During the last years, the developing regions have come under increased pressure by the developed countries, in particular the USA, to join the international effort in global greenhouse gas abatement. On the one hand, the participation of the developing regions would offer the developed world with low cost opportunities for abatement. On the other hand,the economies of some developed regions such as ...
In March 2000, OPEC decided to stabilise oil prices within a range of 22-28 US-Dollar/barrel of crude oil. Such an oil-price-level is far beyond the short and long run marginal costs of oil production, beyond even that in regions with particularly high costs. Nevertheless, OPEC may achieve its goal if world demand for oil increases substantially in the future and oil resources outside the OPEC are ...
This paper investigates climate control coalition games. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating nations like the USA to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased R&D expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentives exist for non-cooperating countries ...
We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of .rms and of the insiders. share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...
This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other's markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, ...
This paper compares the outcomes of corporate self-regulation and traditional ex-ante regulation of network access to monopolistic bottlenecks. In the model of self-regulation, the domestic gas supplier and network owner and the monopsonistic gas customer fix quantities and the network access price, whereas the competitive fringe of foreign gas producers (third party) and the household customers are ...
