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36 results, from 31
Externe referierte Aufsätze

The Impact of Competition Policy Enforcement on the Functioning of EU Energy Markets

We investigate the impact of competition policy enforcement on the functioning of European energy markets while accounting for sectoral regulation. For this purpose, we compile a novel dataset on the European Commission's (EC) and EU member states' competition policy decisions in energy markets and combine it with firm- and sector-level data. We find that EC merger policy has a positive and robust ...

In: The Energy Journal 40 (2019), 5, S. 97-120 | Tomaso Duso, Jo Seldeslachts, Florian Szücs
Externe referierte Aufsätze

Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990–2009 period. Our empirical results suggest phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as—unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions—phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best ...

In: Economic Inquiry 54 (2016), 4, S. 1884-1903 | Joseph A. Clougherty, Tomaso Duso, Miyu Lee, Jo Seldeslachts
Externe referierte Aufsätze

Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment

This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms. Using information from the U.S. National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust ...

In: The Review of Economics and Statistics 96 (2014), 2, S. 349-370 | Tomaso Duso, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Jo Seldeslachts
Externe referierte Aufsätze

Common Ownership in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry: A Network Analysis

We investigate patterns in common ownership networks between firms that are active in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry for the period 2004–2014. Our main findings are that “brand firms”—that is, firms that have research and development capabilities and launch new drugs—exhibit relatively dense common ownership networks with each other that further increase significantly in density over time, whereas ...

In: The Antitrust Bulletin 66 (2021), 1, S. 68–99 | Albert Banal-Estañol, Melissa Newham, Jo Seldeslachts
Externe referierte Aufsätze

Diversification, Common Ownership, and Strategic Incentives

We argue that within-industry investor diversification is directly related to common ownership incentives (profit loads on rival firms by the manager of a firm) in product markets. Because of their respective investment strategies, passive investors are naturally more diversified than active investors. If more money flows from active toward passive investors, then common ownership incentives increase. ...

In: AEA Papers and Proceedings 110 (2020, S. 561-564 | Albert Banal-Estanol, Jo Seldeslachts, Xavier Vives
Zeitungs- und Blogbeiträge

Deterrence in EU Merger Policy

In: VoxEU.org (09.04.2016), [Online-Artikel] | Joseph A. Clougherty, Tomaso Duso, Jo Seldeslachts
36 results, from 31
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