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683 results, from 591
Diskussionspapiere 406 / 2004

Transport Cost Sharing and Spatial Competition

We consider a linear city model where both firms and consumers have to incur transport costs. Following a standard Hotelling (1929) type framework we analyze a duopoly where firms facing a continuum of consumers choose locations and prices, with the transportation rate being linear in distance. From a theoretical point of view such a model is interesting since mill pricing and uniform delivery pricing ...

2004| Sudipta Sarangi, Hrachya Kyureghian
Economic Bulletin 2 / 2004

Product-related Services: Operator Models in German Mechanical Engineering Firms

2004| Kurt Hornschild, Steffen Kinkel, Gunter Lay
Diskussionspapiere 423 / 2004

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of .rms and of the insiders. share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...

2004| Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
Diskussionspapiere 426 / 2004

Foreign Direct Investment, Competition and Industrial Development in the Host Country: An Analysis for the Case of "White" Certificates

This paper analyses the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the development of local firms. We focus on two likely effects of FDI: a competition effect which deters entry of domestic firms and positive market externalities which foster the development of local industry. Using a simple theoretical model to illustrate how these forces work we show that the number of domestic firms follows a ...

2004| Salvador Barrios, Holger Görg, Eric Strobl
Externe referierte Aufsätze

Vertical Foreclosure versus Downstream Competition with Capital Precommitment

The recent literature on vertical foreclosure suggests that vertical integration can have the anticompetitive effect of enabling an upstream firm to commit to restricting output to downstream firms at the monopoly level. We allow the upstream firm to make an ex-ante capital precommitment. We show that, if integration is outlawed, the upstream firm will distort capital downward as an alternative device ...

In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004), 2, S. 185-192 | Pio Baake, Ulrich Kamecke, Hans-Theo Normann
Diskussionspapiere 432 / 2004

Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other's markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, ...

2004| Philipp J. H. Schröder
Diskussionspapiere 436 / 2004

Corporate Self-Regulation vs. Ex-Ante Regulation of Network Access: A Model of the German Gas Sector

This paper compares the outcomes of corporate self-regulation and traditional ex-ante regulation of network access to monopolistic bottlenecks. In the model of self-regulation, the domestic gas supplier and network owner and the monopsonistic gas customer fix quantities and the network access price, whereas the competitive fringe of foreign gas producers (third party) and the household customers are ...

2004| Georg Meran, Christian von Hirschhausen
Weitere Aufsätze

Rail Infrastructure Charging and On-Track Competition in Germany

In: International Journal of Transport Management 2 (2004), 1, S. 17-27 | Heike Link
Externe referierte Aufsätze

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the insiders' share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...

In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004), 8-9, S. 1067-1089 | Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
683 results, from 591
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