For various reasons, the policies governing the energy sector have a central role to play in Germany. Thus, for example, competition on the electricity and gas markets will have to be increased considerably in the course of the market’s liberalization. At the same time, a secure supply of energy must also be ensured, in other words, the matters of preventing short-term power outages while ensuring ...
Top-down computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are used extensively for analysis of energy and climate policies. Energy-intensive industries are usually represented in top-down economic models as abstract economic production functions, of the constantelasticity-of-substitution (CES) functional form. This study explores methods for improving the realism of energy-intensive industries in top-down ...
Gazprom, the dominant gas company in Russia, is widely believed to be the key supplier of gas to Europe in the foreseeable future. However, there are numerous uncertainties and challenges within the Russian and European gas industry that may alter the allocation of Gazprom´s gas sales between domestic and export markets. In this paper we use both theoretical and numerical models to study potential ...
This paper develops a static computational game theoretic model. Illustrative results for the liberalising European electricity market are given to demonstrate the type of economic and environmental results that can be generated with the model. The model is empirically calibrated to eight Northwestern European countries, namely Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, and ...
This paper illustrates the representation of induced technological change in the multi-regional, multi-sectoral integrated assessment model WIAGEM. The main aim of the paper is to investigate quantitatively the economic impacts of climate policy measures due to the induced technological changes that are considered. Improved technological innovations are triggered by increased R&D expenditures that ...
Environmental policies frequently target the ratio of dirty to green output within the same industry. To achieve such targets, the green sector may be subsidized or the dirty sector be taxed. We show that in a monopolistic competition setting, the two policy approaches have different welfare effects, depending on the design of the instrument (ad valorem versus unit instrument) and the initial situation ...