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551 results, from 491
  • Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 2 / 2005

    Trade Policy to Control Climate Change: Does the Stick Beat the Carrot?

    Internationaler Handel und Klimapolitik sind eng miteinander verknüpft. Mithilfe eines allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodells untersuchen wir, welche Rolle Handelseinschränkungen sowie Transfers von energieeffizienten technischen Innovationen für die Stabilisierung der Klimapolitik unter dem Kyoto-Protokoll spielen können. Handelseinschränkungen führen zu einer Verschlechterung der Handelsbilanz für die ...

    2005| Susanne Dröge, Claudia Kemfert
  • Weitere externe Aufsätze

    Could Too Little and Too Much Turn out to Be Just Right? On the Relevance of Pioneering Envirnmental Policy

    In: Klaus Jacob, Manfred Binder, Anna Wieczorek (Eds.) , Governance for Industrial Transformation
    Berlin : Environmental Policy Research Centre
    S. 67-78
    | Jürgen Blazejczak, Dietmar Edler
  • Externe referierte Aufsätze

    OPEC's Optimal Crude Oil Price

    In March 2000, OPEC decided to stabilise oil prices within a range of 22-28 US-Dollar/barrel of crude oil. Such an oil-price-level is far beyond the short and long run marginal costs of oil production, beyond even that in regions with particularly high costs. Nevertheless, OPEC may achieve its goal if world demand for oil increases substantially in the future and oil resources outside the OPEC are ...

    In: Energy Policy 32 (2004), 2, S. 269-280 | Manfred Horn
  • Economic Bulletin 3 / 2004

    OPEC Keeps Oil Prices High: Sign of a Pricing Policy Re-Orientation?

    2004| Manfred Horn
  • Externe referierte Aufsätze

    Climate Coalitions and International Trade: Assessment of Cooperation Incentives by Issue Linkage

    This paper investigates climate control coalition games. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations like the USA to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased R&D expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries ...

    In: Energy Policy 32 (2004), 4, S. 455-465 | Claudia Kemfert
  • Diskussionspapiere 423 / 2004

    The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

    We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of .rms and of the insiders. share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...

    2004| Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
  • Diskussionspapiere 432 / 2004

    Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

    This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other's markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, ...

    2004| Philipp J. H. Schröder
  • Diskussionspapiere 436 / 2004

    Corporate Self-Regulation vs. Ex-Ante Regulation of Network Access: A Model of the German Gas Sector

    This paper compares the outcomes of corporate self-regulation and traditional ex-ante regulation of network access to monopolistic bottlenecks. In the model of self-regulation, the domestic gas supplier and network owner and the monopsonistic gas customer fix quantities and the network access price, whereas the competitive fringe of foreign gas producers (third party) and the household customers are ...

    2004| Georg Meran, Christian von Hirschhausen
  • Sonstige Publikationen des DIW / Monographien

    Lead Markets for Environmental Innovations: Final Report to the Federal Ministry of Research and Education on the Project "Policy Framework for the Development of International Markets for Innovations of a Sustainable Economy - from Pilot Markets to Lead Markets (LEAD)", Grant Number 07RIW1A

    2004| Marian Beise, Jürgen Blazejczak, Dietmar Edler, Rüdiger Haum, Klaus Jacob, Martin Jänicke, Thomas Löw, Klaus Rennings, Ulrich Petschow
  • Externe referierte Aufsätze

    The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

    We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the insiders' share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...

    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004), 8-9, S. 1067-1089 | Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
551 results, from 491
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