This paper contributes to the debate about the optimal design of tax-transfer systems. Based on the theory of optimal taxation, combined with microsimulation and microeconometric techniques we derive the welfare function which makes the current German tax and transfer system for single women optimal. Furthermore, we compare the welfare function conditional on the presence and age of children and assess ...
This paper contributes to the debate about the optimal design of tax-transfer systems. Based on the theory of optimal taxation, combined with microsimulation and microeconometric techniques we derive the welfare function which makes the current German tax and transfer system for single women optimal. Furthermore, we compare the welfare function conditional on the presence and age of children and asses ...
The share of women on the supervisory boards (Aufsichts- und Verwaltungsräte) of the big banks, savings banks and insurance companies in Germany is low. In the banking sector it is 15% and in insurance 11%. That women are to be found on most supervisory or administrative boards is mainly because they are worker´s representation delegates. Posts on management boards (Vorstände) in the big insurance ...
Women hold only 7.8% of the supervisory board posts in the 200 biggest companies (Top 200) in Germany - outside finance -, and three of four (76.0%) are worker´s representation delegates. More than one third of these companies do not have a woman on the supervisory board at all. The share of women on management boards is even smaller. In the 100 biggest companies (Top 100) there is only one woman on ...
In spite of there being few elements of tax or cash benefit systems in developed countries that are any longer explicitly gender-biased in a discriminatory sense, it is well recognised that they have significant gender effects. To the extent that women earn less than men on average under tax-benefit systems that are progressive, there is some redistribution from men to women overall. However, an aggregate ...