0.002)	0.0225 (0.082)	
	Real WTI Price, quarterly average (-2)	-0.0472	0.0391***	-0.0136*	0.0623	0.0618*		
Revenue	1 (-2)	(0.069)	(0.001)	(0.033)	(0.393)	(0.020)	(0.601)	ompetitiv
	Tol M/TI Drice guerterly everege (2)	0.0473***	-0.0157	0.00255	0.0716	-0.0557	0.0197*	
argeting	q · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(0.001)	(0.265)	(0.815)	(0.222)	(0.061)	(0.020)	
•	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-1)	-0.186***	0.0715**	-0.0211	0.379	0.00130	0.0503	
		(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.079)	(0.297)	(0.993)	(0.419)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-2)	-0.419***	0.0974**	-0.0585***	0.357	-0.157	Ò.0131	
		(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.202)	(0.263)	(0.875)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-3)	-0.288***	0.179***	-0.0650***	0.404	-0.448	-0.140	
	D 114(T) D: (4)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.222)	(0.099)	(0.167)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-4)	-0.355***	0.153***	-0.0613**	-0.0537	-0.602*	-0.261	
	Deal WTI Dries was the average (5)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.780)	(0.035)	(0.333)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-5)	-0.103* (0.043)	0.146*** (0.000)	-0.0164 (0.393)	-0.0489 <del>- (0.858)</del>	-0.778* (0.041)	-0.201 (0.335)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-6)	-0.0238	0.0411	0.0302	-0.740*	-0.905**	(0.333) -0.492	
	rtodi vv i i i noo, yodiny dvorago ( o)	(0.674)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.032)	(0.008)	(0.098)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-7)	0.188**	0.0572*	0.0806***	-0.398	-0.770*	0.00326	
	real reservois	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.000)	(0.053)	(0.025)	(0.981)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-8)	Ò.213* <sup>*</sup> **	-0.0875*	Ò.113* <sup>*</sup> **	-0.467 <sup>*</sup> *	-0.329	-0.158 <sup>°</sup>	
		(0.000)	(p.011)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.082)	(0.137)	
	Real WTI Price, yearly average (-9)	0.0601**	-0.0232	0.0998***	-0.0513	-0.227*	0.0542	
		(0.001)	(0.282)	(0.000)	(0.605)	(0.010)	(0.381)	
	Constant	-0.0148***	0.00770***	-0.00198	-0.0870*	0.0933**	-0.00812	
	Observations	(0.001)	(D.000)	(0.172)	(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.649)	
	Observations p-values in parentheses; *, **, *** indicates in parentheses; *, **, ***	165	165	165	109 vel, respectively	109	109	
	p-values in parentineses, , , indica	ate significant	5 at 1116 3 /0 ,	1 /0 and 0.1 /0 let	vei, respectively	1		
			Compet	itive?	Revenue targeting			

## **Role of Prices: Country Level**



# Role of Global Real Economic Activity: Group Level

All controls

with competitive oil supply

		(1)	(2)	(3)
				non-OECD/
		OPEC	OECD	non-OPEC
	Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-1)	-0.301	0.190***	-0.000325
		(0.151)	(0.000)	(0.990)
Countar avaliant	Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-2)	0.320*	0.373***	-0.00655
Counter-cyclical:		(0.038)	(0.000)	(0.868)
consistent with	Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-3)	-0.436	0.596***	-0.0820
		(0.105)	(0.000)	(0.174)
stated OPEC	Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-4)	-0.330***	0.446**	-0.0280
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.767)
macro stabilization	Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-5)	-0.0300	0.273***	0.128
objective	5 1551 :1 1 (0)	(0.688)	(0.000)	(0.055)
Objective	Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-6)	-0.0654	0.216**	-0.0269
	D 1001 11 1 (3)	(0.539)	(0.007)	(0.804)
	Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-7)	0.0551	0.107	0.137
	D   DD     ( 0 )	(0.774)	(0.165)	(0.261)
	Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-8)	-0.145	0.260**	0.268*
	Real PDI reciduals, wearly everage ( 0)	(0.079)	(0.004)	(0.036)
	Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-9)	-0.0144 (0.818)	(0.004)	0.219*
	Constant	-0.0870*	0.0933**	-0.008 <sub>1</sub> 12
	Constant	(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.649)
	Observations	109	109	109
	p-values in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate si			
	p raises in parentinesses, , , indicate of	gourioo at trio	2,5, 1,0 0110	7.1.70 10 VOI, 100P0011 VOI
			$\downarrow$	Ţ
		Dro ov	aliaali a	onoiotont
		Pro-cy	Ciicai: C	onsistent



## Role of Global Real Economic Activity: Country Level

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
	OPEC			OECD			Non-OECD/non-OPEC	
	United Arab		•	United				
	Saudi Arabia	Emirates	Norway	Kingdom	United States	China	Russia	
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-1)	-0.0495	0.589*	0.877***	0.967***	0.0658	0.0408	-0.0712	
	(0.656)	(0.023)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.457)	(0.094)	(0.092)	
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-2)	-0.166	0.586	0.282	1.491***	0.0994	0.0481	-0.0789**	
	(0.122)	(0.055)	(0.438)	(0.000)	(0.399)	(0.110)	(0.004)	
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-3)	-0.154	0.848**	0.355**	1.097***	0.526***	0.0461	-0.0988***	
	(0.072)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.350)	(0.000)	
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-4)	-0.0801	-0.0275	0.208	1.577***	0.252	-0.0420	-0.155***	
	(0.582)	(0.777)	(0.475)	(0.000)	(0.227)	(0.457)	(0.000)	
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-5)	-0.157***	-0.132	0.555*	0.881***	0.367**	-0.120***	-0.0987***	
	(0.000)	(0.073)	(0.024)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-6)	-0.354	-0.0429	0.664**	0.692*	, 0.0985	0.0103	-0.0795**	
	(0.155)	(0.779)	(0.001)	(0.031)	(0.438)	(0.821)	(0.007)	
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-7)	-0.113	0.439**	0.708	1.242*** /	-0.186	0.0844	-0.0474	
	(0.706)	(0.005)	(0.051)	(0.000)	(0.259)	(0.120)	(0.233)	
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-8)	-0.0353	0.0439	0.490	1.973***	0.107	0.00426	0.00457	
	(0.798)	(0.783)	(0.301)	(0.009)	(0.171)	(0.957)	(0.836)	
Real BDI residuals, yearly average (-9)	0.135	-0.0166	-0.111	1.33⁄2***	0.341	-0.0138	-0.00190	
	(0.159)	(0.867)	(0.712)	(0.Ø00)	(0.094)	(0.864)	(0.915)	
Constant	-0.0727	0.212***	-0.0200	0/117**	0.108	0.0141**	-0.00626	
	(0.138)	(0.001)	(0.756)	(0.005)	(0.086)	(0.007)	(0.074)	
Observations	109	109	109	/ 109	109	134	134	

**Consistent with macro stabilization** 

Competitive

**Contradicts competitive behavior** 



- 1. Introduction
- 2. Data and Methodology
- 3. Results and Discussion
- 4. Conclusions



### **Conclusions**

- Dynamic structure of our main model is important
  - We find significant responses across all lags
    - Static models may only capture part of the effect
  - In some cases the signs switch along the lag spectrum
    - Static models may be misleading since net effect may differ
- Substantial heterogeneity across both country groups and individual countries
  - Some countries resemble countries from other groups more than from their own groups
- Next steps:
  - Net output effects
  - SVAR







Thank you for your attention!

Contact: azaklan@diw.de

**German Institute for Economic Research** 

- Alhajji, A.F., Huettner, D., 2000. OPEC and World Crude Oil Markets from 1973 to 1994: Cartel, Oligopoly or Competitive? Energy Journal 21 (3), 31–60.
- Dvir, E., Rogoff, K. S., 2009. Three Epochs of Oil. NBER Working Paper No. 14927.
- Griffin, J.M., 1985. OPEC Behavior: A Test of Alternative Hypotheses. American Economic Review 75 (5), 954–963.
- Hotelling, H., 1931. The Economics of Exhaustible Resources. Journal of Political Economy 39, 137-75.
- Hubbert, M. K., 1956. Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels. American Petroleum Institute Drilling and Production Practice, Proceedings of Spring Meeting, San Antonio, 7-25.
- Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2009. Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2008. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4978.
- Kaufmann, R.K, Bradford, A., Belanger, L.H., McLaughlin, J.P., Miki, Y., 2008. Determinants of OPEC Production: Implications for OPEC Behaviour, Energy Economics 30, 333-351.
- Kilian, L., 2009. Not all Oil Price Shocks are Alike: Disentangling Demand and Supply Shocks in the Crude Oil Market. American Economic Review 99 (3), 1053-1069.
- MacAvoy, P., 1982. Crude Oil Prices as Determined by OPEC and Market Fundamentals. Cambridge: Ballinger.
- Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 2006. OPEC Long-Term Strategy, Vienna.
- Ringlund, G.B., Rosendahl, K.E., Skjerpen, T., 2008. Does Oil Rig Activity React to Price Changes? An Empirical Investigation. Energy Economics 30, 371-396.
- Ramcharran, H., 2002. Oil Production Responses to Price Changes: An Empirical Application of the Competitive Model to OPEC and Non-OPEC Countries. Energy Economics 24, 97–106.
- Smith, J.L., 2005. Inscrutable OPEC? Behavioral Tests of the Cartel Hypothesis. The Energy Journal 26 (1), 51–82.
- Teece, D., 1982. OPEC Behavior: An Alternative View in Griffin, J.M., OPEC Behavior and World Oil Prices, London: Allen & Unwin.
- World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators. Data and extensive documentation available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
- Wurzel, E., Willard, L., Ollivaud, P., 2009. Recent Oil Price Movements Forces and Policy Issues. OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 737.

