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Refereed essays Web of Science
Theory suggests that large firms are more likely to engage in lobbying behaviour and are geographically more mobile compared with smaller entities. Conditional on jurisdiction size, policy choices are thus predicted to depend on the shape of a jurisdiction's firm size distribution, with more business-oriented policies being enacted if jurisdictions host large firms. The paper empirically tests this ...
In:
Canadian Journal of Economics
54 (2021), 2, S. 812-839
| Nadine Riedel, Martin Simmler
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Diskussionspapiere 1933 / 2021
As the institutional literature convincingly shows, socioeconomic phenomena are to a large extent shaped by the formal institutions, that is, legal acts (laws and ordinances). However, the latter are formulated in a specific language that is difficult to understand, let alone to measure. However, since the early 1990s, a whole branch of economic analysis of governmental regulations has evolved. It is ...
2021| Konstantin A. Kholodilin, Linus Pfeiffer
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Diskussionspapiere 1944 / 2021
This paper evaluates the temporary VAT reduction introduced by the German government over the third and fourth quarter of 2020 as most controversial part of the COVID-19 stimulus package. Critics argue that VAT reductions are ineffective because of limited pass-through of temporary measures to consumer prices and in presence of lockdown measures. Advocates emphasize positive effects on durables and ...
2021| Marius Clemens, Werner Röger
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Refereed essays Web of Science
Across the world, tax exemptions for jobs with low earnings intend to incite non-participating workers to rejoin the labor market. However, such tax exemptions may also have negative equilibrium effects. The German minijob tax exemption offers a convenient case to identify equilibrium effects as it applies to some but not to other low-wage jobs. We build and estimate a structural job search model with ...
In:
Labour Economics
69 (2021), 101976, 15 S.
| Luke Haywood, Michael Neumann
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Diskussionspapiere 1969 / 2021
We compute participation tax rates across the EU and find that work disincentives inherent in tax-benefit systems largely depend on household composition and the individual's earner role within the household. We then estimate participation elasticities using an IV group estimator that enables us to investigate the responsiveness of individuals to work incentives. We contribute to the literature on ...
2021| Charlotte Bartels, Cortnie Shupe
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Research Project
In this study, we analyze a reform to better balance income taxation, social contributions and means-tested social benefits. In order to relieve low-wage earners and middle classes, the employee contributions to social security are to be integrated into the personal income tax and the top income tax rates are to be increased. In addition, families with low and middle income are to be relieved and...
Completed Project| Public Economics
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DIW Applied Micro Seminar
Abstract: I derive an optimal benefit-based corporate tax rate formula as a function of the public input elasticity of profits and the (net of) tax elasticity of profits. I argue that the existence of the corporate income tax should be justified by the benefit-based view of taxation: firms should pay tax according to the benefits they receive from the use of the public input. I argue that...
28.02.2020| Simon Naitram, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill
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Diskussionspapiere 1845 / 2020
We decompose permanent earnings risk into contributions from hours and wage shocks. To distinguish between hours shocks, modeled as innovations to the marginal disutility of work, and labor supply reactions to wage shocks we formulate a life-cycle model of consumption and labor supply. Both permanent wage and hours shocks are important to explain earnings risk, but wage shocks have greater relevance. ...
2020| Robin Jessen, Johannes König
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DIW Weekly Report 35 / 2020
Following the global financial crisis of 2008/2009, many European countries introduced bank levies to enable financial institutions to share in the costs of future banking crises via resolution and restructuring funds. Simultaneously, bank levies can set an incentive for banks to reduce their leverage, thereby achieving a more stable capital structure. Using information from banks’ balance sheets, ...
2020| Franziska Bremus, Lena Tonzer
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Externe Monographien
To finance resolution funds, the regulatory toolkit has been expanded in many countries by bank levies. In addition, these levies are often designed to reduce incentives for banks to rely excessively on wholesale funding resulting in high leverage ratios. At the same time, corporate income taxation biases banks’ capital structure towards debt financing in light of the deductibility of interest on debt. ...
Vienna:
SUERF,
2020,
6 S.
(SUERF Policy Briefs ; 21/2020)
| Franziska Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer