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Weitere externe Aufsätze
In:
Trade, Poverty, and the Environment : 8th Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis ; June 9 - 11, 2005, Lübeck, Germany [CD-ROM]
West Lafayette (Ind.) : GTAP
o.S.
| Michael Kohlhaas, Stefan Bach
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Diskussionspapiere 408 / 2004
Tax competition for a mobile factor is different in "new economic geography settings" compared to standard tax competition models. The agglomeration rent which accrues to the mobile factor in the core region can be taxed. Moreover, a tax differential between the core and the periphery can be maintained. The present paper reexamines this issue in a setting which, in addition to the core-periphery equilibria, ...
2004| Rainald Borck, Michael Pflüger
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Diskussionspapiere 409 / 2004
We analyze optimal income taxes with deductions for work-related or consumptive goods. We consider two cases. In the first case (called a complex tax system) the tax authorities can exactly distinguish between consumptive and work-related expenditures. In the second case (called a simple tax system) this distinction is not exact. Assuming additively separable utility functions, we show that work-related ...
2004| Pio Baake, Rainald Borck, Andreas Löffler
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Externe Monographien
Bonn:
IZA,
2004,
30 S.
(Discussion Paper Series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 1033)
| Rainald Borck, Michael Pflüger
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Diskussionspapiere 419 / 2004
In the year 2000, the German government passed the most ambitious tax reform in postwar German history aiming at a significant tax relief for households. Drawing on data of the GSOEP, we analyze the distributional and fiscal effects of the tax reform. Our analysis employs microsimulation techniques. Furthermore, we estimate behavioral effects of the tax reform using a discrete choice labor supply model. ...
2004| Peter Haan, Viktor Steiner
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Diskussionspapiere 421 / 2004
We analyze potential labor supply effects of a shift from the current German system of taxation of married couples to a system of limited real income splitting on the basis of econometric household labor supply model embedded in a tax-benefit model. Our simulation results show relatively small labor supply effects of a shift from the current system to one limited real income splitting system. In the ...
2004| Viktor Steiner, Katharina Wrohlich
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Refereed essays Web of Science
We analyze optimal income taxes with deductions for work-related or consumptive goods. We consider two cases. In the first case (called a complex tax system) the tax authorities can exactly distinguish between consumptive and work-related expenditures. In the second case (called a simple tax system) this distinction is not exact. Assuming additively separable utility functions, we show that work-related ...
In:
International Tax and Public Finance
11 (2004), 3, S. 299-312
| Pio Baake, Rainald Borck, Andreas Löffler
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Refereed essays Web of Science
We analyze potential labor supply effects of a shift from the current German system of joint taxation of married couples to a system of limited real income splitting on the basis of an econometric household labor supply model embedded in a tax benefit model. Our simulation results show relatively small labor supply effects of a shift from the current system to one of limited real income splitting system. ...
In:
CESifo Economic Studies
50 (2004), 3, S. 541-568
| Viktor Steiner, Katharina Wrohlich
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Refereed essays Web of Science
This paper shows that stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion. Individuals vote on a linear income tax, which is used to finance lump sum transfers. Individuals may evade taxes, but they have to pay fines when caught. Stricter enforcement may make redistributive taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The tax rate and transfer may rise, which in turn may increase tax evasion. The paper ...
In:
European Journal of Political Economy
20 (2004), 3, S. 725-737
| Rainald Borck
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Diskussionspapiere 329 / 2003
This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against ...
2003| Rainald Borck