Lifetime Earnings Inequality in Germany

by
Timm Bönke*, Giacomo Corneo** and Holger Lüthen***

March 2012

Abstract: This paper documents the magnitude, pattern, and evolution of lifetime earnings inequality in Germany. Based on a large sample of earnings biographies from social security records, we show that the intra-generational distribution of lifetime earnings of male workers has a Gini coefficient around .2 for cohorts born in the late 1930s and early 1940s; this amounts to about 2/3 of the value of the Gini coefficient of annual earnings. Within cohorts, mobility in the distribution of yearly earnings is substantial at the beginning of the life cycle, decreases afterwards and virtually vanishes after age forty. Earnings data for thirty-one cohorts reveals striking evidence of a secular rise of intra-generational inequality in lifetime earnings: West-German men born in the early 1960s are likely to experience about 80 % more lifetime inequality than their fathers. In contrast, both short-term and long-term intra-generational mobility have been rather stable. Longer unemployment spells of workers at the bottom of the distribution of younger cohorts contribute to explain 30 to 40 % of the overall increase in lifetime earnings inequality.

Keywords: Earnings Distribution, Lifetime Inequality, Intra-generational Mobility.

JEL Classification: D31, D33, H24.

Corresponding author:
Giacomo Corneo
Department of Economics
Free University of Berlin
Boltzmannstr. 20
14195 Berlin
Germany

Acknowledgement: We thank Anders Björklund, Tarjei Havnes and seminar participants at various venues for many helpful comments as well as the Data Research Centre of the German Federal Pension Insurance for its technical support.

* Free University of Berlin
** Free University of Berlin, CEPR, CESifo, IZA
*** German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin (DIW Berlin)
1 Introduction

Labor income inequality is usually apprehended in terms of a distribution of yearly earnings and such earnings distributions have become more unequal in many advanced economies during the last three decades.1 However, labor markets also generate a heterogeneous dynamics of individual earnings, so that the evolution of inequality of long-term earnings might considerably differ from the evolution of inequality of yearly earnings. A life-cycle perspective recognizes that some levels of earnings are transient and not representative of an individual’s position in the long-term distribution, e.g. low earnings during college years and when unemployed, or high earnings thanks to temporarily skyrocketing bonuses. In that perspective, it is the inequality of lifetime earnings that is crucial in order to assess how much inequality is generated by the labor market.

In this paper, we exploit a unique sample of high-quality administrative data to study true lifetime earnings and their dispersion. We investigate earnings inequality for cohorts of people born in the same year, i.e. intra-generational lifetime inequality. That is a key dimension of inequality for several reasons. First, inequality of lifetime earnings portrays permanent disparities in labor-market incomes which include the mobility experienced by individuals over their entire life cycle. Comparing lifetime inequality across cohorts can add to our understanding of the drivers of growing cross-sectional inequality and the ways in which labor markets have changed during the last decades. Second, intra-generational earnings inequality matters for generational welfare, both because earnings are the largest income component and because individuals often compare their earnings with those of people of similar age. Third, intra-generational inequality is likely to significantly affect people’s feelings of sharing a common fate, which foster generalized trust and shape attitudes towards redistribution.

1 See e.g. Atkinson and Piketty (2010), Autor et al. (2006), Card and DiNardo (2002), Goos et al. (2009), Lemieux (2007).
We examine the largest European economy, Germany, and, for the first time, investigate the magnitude, structure and evolution of intra-generational lifetime earnings inequality there. We exploit data on earnings biographies from social security administrative records to shed light on the following issues: What is the magnitude of lifetime earnings inequality and how does it compare to usual measures of inequality of annual earnings? How do cohort-specific inequality and mobility evolve over the life cycle? Is lifetime inequality for individuals who currently are in working age going to be larger or smaller than the one experienced by their parents?

In order to answer those questions we analyze the earnings histories of thirty-one birth cohorts in Germany, ranging from individuals who were born in 1938 to those born in 1968. The dataset we scrutinize is a highly representative sample of the male employee population of West Germany. We define lifetime earnings as the present value of an individual’s earnings until the individual reaches age sixty. For the eleven oldest birth cohorts in our dataset we observe all annual earnings until they reach age sixty, so that we can compute their lifetime inequality as well as their mobility in the intra-generational distribution of annual earnings during their entire active life cycle. We observe younger cohorts’ earnings only for an initial part of their life cycle and can compute measures of earnings inequality and mobility up to some age between forty and sixty. Using both the information about cohorts that have completed their labor-market life cycle and the information about the still active cohorts, we attempt to gauge how lifetime inequality is evolving across generations in Germany.

We find that the intra-generational distribution of lifetime earnings of male workers has a Gini coefficient around 0.2 for cohorts born in the late 1930s and that the extent of inequality of lifetime earnings is about 2/3 of the size of inequality of annual earnings. Age-specific annual earnings inequality follows a U-shaped pattern over the life cycle, with a minimum reached around age thirty-five. Even controlling for age, measures of inequality of annual earnings substantially overestimate the inequality of lifetime earnings, the difference between the two measures being due to individuals’ mobility in the distribution over time. Within cohorts, mobility in the distribution of yearly earnings is substantial at the beginning of the life cycle,
decreases afterwards and virtually vanishes after age forty. Age-earnings profiles are concave and steeper for better educated individuals.

Our main finding concerns the evolution of lifetime inequality. A comparison of earnings biographies across all cohorts reveals striking evidence of a secular rise of intra-generational inequality in lifetime earnings: West-German men born in the early 1960s are likely to experience about 80% more lifetime inequality than their fathers. In contrast, both short term and long term intra-generational mobility have been rather stable for the cohorts born after 1938. Intra-generational lifetime earnings inequality has increased both at the bottom half of the distribution and at the top half of the distribution, but the rise has been stronger at the bottom. We find that some 30 to 40% of the rise of lifetime inequality in Germany can be attributed to an increase of the duration of unemployment for individuals at the bottom of the earnings distribution, while the rest is due to an increase of intra-generational wage inequality.

This paper is related to various strands of literature. Firstly, it relates to the literature on the long-run evolution of wage and earnings inequality. Our finding of a secular rise of intra-generational lifetime earnings is, to the best of our knowledge, a novel one. There seem to be no other studies that attempt to pin down the evolution of the inequality of lifetime earnings. Closest to the current paper is probably the article by Kopczuk et al. (2010) about earnings inequality in the United States. Using social security data, they compute Gini coefficients of cohort-specific long-term earnings distributions since 1937. Long-term earnings are defined as earnings over a twelve-year period and three benchmark periods are considered: from age twenty-five to age thirty-six, from age thirty-seven to age forty-eight, and from age forty-nine to age sixty. For cohorts born after the late 1930s, all three measures of long-term earnings exhibit a clear upward trend of cohort-specific inequality. Our finding that intra-generational inequality
of lifetime earnings has increased in Germany points to a remarkable common trend of labor income inequality in the US and in Germany.\textsuperscript{2}

Secondly, this paper complements various analyses of how wage inequality has evolved in Germany over the last three decades. The literature has mainly focused on the distribution of annual wages and discussed when inequality began to increase. Using social security records, Dustmann et al. (2009) find that earnings inequality has increased in West Germany in the 1980s, but only at the top half of the distribution; in the early 1990s, inequality started to rise for the entire distribution. They argue that skill-biased technological change drove the widening of the wage distribution at the top, while changes in labor market institutions and immigration shocks were responsible for the increasing inequality at the bottom. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS), Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2010) confirm the rise of earnings inequality in West Germany after reunification, the upward trend of inequality being mainly driven by an increase in earnings inequality after the year 2000. By contrast, they find that inequality has not noticeably increased during the 1980s. Interestingly, they find that the experience premium has increased over time. Also using the SOEP data, Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2007) find that inequality of hourly wages for prime-age male employees was stable in West Germany between 1984 and 1994 and increased thereafter. In the period of increasing inequality they find a significant positive gap between high-tenure and low-tenure workers in terms of respective wage growth rates. They suggest that the adjustment of wages to worsening labor market conditions mainly concerned the entrants in the labor market rather than the incumbents.\textsuperscript{3} Our paper adds to the overall picture of the evolution of inequality in Germany by establishing how lifetime earnings inequality has

\textsuperscript{2} Björklund (1993) studied the distribution of lifetime income in Sweden for cohorts born between 1924 and 1936. The evolution of the corresponding Gini coefficients does not exhibit a systematic pattern, possibly because of sampling variation since the samples for each cohort are small.

\textsuperscript{3} Dell (2005) and Bach et al. (2009) investigate the evolution of top salaries in Germany using tax returns data, as earners at the very top of the distribution are not represented well in social security and SOEP data. Consistently with results from other countries, they document an increase of top salary inequality after reunification. However, that inequality increase is much less accentuated than in the US.
changed across cohorts, which is necessary in order to assess how increases in cross-sectional wage inequality translate into inequality experienced over the entire life cycle. Furthermore, our investigation of age-earnings profiles confirms the importance of controlling for the age composition of the workforce when evaluating long-run changes in the distribution of annual earnings.

Thirdly, our work is related to the literature on the relationship between annual and lifetime income inequality and the extent of intra-generational mobility. We contribute to that literature by offering findings based on high-quality data drawn from a sample that is significantly larger than those analyzed in earlier work. The main previous study of complete income biographies is probably Björklund (1993), who exploits Swedish tax registers to compute the lifetime income before taxes of cohorts of men born between 1924 and 1936. Similarly to our result for the cohorts born in the late 1930s, he finds that the Gini coefficient of the distribution of lifetime earnings is close to 0.2 and that it is around 35-40 percent lower than the one for cross-sections of annual incomes. Another common finding, shared by a number of studies of panels covering only subsets of the life cycle, is the existence of substantial intra-generational mobility during the early stages of the life cycle. Björklund (1993) finds that age-specific annual income inequality follows an L-shaped pattern over the life cycle, i.e. the Gini coefficient of the distribution of annual income does not rise when individuals approach age sixty, as we find for earnings in Germany for later cohorts. That difference appears to be mainly due to the role of pensions, that are included in Björklund’s (1993) income concept whereas they do not count as earnings in our investigation.

---

4 OECD (2008) gives an overview of the impact of demographic change on the income distribution. In a recent paper, Almas et al. (2011) provide evidence that changes in the age structure of the workforce had a significant impact on the Gini coefficient of annual earnings in Norway in the period 1967-2000.

5 Burkhauser and Poupore (1997) compare the distribution of annual earnings with the one of earnings over a six-year period from 1983 to 1988. Using the SOEP, they find that when the Gini coefficient is computed over six years, its level falls by less than ten percent. See also Maasoumi and Trede (2001).

6 For West Germany, Trede (1998) analyzes short-run earnings mobility between 1983 and 1993 using the SOEP. He finds that mobility declines with age until age thirty-five and does not change thereafter.
Fourthly, this paper adds to the literature on the life cycle variation in the association between annual and lifetime earnings by assessing that association over completed life cycles for the case of Germany. We confirm Björklund’s (1993) result that the correlation between annual income and lifetime income is quite high and stable after age thirty-five, while it is relatively low before. With respect to age-earnings profiles, our finding that they are much steeper for university graduates than for uneducated workers is in line with standard models of human capital investment. It also accords well with recent findings by Bhuller et al. (2011) based on Norwegian earnings biographies for cohorts born in the 1948-1950 period.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we describe our dataset and define the variables of interest. Section 3 quantifies lifetime earnings inequality and compares it with annual earnings inequality. Section 4 is devoted to the pattern of earnings mobility during the entire active life cycle. In Section 5 we attack the issue of determining the evolution of intra-generational lifetime inequality and dissect its main driving forces. Section 6 concludes.

2 Data and Methodology

Our investigation of lifetime earnings exploits administrative data of the German social security. Virtually all employees in Germany mandatorily participate in its national pay-as-you-go pension system which, being of the Bismarckian variety, carefully records all contributors’ earnings biographies. We analyze an excerpt of the social security data, namely the Insurance Account Sample (“Versicherungskontenstichprobe”, VSKT in the following). That is a stratified random sample of individuals who live in Germany, have at least one entry in their individual

---

7 Implications of that variation for regression models are discussed by Jenkins (1987) and further worked out by Haider and Solon (2006). Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) apply Haider and Solon’s model to high-quality Swedish data. An application of their methodology to correct for the life-cycle bias that uses German earnings data is Brenner (2010).

8 A few categories of employees - like civil servants, miners, and employees of the federal railways - have distinctive pension systems and do not appear in the social security data. We return to the issue of representativeness shortly.
social security record, and are aged between thirty and sixty-seven in the reference year of the sample (Himmelreicher and Stegmann, 2008). Insurance Account Samples are provided for the reference years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 by the Data Research Center of the German Federal Pension Insurance. Each sample contains the earnings biographies of the observed individuals up to the reference year. Data are collected following individuals over time so as to form a panel. For each individual, a monthly history of employment, unemployment, sickness, and contributions to the pension system is recorded. Information about contributions allows one to recover individual gross wages. Individual records cover the period from the year the insured reached age fourteen until the year the individual turned sixty-seven. To avoid difficult issues of comparability of wage levels in the FRG and the GDR, we focus on male earners who have only been working in West Germany. For each birth cohort, we are left with a number of individuals that roughly oscillates between 1,000 and 2,000; the exact numbers are reported in Appendix B in table B1.

While our data is virtually free from measurement errors, some limitations remain. In order to ensure a consistent time series of earnings, three major adjustments were performed. The first one concerns the imputation of one-time payments. Those payments were not included in the social security data before 1984. In order to work with a time invariant definition of earnings, we follow a route suggested by Fitzenberger (1999) and also followed by Dustmann et al. (2009): we adjust earnings above the median for the years before 1984 using an earnings specific growth factor.

The second adjustment is the addition of employers’ social contributions (to unemployment, health, pension and nursing care public insurances) to the individuals’ gross wages. Adding those elements of pay is necessary in order to determine the market value of the

---

9 We use all four samples in our analysis. Information on birth cohort 1938 is picked from the 2005 sample; information on the 1939 cohort comes from the 2006 sample; information on the 1940 cohort is taken from the 2007 sample. Later birth cohorts are covered using the 2008 sample.
individuals’ skills and in order to take into account the changes of contribution rates and assessment ceilings that have occurred over the years across various branches of the social insurance system and across various subgroups of the working population.

Third, we deal with the issue of top-coded earnings. In Germany, employees contribute a share of their gross wage to the mandatory pension system up to a wage ceiling. As a result, the social security data is right-censored as individuals whose wages exceed that ceiling are recorded as if their wages were equal to that ceiling. Over all years and cohorts in our sample, censoring affects about 9.1 percent of the recorded yearly earnings. In order to better approximate the true distribution of top earnings, we impute them to individuals affected by top coding. Our imputation method rests on the assumption that the upper tail of the earnings distribution behaves according to the Pareto law. We posit that the top 10 percent of individual earnings below the contribution ceiling are Pareto-distributed. Then, we estimate the corresponding Pareto-coefficient by OLS. The estimation is conducted separately for all years and birth cohorts. The estimated Pareto-coefficients are then used to determine the distribution of the unobserved earnings above the contribution ceiling. The assignment of estimated earnings to individuals is done so as to preserve the individual rankings in the earnings distribution. Thereby, the rank of an individual is based on the last observable rank in relation to all individuals at or above the contribution ceiling in the cohort-specific earnings distribution. We also explore the implications of two alternative imputation methods: an imputation of the estimated mean income above the ceiling to all individuals with top-coded, earnings and a maximum mobility scenario where the ranking order is reversed every year. Results from those alternative imputations are reported in the Appendix B. They do not differ much from those obtained under our preferred rank-preserving assumption.

In order to validate the earnings data we finally work with, we have compared it with the earnings data from the SOEP. The latter is based on an annual survey of private households and is constructed so as to be highly representative of the population living in Germany in a given year. SOEP earnings data goes back to 1984. For the years from 1984 to 2008, we have used the
cross-sectional earnings distribution revealed by the SOEP in order to assess the representativeness of our data. As shown in Appendix A, the cross-sectional earnings distributions obtained from our data reproduce remarkably well those obtained from the SOEP. Statistical tests confirm that, for any given year, the two distributions are undistinguishable in the part of the distribution where we impute earnings. Furthermore, SOEP data reveals our sample to represent about 80% of the total West-German male workforce, see Appendix A.

3 Inequality of Lifetime Earnings

A key objective of this paper is to determine the extent of lifetime earnings inequality within annual birth cohorts. Lifetime earnings are computed from the earnings an individual has received from age seventeen to age sixty. Given that age limit, we can determine the complete lifetime earnings of eleven cohorts, born between 1938 and 1948. When computing lifetime earnings, we discount yearly earnings to the year the individual turned seventeen and then determine the corresponding present value of earnings. Two discounting methods are applied. The first one uses the average nominal return on German government bonds, obtained from an official time series provided by the German central bank. The second one uses the consumer price index, so that lifetime earnings equal the unweighted sum of real annual earnings. Discount rates are higher when the first method is used.

Results about the Gini coefficient of the cohort-specific distribution of lifetime earnings are displayed in the lower part of Figure 1. The lowest curve represents the Gini coefficient of lifetime earnings when annual earnings are discounted using the rate of returns of German federal bonds. The Gini coefficient oscillates between a minimum of 0.166 for the 1938 cohort and a maximum of 0.216 for those born in 1942. The discounting method affects the results, as shown by the second curve from below, which obtains when annual earnings are discounted.

10 Details on the methodology used to compute the time series are available at http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_zeitreihen.php?lang=de&open=zinsen&func=row&tr=WU0004.
using the consumer price index. A higher discount rate reduces intra-generational inequality because of the steeper rising age-profile of earnings for better educated workers, who are also those with the higher lifetime earnings. We display those age-earning profiles in Section 4.

Because of earnings mobility, inequality in lifetime earnings is smaller than inequality in annual earnings. In order to assess the extent to which lifetime earnings inequality is overestimated by measures of yearly earnings inequality, we compare it with an average of measures of yearly earnings inequality. The curve lying in the middle of Figure 1 shows the average of the Gini coefficients of the distribution of yearly earnings for each cohort. Across all observed cohorts, that average Gini coefficient ranges from a minimum of 0.273 for the 1938 cohort to a maximum of 0.337 for the 1948 cohort. Hence, Gini coefficients of lifetime earnings distributions are somewhat less than two thirds of the corresponding average Gini coefficients of annual earnings distributions.

The Gini coefficients associated with the curve lying in the middle of Figure 1 are computed for populations of individuals with the same age. However, analyses of cross-sectional earnings inequality often refer to populations that are heterogeneous with respect to age. A comparison with yearly earnings distributions defined over individuals with possibly different ages can be performed by constructing from each cohort a fictitious population of differently-aged individuals. Thereby, yearly earnings of the same individual in two different years are treated as if they were two observations of individual earnings in the same year. Time effects are taken into account by discounting to a common year, namely the year when the cohort turned seventeen. This fictitious population captures both, the inequality an individual experiences over his lifetime and earnings differentials among individuals. Therefore, it captures the whole dimension of earnings inequality experienced by a cohort. Results for, respectively, the case of discounting using the German federal bonds and the case of total real earnings are depicted by the two curves in the upper part of Figure 1.

In order to illustrate the implications of our findings, an interpretation of the Gini coefficient stressed e.g. by Sen (1973) may be useful. Accordingly, the Gini coefficient equals
one half of the expected income difference between two randomly selected individuals divided by the average income in the population. A Gini coefficient of 0.3, which roughly corresponds to our finding for annual earnings inequality, means that in a hypothetical two-person economy the lower income amounts to $7/13$ of the higher income. A Gini coefficient of 0.2, which roughly corresponds to our finding for lifetime earnings inequality, means that in a two-person economy the lower income amounts to $2/3$ of the higher income. Thus, inequality measured from annual earnings substantially overestimates the inequality of lifetime earnings, but the latter is by no means negligible.

Figure 1: Gini coefficients of fictitious populations, means of the cross sectional Gini coefficients, and Gini coefficients of lifetime earnings.

![Gini Coefficient Chart](image)

Note: real denotes CPI discounting, federal denotes federal bond discounting.

4 Inequality and Mobility over the Life Cycle

We are now in a position to assess how intra-generational inequality develops along the life cycle of each cohort and how it relates to lifetime inequality. Figure 2 shows for each cohort the evolution of the Gini coefficient of annual earnings as a cohort grows older. A U-shaped pattern clearly emerges from the data. Inequality is maximal when the cohort is below twenty because many individuals have not yet entered the labour market and have thus zero earnings. Inequality then declines and reaches a minimum when the cohort is in its mid-thirties. After that,
a period of rising inequality of annual earnings sets in.\textsuperscript{11} When individuals are sixty-years old, the distribution of their annual earnings has about the same Gini coefficient as the distribution that prevailed when they were twenty-years old. This pattern is consistent with the presumption that better educated workers have a relatively steeper age-earnings profile, something to which we return below. The sudden and short-lived rise of annual inequality when individuals are in their early twenties can be attributed to mandatory military and civil service, which entail a temporary lack of earnings. Older cohorts are less affected by that because the serving time increased from twelve to eighteen months in 1963.\textsuperscript{12}

Figure 2: Annual Gini coefficients from age 17 to 60 for cohorts 1938-1948.

![Figure 2: Annual Gini coefficients from age 17 to 60 for cohorts 1938-1948.](image)


If age-earnings profiles systematically differ across members of the same cohort, some mobility in the intra-generational distribution of yearly earnings should be expected. Figure 3 shows for each cohort the correlation of individuals’ ranks in the distributions of two consecutive years. The displayed correlation coefficients are inversely related to the short-run mobility of individuals in the earnings distribution: the lower is the coefficient, the higher is the mobility. As shown by Figure 3, some intra-generational mobility always exists during the life

\textsuperscript{11} Familiar models of stochastic earnings dynamics focus on employed individuals and predict that, for any cohort, earnings inequality should grow with age. See e.g. Deaton and Paxson (1994) and Huggett et al. (2011).

\textsuperscript{12} The serving time was later reduced to fifteen months in the 1970s.
cycle and that mobility decreases with age. While there is significant mobility when the cohort
is in its twenties, mobility virtually vanishes when the cohort enters its forties. This suggests that
most of the intra-generational mobility is the effect of the better educated catching up and then
leaving behind the less educated, and that this process is almost completed when individuals get
into their forties.

Figure 3: Rank correlations of consecutive years for cohorts 1938-1948.

Further details on mobility are provided by the correlation between annual and lifetime
earnings, which is far from perfect and strongly changes with age. Figure 4 shows that
relationship for various cohorts for which lifetime earnings can be computed. When adulthood
begins, annual earnings contain virtually no information about lifetime earnings as their mutual
correlation is close to zero. The correlation between annual and lifetime earnings then rapidly
increases with age. A correlation coefficient of 0.9 is reached when the cohort is at the end of its
thirties and such a high level persists until the mid-fifties. Thus, in that period of the life cycle
the level of individuals’ annual earnings can be considered representative of their respective
lifetime earnings.\footnote{Figure 4 uses lifetime earnings discounted at the German federal bond rate. The corresponding figures for the
case of undiscounted real earnings are in the Appendix, see Figures B5 and B7.}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3}
\caption{Rank correlations of consecutive years for cohorts 1938-1948.}
\end{figure}
The impact of earnings mobility on long-term earnings inequality can be assessed by computing the effect of rank changes in the earnings distribution over a small number of years on the inequality of the present value of earnings received up to certain age. For that purpose, we employ the concept of “up-to-age-$X$” earnings, UAX for short. For a given individual, UAX is the present value of all his earnings before he becomes $X$-years old. The higher the $X$, the closer that earnings measure to lifetime earnings, and the two concepts coincide if $X = \ 60$.

In order to measure the impact of mobility on the UAX distribution, we decompose the change in the Gini coefficient of the UAX distribution into two components, one that mirrors the growth of earnings in different parts of the distribution, and one that mirrors the re-ranking of individuals in the UAX distribution. Our decomposition method follows the one developed by Jenkins and Van Kerm (2009) in a related framework.

Let $G_{X,c}$ denote the Gini coefficient of the UAX distribution for a cohort $c$. We are interested in decomposing the change, $\Delta_{X,c} = G_{X+5,c} - G_{X,c}$ i.e. the change in the Gini coefficient of the present value of earnings at a given age and five years later. From the covariance definition of the Gini coefficient (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985), we have:

\[
G_{X,c} = \frac{2 \text{cov} \left( W_{X,c}, F(W_{X,c}) \right)}{E[ W_{X,c} ]} \quad (1)
\]
where $W_{X,c}$ represents the present value of earnings that members of cohort $c$ have received between age 17 and age $X$. Furthermore, $E[W_{X,c}] = \mu_{X,c}$ denotes the mean of those earnings and $F(W_{X,c})$ their cumulative density function.

If one keeps the ranking of individuals in the original UAX distribution when computing the Gini coefficient of the UAX distribution five years later, the following concentration coefficient obtains:

$$c^{(X)}_{X+5} = \frac{2 \text{cov}(W_{X+5}, F(W_X))}{\mu_{X+5}}$$

(2)

where we have suppressed the cohort index for notational simplicity. Hence, the difference between $G_{X+5}$ and $c^{(X)}_{X+5}$ captures the re-ranking effect, while the remaining portion of the change in the Gini coefficient of the UAX distribution is due to heterogeneous earnings growth at the various ranks. This invites one to partition the change in the Gini coefficient as

$$\Delta_X = \left[ G_{X+5} - c^{(X)}_{X+5} \right] - \left[ G_X - c^{(X)}_{X+5} \right] \equiv R_X$$

(3)

where

$$R_X = \frac{2}{\mu_{X+5}} \left[ \text{cov}(W_{X+5}, F(W_{X+5})) - \text{cov}(W_{X+5}, F(W_X)) \right]$$

(4)

is the re-ranking effect and $R_X = 0$ if no re-ranking occurs. Furthermore,

$$P_X = \frac{2}{\mu_X \mu_{X+5}} \left[ \text{cov}(W_X, F(W_X)) \mu_{X+5} - \text{cov}(W_{X+5}, F(W_X)) \mu_X \right]$$

(5)

captures the relative average earnings growth between the two periods, where the growth is weighted by the earnings hierarchy in the initial distribution. Following Jenkins and Van Kerm (2009), $P_X$ measures the progressivity of earnings growth: $P_X > 0$ ($P_X < 0$) indicates that...
earnings growth is concentrated at the lower (upper) end of the distribution, which leads to decreasing (increasing) inequality over time.

We now apply the above framework to decompose the changes in the inequality of UAX measured between the age of 20 and 25, 21 and 26, and so on up to age 55 and 60. Figure 5 depicts our results for an exemplary cohort of individuals born in 1944, the pattern is similar for the remaining cohorts. The continuous line, indicating the change in the Gini coefficient, shows that the UAX distribution becomes less unequal during the initial part of the life cycle and that inequality starts increasing when the cohort enters its forties. The two dashed lines describe the progressivity effect and the re-ranking effect. As shown by Figure 5, most of the change in UAX inequality is caused by progressivity. The progressivity index shows that earnings growth is pro-poor until the age of forty and pro-rich thereafter.

Figure 5: Evolution of lifetime inequality, federal bond discounting for cohort 1944

The effect from re-ranking peaks at the beginning of the life cycle and decreases afterwards. Its influence on the development of UAX inequality becomes negligible in the second half of the life cycle, which means that five-year mobility in that earnings ladder is nearly non-existing during the second half of the life cycle.
The patterns detected above can be related to the age-earnings profiles of individuals with different educational attainments. In Figure 6 we plot those profiles for three levels of education for the pooled cohorts from 1938 to 1948. The horizontal lines depict the annualized value of the corresponding present value of lifetime earnings. All earnings are in real terms, on the basis of prices in 2000, and expressed in logs. For each educational group, the profile has a mainly rising, concave shape. However, the higher educated individuals experience more rapid earnings growth through the entire life cycle. Hence, the earnings dynamics triggered by human capital investment and the subsequent effects of accumulated knowledge in the accomplishment of intellectual tasks is consistent with the kind of mobility in the earnings distribution that is exhibited by the data.

Figure 6: Age-earning-profiles for pooled cohorts 1938-1948.

![Age-earning-profiles for pooled cohorts 1938-1948.](image)


5 Evolution of Lifetime Inequality

Are cohorts becoming more or less equal in terms of their lifetime earnings? This question cannot be satisfactorily answered by examining just the cohorts born between 1938 and 1948 for which lifetime earnings can be computed. We now exploit also the data available for younger cohorts in order to uncover patterns of the long-run evolution of lifetime earnings inequality in Germany.
5.1 Main finding

We resort to the concept of “up-to-age-X” earnings, UAX for short. As already mentioned, UAX is the present value of an individual’s earnings before he becomes $X$-years old, and lifetime earnings correspond to $X = 60$. For each cohort, the Gini coefficient of the distribution of UAX can be computed for different values of $X$. Establishing how the Gini coefficient of the distribution of UAX has evolved over successive cohorts can provide valuable hints about the underlying evolution of lifetime earnings inequality. If younger cohorts display higher Gini coefficients for the same $X$ and if this applies to all $X$, that would strongly suggest that there is a trend of increasing lifetime earnings inequality. The opposite conclusion would be drawn from observing lower Gini coefficients for younger cohorts; in that case one would argue that younger cohorts are characterized by less inequality and are likely to experience more equal lifetime earnings.

The results in Section 4 indicate that mobility in the earnings distribution is significant until about age forty. Therefore, we focus on the distribution of UAX for $X \geq 40$. The VSKT excerpt from the social security data allows us to compute UAX for $X \geq 40$ for the thirty-one cohorts born between 1938 and 1968. For each cohort and each definition of $X$, one can then compute the Gini coefficient of the distribution of UAX. Representative results are displayed in Figure 7 for earnings up to the ages of 40, 45, 50, 55, and 60 (lifetime earnings). The results are surprisingly clear.\textsuperscript{14} Gini coefficients trend upwards for each value of $X$. This strongly suggests that younger generations are likely to experience more intra-generational lifetime economic disparity than their fathers.

\textsuperscript{14} Statistical inference shows that this trend of increasing inequality is significant. Respective confidence intervals for UAX Ginis with federal bond discounting are provided in Table B3.
The increase in intra-generational earnings inequality is remarkable. To illustrate, one may compare the cohort born in 1938 with the cohort born in 1963, which may respectively be seen as “parents” and “children”. When they reached age forty-five, the parents’ generation was characterized by a distribution of accumulated earnings with a Gini coefficient of about 0.133. At the same age, their children’s generation was characterized by a distribution of accumulated earnings with a Gini coefficient of about 0.238, an increase of inequality by nearly 80%. A similar order of magnitude obtains when focusing on interquantile ratios. Figure 8 plots the evolution of the ratio between the UAX at the 85th quantile and the one at the 15th quantile, computed according to our two discounting methods.

Figure 8 shows that the finding that inequality of accumulated earnings increases with age after age forty holds for all cohorts. In any cohort, individuals who by age forty have received larger earnings tend to experience earnings growth at a higher rate at a later age. Furthermore, inequality comparisons across cohorts tend to be rather unaffected by the age at which they are made. By way of an example, relative to its neighbouring cohorts, the cohorts of 1942 and 1943 are characterized by a large inequality of UAX and that is true for all $X > 40$. This suggests that the evolution of inequality of lifetime earnings is likely to mirror the evolution of inequality of earnings up to age forty.
Our finding of a rising intra-generational inequality does not hinge on the expansion of tertiary education. Indeed, the same pattern as in Figure 7 obtains if UAX are computed starting with a higher age so that virtually all individuals in the sample participate in the labor market in all years when their earnings are taken into account. Representative results for UAX computed from earnings starting at age twenty-five are displayed in Appendix D.

Further insights into the evolution of intra-generational inequality come from an analysis of the evolution of mobility after age forty. For each cohort, we compute the correlation between the individuals’ ranks in the distribution of UAX for $X = 40$ with their ranks in the distribution of UAX for $40 < X \leq 60$. Results for $X = 41, 45, 50, 55,$ and $60$ are plotted in Figure 9. No major change in mobility can be detected. By way of an example, the rank correlations observed for the 1938 cohort are virtually indistinguishable from those observed for the 1963 cohort for the same $X$. The only noticeable change is an increase in mobility going from the cohort born in 1947 to the one born in 1950; that increase was however reversed by later cohorts.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15} The cohorts born in West Germany in the late 1940s were the protagonists of the 1968 movement against bourgeois way of life. Possibly, many future highly skilled employees who participated as students in that movement participated less intensely in the labor market as compared to other generations and thus received...
Figure 9: Rank correlation of UA-40 earnings with UAX earnings.

![Rank correlation graph](image)


5.2 Proximate causes

In order to get some insight into the proximate causes of the observed rise of lifetime earnings inequality in Germany, it is useful to assess how that inequality has evolved at various parts of the distribution. We have therefore replaced the Gini coefficient with generalized entropy inequality indices that are more sensitive to distinctive parts of the distribution. Results for the Theil index, the mean logarithmic deviation and half the squared coefficient of variation are exhibited in Appendix C. They suggest that intra-generational lifetime inequality has significantly increased both at the bottom and at the top of the distribution. Here, we merely present the evolution of two interquantile ratios of the UAX distribution that respectively capture inequality at the bottom and at the top of the distribution. In Figure 10, the left graph plots the $50^{\text{th}} / 15^{\text{th}}$ ratio while right graph plots the $85^{\text{th}} / 50^{\text{th}}$ ratio, both using the discount factors based on federal bonds.

---

relatively low earnings during the initial part of their life cycle. This might explain why those cohorts exhibit greater intra-generational long-term mobility.
Figure 10: 50th / 15th and 85th / 50th ratio of UAX-earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968.

While lifetime earnings inequality has increased both at the bottom and at the top of the distribution, the above Figures show that the increase has been stronger at the bottom of the distribution. As this may be driven by the rise of the incidence of unemployment for low-skill workers, it is instructive to disentangle the effect on inequality due to changes in the distribution of unemployment spells from the one due to changes in the wage structure.

Figure 11 below plots for each cohort the average number of months spent in employment, unemployment, and other ways during the life span that goes from age seventeen to age forty. The residual category (“other”) includes civil and military service, periods of occupational disability, and college education. Within each cohort, individuals have been ranked into quartiles according to their lifetime earnings up to age forty, computed with Federal Bond discounting.

Figure 11 suggests that unemployment is an important source of lifetime earnings inequality. Over time, there has been a substantial increase of periods of unemployment for the bottom quartile, a moderate increase for the next quartile, and virtual stability for the upper half of the distribution. Individuals in the bottom quartile of the earnings distributions of cohorts born in the late 1930s spent on average about 5 months in unemployment before reaching age forty. By contrast, their statistical children born in the mid-1960s spent about 42 months in...
unemployment before reaching age forty. For individuals in the upper half of the distribution, no comparable rise of unemployment incidence for the younger cohorts can be observed. Interestingly, the same pattern arises if one only considers the employment records starting with age twenty-five; see Figure D10 in the Appendix.

Figure 11: Employment status up to age 40 by UA-40 earnings quartiles.

![Graphs showing employment status](image)

Note: Earnings quartiles based on up-to-age 40 earnings with federal bond discounting.

The substantial increase of unemployment spells at the bottom of the intra-generational earnings distribution suggests that it may be a major driving factor behind the secular rise of lifetime earnings inequality in Germany. In order to quantify that effect, we simulate the evolution of lifetime inequality under the counterfactual of full employment. Based on the actual earnings distribution, we construct a hypothetical scenario by imputing earnings when individuals are not recorded as employed. The imputed value for an individual is the last earning level observed for that individual.\(^{16}\) Results for the hypothetical distributions of UAX are plotted in Figure 12. In the left panel of Figure 12, earnings have been imputed for all months in which

\[^{16}\text{In cases where no previous individual earnings are observed, we impute retrospectively the first level of earnings observed for that individual. In an additional scenario, we reversed our imputation procedure and imputed the level of earnings observed when the individual exits unemployment. Results were similar to those based on our preferred imputation and can be obtained upon request.}\]
an individual was not in employment. In the right graph, earnings have only been imputed for the months in which an individual was registered as unemployed.

Figure 12: Ginis of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968 with imputation for complete times of non-employment and for unemployment.

Comparing Figure 12 with Figure 7 reveals that the unequal evolution of unemployment spells goes some way in explaining the rise of lifetime earnings inequality. To illustrate, consider again the cohort born in 1938 and the one of their statistical children born in 1963. In the scenario of complete imputation (left graph in Fig. 12), when the parents reached age forty-five their accumulated earnings were distributed with a Gini coefficient of about .115. At the same age, their children’s generation was characterized by a distribution of accumulated earnings with a Gini coefficient of about .175, an increase of inequality by slightly more than 50 %. In the scenario of imputation for unemployment only (right graph in Fig. 12), the same comparison yields an increase of the Gini coefficient by slightly more than 60 %. In both cases, the Gini coefficient increases by considerably less than 80 %, the growth rate obtained from the data used for Fig. 7. This suggests that the unequal evolution of unemployment spells for individuals at different points of the earnings distribution contributes to explain some 30 to 40 percent of the secular rise of lifetime earnings inequality. The remaining 60 to 70 percent can be attributed to the evolution of wage inequality. With respect to the rise of wage inequality in Germany, the analysis by Dustmann et al. (2009) suggests that various factors played a role.
Skill-biased technological change appears to be the best explanation for the widening of the dispersion of wages at the top of the distribution. Changes in labor market institutions – related in particular to declining union power – and labor supply shocks – in particular, immigration waves – were key drivers of growing wage inequality at the bottom.

6 Conclusion

We have documented, for the first time, the magnitude, pattern, and evolution of lifetime earnings inequality in Germany. Based on a large sample of earnings biographies from social security records, we have shown that the intra-generational distribution of lifetime earnings of male workers has a Gini coefficient around .2 for cohorts born in the late 1930s and early 1940s; this amounts to about 2/3 of the value of the Gini coefficient of annual earnings. Within cohorts, mobility in the distribution of yearly earnings is substantial at the beginning of the life cycle, decreases afterwards and virtually vanishes after age forty.

The main novel finding from our investigation is the secular rise of intra-generational inequality in lifetime earnings in Germany: West-German men born in the early 1960s are likely to experience about 80% more lifetime inequality than their fathers. Longer unemployment spells affecting workers at the bottom of the distribution of younger cohorts contribute to explain some 30 to 40 percent of the overall increase in lifetime earnings inequality. The remaining 60 to 70 percent is due to the increase of wage inequality.

The 80% rise in lifetime earnings inequality that we observe when comparing the generations born around World War II with those of the baby boomers of the 1960s is large and unlikely to be offset by more progressive taxes and transfers. It is bound to have far-reaching repercussions for a number of policy issues in Germany, including the provision of better education and life-long learning to the low-skilled, the role of the welfare state, pension reform, and bequest taxation, as well as for how people relate to each other and see themselves as members of society.
References


Appendix A: Imputation of top-coded earnings

The imputation of incomes for top-coded observations assumes that top incomes are distributed according to the Pareto law. Several studies investigating income distributions in various countries indicate that this is a good assumption.

Assume that individual earnings $w_i$ exceeding $\bar{w}$ are Pareto-distributed. Then, the probability to observe an income greater or equal to $w_i > \bar{w}$ is given by

$$1 - F(w_i) = \left(\frac{w_i}{\bar{w}}\right)^{-\alpha}$$

(A1)

where $F(w_i)$ denotes the cumulative probability density function. Consider $n$ to be the number of earners with $w_i > \bar{w}$ and $i = 1, \ldots, n$. Furthermore, earners $i$ are ranked in ascending order according to their income. From equation (A1) each individual’s rank $r_i$ in the income distribution is determined as

$$r_i = nF(w_i) = n \left( 1 - \left(\frac{w_i}{\bar{w}}\right)^{-\alpha} \right)$$

(A2)

In top-coded data, individual earnings are available up to a contribution ceiling, $z$. If an individual earns more, reported earning is $w_i = z$. Consider $m$ out of the $n$ earners to receive an income above the contribution ceiling $z > \bar{w}$. Since for $m$ earners neither $r_i$ nor $w_i$ is observable, we estimate the parameters of the Pareto-distribution by exploiting earnings data from the interval $[\bar{w}, z]$. Rearranging equation (A2) yields

$$\ln \left( 1 - \frac{r_i}{n} \right) = -\alpha \ln \left( \frac{w_i}{\bar{w}} \right)$$

(A3)

We employ equation (A3) to estimate the Pareto-coefficient $\alpha$. Suppose at least the top 10% of individual earnings $w_i$ in the interval $[0, z]$ to be Pareto-distributed. Accordingly, $\bar{w}$ is assigned the value of the 90th percentile in the respective distribution of earnings below $z$. The Pareto-coefficient is estimated by means of an OLS regression without constant. The regression is conducted separately for all years $t$ and birth cohorts $c$. Hence, the cohort and year specific Pareto-coefficient $\hat{\alpha}_{c,t}$ is derived for $c = 1938, \ldots, 1968$ and $t = 1954, \ldots, 2008$ distributions.

With the estimated Pareto-coefficient at hand, unobserved earnings above the contribution ceiling $z$ can be estimated by rearranging (A2):

$$\hat{w}_i = \bar{w} \left( 1 - \frac{\hat{r}_i}{n} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}$$

(A4)

where $\hat{w}_i$ denotes the estimated earned income and $\hat{r}_i$ the assumed rank. The conjectures regarding $\hat{r}_i$ have an immediate affect on measures of income mobility and, therefore, are crucial when investigating earnings dynamics. In our preferred imputation, we choose $\hat{r}_i$ under the minimal mobility assumption. Thereby, the rank $\hat{r}_i$ is based on the last observable rank in
relation to all individuals at or above the contribution ceiling in the cohort-specific earnings distribution.\textsuperscript{17} This imputation procedure leads to plausible annual earnings distributions. Comparing the obtained annual earnings distributions to (almost) uncapped survey-based micro data reveals a good fit, see Figure A1.

Figure A1. Comparison of Kernel density estimates for annual earnings distributions

For illustration consider two earnings distributions in subsequent periods \( t - 1 \) and \( t \) made out of three individuals \( a, b \) and \( c \). Suppose the following ordering of earnings in \( t - 1 \): \( w_{a,t-1} < w_{b,t-1} < z_{t-1} < w_{c,t-1} \) and resulting ranks \( r_{a,t-1} = 1, r_{b,t-1} = 2 \) and the estimated rank \( \hat{r}_{c,t-1} = 3 \) since \( c \)'s earnings exceed \( z_{t-1} \). In \( t \) individual \( a \) has earnings above the contribution ceiling such that \( w_{b,t} < z_{t} \) and \( w_{a,t}, w_{c,t} > z_{t} \) where it is not observable whether \( a \) or \( c \) earns more. Then, the ranking order in \( t \) is \( r_{b,t} = 1, \hat{r}_{a,t} = 2 \) and \( \hat{r}_{c,t} = 3 \) because of \( \hat{r}_{c,t-1} > \hat{r}_{a,t-1} \). Thus, the relative ordering of \( a \) and \( c \) remains unchanged for future years unless either \( a \)'s or \( c \)'s earnings fall below the contribution ceiling. To establish whether mobility results are robust, two alternative mobility scenarios are calculated: an equal ranking with imputation of estimated average earnings above the contribution ceiling and a maximum mobility scenario. In the maximum mobility scenario, the ranking order is reversed between years \( t \) and \( t + 1 \). Together with a no imputation scenario, all alternative results are provided in Appendix B.

\textsuperscript{17}For illustration consider two earnings distributions in subsequent periods \( t - 1 \) and \( t \) made out of three individuals \( a, b \) and \( c \). Suppose the following ordering of earnings in \( t - 1 \): \( w_{a,t-1} < w_{b,t-1} < z_{t-1} < w_{c,t-1} \) and resulting ranks \( r_{a,t-1} = 1, r_{b,t-1} = 2 \) and the estimated rank \( \hat{r}_{c,t-1} = 3 \) since \( c \)'s earnings exceed \( z_{t-1} \). In \( t \) individual \( a \) has earnings above the contribution ceiling such that \( w_{b,t} < z_{t} \) and \( w_{a,t}, w_{c,t} > z_{t} \) where it is not observable whether \( a \) or \( c \) earns more. Then, the ranking order in \( t \) is \( r_{b,t} = 1, \hat{r}_{a,t} = 2 \) and \( \hat{r}_{c,t} = 3 \) because of \( \hat{r}_{c,t-1} > \hat{r}_{a,t-1} \). Thus, the relative ordering of \( a \) and \( c \) remains unchanged for future years unless either \( a \)'s or \( c \)'s earnings fall below the contribution ceiling. To establish whether mobility results are robust, two alternative mobility scenarios are calculated: an equal ranking with imputation of estimated average earnings above the contribution ceiling and a maximum mobility scenario. In the maximum mobility scenario, the ranking order is reversed between years \( t \) and \( t + 1 \). Together with a no imputation scenario, all alternative results are provided in Appendix B.
Table A1: Male West-German workforce for selected years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age range of sample</td>
<td>20-50</td>
<td>26-56</td>
<td>32-59</td>
<td>38-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force status</td>
<td>Weighted observations</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Weighted observations</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed (\text{C,D})</td>
<td>9,182,208</td>
<td>70.47</td>
<td>10,453,852</td>
<td>71.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprentice (\text{C,D})</td>
<td>462,828</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>49,166</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Serv.</td>
<td>1,463,725</td>
<td>11.23</td>
<td>1,644,782</td>
<td>11.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-empl.</td>
<td>942,454</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>1,519,161</td>
<td>10.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unempl. (\text{D})</td>
<td>674,343</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>885,056</td>
<td>6.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com. S. (\text{D,E})</td>
<td>305,013</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>11,287</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covered in VSKT</td>
<td>10,624,392</td>
<td>81.54</td>
<td>11,399,361</td>
<td>78.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sample selection mirrors the respective birth cohorts in our deployed VSKT2005-2008 data. \(\text{A}\) year of cross section; \(\text{B}\) age range of observations present in our VSKT2005-2008 sample for the respective cross section; \(\text{C}\) workforce with earnings accounted for in our VSKT2005-2008 sample; \(\text{D}\) workforce covered in our VSKT2005-2008 sample; \(\text{E}\) community service and military service.

Source: SOEP v27, own calculations using weighted data.
Appendix B: Descriptive statistics and alternative imputations

Table B1: Number of observations up to a certain age, unweighted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth cohort</th>
<th>Up to 40</th>
<th>Up to 45</th>
<th>Up to 50</th>
<th>Up to 55</th>
<th>Up to 60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1,033</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td>1,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>1,051</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>1,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1,105</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>1,089</td>
<td>1,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>1,114</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>1,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>1,089</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>1,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>1,158</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>1,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1,214</td>
<td>1,167</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>1,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>1,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>1,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,209</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>1,137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,299</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>1,382</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,881</td>
<td>1,805</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>1,819</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,026</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2,007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2,096</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43,541</td>
<td>32,485</td>
<td>23,839</td>
<td>17,466</td>
<td>11,804</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B2: Number of observations up to a certain age, weighted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth cohort</th>
<th>Up to 40</th>
<th>Up to 45</th>
<th>Up to 50</th>
<th>Up to 55</th>
<th>Up to 60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>220,232</td>
<td>217,133</td>
<td>215,383</td>
<td>212,369</td>
<td>210,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>248,090</td>
<td>239,754</td>
<td>234,731</td>
<td>228,828</td>
<td>226,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>241,934</td>
<td>237,150</td>
<td>235,451</td>
<td>235,428</td>
<td>233,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>223,777</td>
<td>221,106</td>
<td>218,880</td>
<td>217,072</td>
<td>217,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>185,553</td>
<td>182,294</td>
<td>183,037</td>
<td>179,488</td>
<td>179,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>189,304</td>
<td>187,452</td>
<td>184,261</td>
<td>180,665</td>
<td>179,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>187,669</td>
<td>180,465</td>
<td>177,095</td>
<td>171,838</td>
<td>171,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>148,087</td>
<td>145,490</td>
<td>143,321</td>
<td>141,886</td>
<td>141,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>186,823</td>
<td>180,147</td>
<td>176,580</td>
<td>173,469</td>
<td>169,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>202,736</td>
<td>198,089</td>
<td>194,473</td>
<td>190,454</td>
<td>187,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>210,821</td>
<td>204,147</td>
<td>199,922</td>
<td>198,110</td>
<td>193,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>224,189</td>
<td>216,556</td>
<td>211,653</td>
<td>208,567</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>229,461</td>
<td>221,167</td>
<td>216,950</td>
<td>213,633</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>213,650</td>
<td>208,678</td>
<td>202,316</td>
<td>199,721</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>220,289</td>
<td>210,641</td>
<td>204,772</td>
<td>202,641</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>204,980</td>
<td>199,173</td>
<td>193,775</td>
<td>190,055</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>225,753</td>
<td>217,265</td>
<td>212,062</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>227,899</td>
<td>220,669</td>
<td>214,523</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>244,608</td>
<td>234,339</td>
<td>226,798</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>243,499</td>
<td>236,167</td>
<td>231,693</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>249,580</td>
<td>244,416</td>
<td>233,676</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>269,384</td>
<td>262,298</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>276,926</td>
<td>267,851</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>281,291</td>
<td>273,518</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>297,397</td>
<td>287,350</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>299,297</td>
<td>286,464</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>305,386</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>307,182</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>307,047</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>310,611</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>297,228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,480,683</td>
<td>5,779,779</td>
<td>4,311,352</td>
<td>3,144,224</td>
<td>2,110,514</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table B3: UAX Ginis for selected cohorts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Up to 40</th>
<th>Up to 45</th>
<th>Up to 50</th>
<th>Up to 55</th>
<th>Up to 60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124; 0.138)</td>
<td>(0.126; 0.141)</td>
<td>(0.138; 0.157)</td>
<td>(0.149; 0.172)</td>
<td>(0.156; 0.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.149; 0.168)</td>
<td>(0.164; 0.188)</td>
<td>(0.184; 0.212)</td>
<td>(0.197; 0.228)</td>
<td>(0.202; 0.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.146; 0.166)</td>
<td>(0.157; 0.180)</td>
<td>(0.171; 0.197)</td>
<td>(0.180; 0.206)</td>
<td>(0.190; 0.218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.164; 0.184)</td>
<td>(0.173; 0.197)</td>
<td>(0.184; 0.211)</td>
<td>(0.199; 0.230)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.185; 0.208)</td>
<td>(0.202; 0.233)</td>
<td>(0.213; 0.250)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.214; 0.236)</td>
<td>(0.225; 0.251)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.229; 0.255)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Bias corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals at the 95%-level in brackets.

Figure B1: Comparison of Gini coefficients of fictitious populations, mean of cross sectional Gini coefficients and Gini coefficients of lifetime earnings.

![Graph showing comparisons of Gini coefficients](image_url)


Figure B2: Annual Gini coefficients from age 17 to 60 for cohorts 1938-1948.

![Graph showing annual Gini coefficients](image_url)

Figure B3: Rank correlations of consecutive years for cohorts 1938-1948.

(a) Maximal mobility
(b) Mean imputation
(c) Not imputed

Rank correlation vs Age for different cohorts with different methods of handling missing data.


Figure B4: Correlation coefficients of annual and lifetime earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1948.

(a) Maximal mobility
(b) Mean imputation
(c) Not imputed

Correlation coefficient vs Age for different cohorts with different methods of handling missing data.

Figure B5: Correlation coefficients of annual and lifetime earnings with real discounting for cohorts 1938-1948.


Figure B6: Rank correlation of annual and lifetime earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1948.

Figure B7: Rank correlation of annual and lifetime earnings with real discounting for cohorts 1938-1948.


Figure B8: Ginis of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968.

Figure B9: Ginis of real UAX- earnings for cohorts 1938-1968.

(a) Maximal mobility
(b) Mean imputation
(c) Not imputed


Figure B10: 85th / 15th ratio of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968.

(a) Maximal mobility
(b) Mean imputation
(c) Not imputed

Figure B11: $85^{th}$ / $15^{th}$ ratio of real UAX-earnings for cohorts 1938-1968.

Source: VSKT2005-2008, own calculations using weighted data

Figure B12: Rank correlation UA-40 earnings with UAX earnings, federal bond discounting.

Figure B13: Rank correlation real UA-40 earnings with real UAX earnings.


Figure B14: 50th / 15th ratio of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968.

Figure B15: 85th / 50th ratio of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968.

Appendix C: Generalized entropy measures

Figure C1: Mean logarithmic deviation of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968.

- (a) Minimal mobility
- (b) Maximal mobility
- (c) Mean imputation
- (d) Not imputed


Figure C2: Mean logarithmic deviation of real UAX- earnings for cohorts 1938-1968.

- (a) Minimal mobility
- (b) Maximal mobility
- (c) Mean imputation
- (d) Not imputed

Figure C3: Theil index of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968.

Figure C4: Theil index of real UAX- earnings for cohorts 1938-1968.
Figure C5: Half the square of the coefficient of variation of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968.

![Graph A](image1)
![Graph B](image2)
![Graph C](image3)
![Graph D](image4)


Figure C6: Half the square of the coefficient of variation of real UAX- earnings for cohorts 1938-1968.

![Graph A](image1)
![Graph B](image2)
![Graph C](image3)
![Graph D](image4)

Appendix D: Robustness, results from age 25 to X (selected results)

Note: In Appendix D results are provided for earnings measures starting at age 25 instead of age 17.

Figure D1: Gini coefficients of fictitious population, means of cross sectional Gini coefficients and Gini coefficients of lifetime earnings.

Figure D2: Correlation coefficients of annual and lifetime earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1948.


Figure D3: Correlation coefficients of annual and lifetime earnings with real discounting for cohorts 1938-1948.

Figure D4: Rank correlation of annual and lifetime earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1948.


Figure D5: Rank correlation of annual and lifetime earnings with real discounting for cohorts 1938-1948.

Figure D6: Ginis of UAX- earnings with federal bond discounting for cohorts 1938-1968.


Figure D7: Ginis of real UAX- earnings for cohorts 1938-1968.

Figure D8: Rank correlation of UA-40 earnings with UAX earnings, federal bond discounting.

(a) Minimal mobility
(b) Maximal mobility
(c) Mean imputation
(d) Not imputed


Year of birth

Rank correlation


Figure D9: Rank correlation real UA-40 earnings with real UAX earnings.

(a) Minimal mobility
(b) Maximal mobility
(c) Mean imputation
(d) Not imputed


Year of birth

Rank correlation

Figure D10: Employment status up to age 40 by UA-40 earnings quartiles.

Note: Earnings quartiles based on up-to-age 40 earnings with federal bond discounting.