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215 results, from 201
  • Refereed essays Web of Science

    Stricter Enforcement May Increase Tax Evasion

    This paper shows that stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion. Individuals vote on a linear income tax, which is used to finance lump sum transfers. Individuals may evade taxes, but they have to pay fines when caught. Stricter enforcement may make redistributive taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The tax rate and transfer may rise, which in turn may increase tax evasion. The paper ...

    In: European Journal of Political Economy 20 (2004), 3, S. 725-737 | Rainald Borck
  • Refereed essays Web of Science

    Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model

    This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment ...

    In: Journal of Urban Economics 54 (2003), 1, S. 173-180 | Rainald Borck
  • Diskussionspapiere 329 / 2003

    Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion

    This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against ...

    2003| Rainald Borck
  • Diskussionspapiere 335 / 2003

    Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model

    This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment ...

    2003| Rainald Borck
  • Refereed essays Web of Science

    The Effects of Environmental Fiscal Reform in Germany: A Simulation Study

    This paper presents the first comprehensive, model-based impact analysis of the German environmental fiscal reform, addressing the effects on CO2 emissions, economic growth, employment, and personal income distribution. Both an econometric input-output model and a dynamic computable general equilibrium model are applied in order to enhance the credibility of our results. The macroeconomic results are ...

    In: Energy Policy 30 (2002), 9, S. 803-811 | Stefan Bach, Michael Kohlhaas, Bernd Meyer, Barbara Praetorius, Heinz Welsch
  • Economic Bulletin 10 / 2002

    The Public Budgets in 2002/2003: Shortfalls in Tax Revenues May Jeopardise the Economy's Course - Risk of Higher Deficits

    2002| Dieter Teichmann, Dieter Vesper
  • Refereed essays Web of Science

    Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets

    In theory, the incidence of a tax should be independent of the side of the market on which it is levied. This principle of liability-side equivalence underlies virtually all theories of tax incidence. Policy discussions, however, tend to place great emphasis on the legal division of tax payments. We use computerized experimental posted-offer markets to test liability-side equivalence. We find that ...

    In: The Southern Economic Journal 68 (2002), 3, S. 672-682 | Rainald Borck, Dirk Engelmann, Wieland Müller, Hans-Theo Normann
  • Economic Bulletin 12 / 2002

    Developments in Tax Systems: An International Comparison

    2002| Stefan Bach, Bernhard Seidel, Dieter Teichmann
  • Diskussionspapiere 297 / 2002

    Stricter Enforcement May Increase Tax Evasion

    This paper shows that stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion. Individuals vote on a linear income tax which is used to finance lump sum transfers. Stricter enforcement may make redistributive taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The tax rate and transfer may rise which in turn may increase tax evasion. An example shows that this result can actually occur. The paper also discusses ...

    2002| Rainald Borck
  • Economic Bulletin 5 / 2001

    The Effects of the Ecological Tax Reform in Germany

    2001| Stefan Bach, Michael Kohlhaas, Barbara Praetorius
215 results, from 201
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