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Topic Competition and Regulation

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686 results, from 601
Externe referierte Aufsätze

Pitfalls in Restructuring the Electricity Industry

This paper models some reductions in output that may follow the opening of electricity markets to competition. Specifically, we show that vertical separation of electricity generation, transmission and distribution could reduce welfare compared to the previous system of vertically integrated monopoly, if grid owners can act as monopolistic retailers or, alternatively, set access prices that maximize ...

In: German Economic Review 5 (2004), 1, S. 81-101 | Georg Meran, Reimund Schwarze
Diskussionspapiere 423 / 2004

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of .rms and of the insiders. share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...

2004| Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
Diskussionspapiere 426 / 2004

Foreign Direct Investment, Competition and Industrial Development in the Host Country: An Analysis for the Case of "White" Certificates

This paper analyses the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the development of local firms. We focus on two likely effects of FDI: a competition effect which deters entry of domestic firms and positive market externalities which foster the development of local industry. Using a simple theoretical model to illustrate how these forces work we show that the number of domestic firms follows a ...

2004| Salvador Barrios, Holger Görg, Eric Strobl
Diskussionspapiere 432 / 2004

Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other's markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, ...

2004| Philipp J. H. Schröder
Weitere Aufsätze

Introduction

In: Christian von Hirschhausen, Thorsten Beckers, Kay Mitusch (Eds.) , Trends in Infrastructure Regulation and Financing
Cheltenham [u.a.] : Edward Elgar
S. 1-10
| Christian von Hirschhausen, Thorsten Beckers, Kay Mitusch
Weitere Aufsätze

Deregulation through Reciprocity in Network Industries: A German-French Perspective ; Background Paper for the German-French Council of Economic Advisers

In: Deregulierung und Daseinsvorsorge
Bruxelles : Fondation Universitaire
S. 5-25
Arbeitsdokument ; 2
| Charles Beat Blankart, Christian von Hirschhausen
Weitere Aufsätze

The Promotion of Regional Innovative Networks: Lessons from the German InnoRegio-Program

In: Regions (2004), 253, S. 11-15 | Alexander Eickelpasch
Weitere Aufsätze

Deregulating Professional Services?

In: Deregulierung und Daseinsvorsorge
Bruxelles : Fondation Universitaire
S. 41-44
Arbeitsdokument ; 2
| Georg Meran
Externe referierte Aufsätze

Vertical Foreclosure versus Downstream Competition with Capital Precommitment

The recent literature on vertical foreclosure suggests that vertical integration can have the anticompetitive effect of enabling an upstream firm to commit to restricting output to downstream firms at the monopoly level. We allow the upstream firm to make an ex-ante capital precommitment. We show that, if integration is outlawed, the upstream firm will distort capital downward as an alternative device ...

In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004), 2, S. 185-192 | Pio Baake, Ulrich Kamecke, Hans-Theo Normann
Diskussionspapiere 436 / 2004

Corporate Self-Regulation vs. Ex-Ante Regulation of Network Access: A Model of the German Gas Sector

This paper compares the outcomes of corporate self-regulation and traditional ex-ante regulation of network access to monopolistic bottlenecks. In the model of self-regulation, the domestic gas supplier and network owner and the monopsonistic gas customer fix quantities and the network access price, whereas the competitive fringe of foreign gas producers (third party) and the household customers are ...

2004| Georg Meran, Christian von Hirschhausen
686 results, from 601
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