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426 results, from 391
  • Diskussionspapiere 568 / 2006

    New Networks, Competition and Regulation

    We consider a model with two firms operating their individual networks. Each firm can choose its price as well as its investment to build up its network. Assuming a skewed distribution of consumers, our model leads to an asymmetric market structure with one firm choosing higher investments. While access regulation imposed on the dominant firm leads to lower prices, positive welfare effects are diminished ...

    2006| Pio Baake, Ulrich Kamecke
  • Diskussionspapiere 464 / 2005

    Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives

    This paper argues that - in contrast to an often expressed view - the formation of larger and more powerful buyers need not reduce welfare by stifling suppliers' incentives. If contracts are determined in bilateral negotiations, the presence of larger buyers may both increase suppliers' incentives for product improvement and induce suppliers to choose a more efficient technology. The paper also isolates ...

    2005| Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
  • Weekly Report 18 / 2005

    The Eastern Enlargement of the EU - An Initial Assessment: Growing Imports to the New Member States from the Euro Zone

    On 1 May 2004 eight former socialist countries - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia - joined the European Union. In the accession year the new EU member states have experienced powerful macroeconomic dynamics, and convergence of per capita income within the new EU-25 was progressing. However, it is remarkable that, for the accession ...

    2005| Timo Baas, Mechthild Schrooten
  • Refereed essays Web of Science

    Bundling of Social and Private Goods and the Soft Budget Constraint Problem

    Firms in socialist and transitional economies are often obliged to provide social goods at the same time that they are competing with private firms. This paper analyzes the impact of such bundling on the provision of private and social goods focussing on the inability of politicians to commit not to bail out firms experiencing financial trouble. This soft budget constraint problem results in firms ...

    In: Journal of Comparative Economics 33 (2005), 1, S. 47-58 | Lars-Hendrik Röller, Zhentang Zhang
  • Refereed essays Web of Science

    International Market Integration for Natural Gas? A Cointegration Analysis of Prices in Europe, North America and Japan

    This paper investigates the degree of integration of natural gas markets in Europe, North America and Japan in the time period between the early 1990s and 2004. The relationship between international gas market prices and their relation to the oil price are explored through principal components analysis and Johansen likelihood-based cointegration procedure. Both of them show a high level of natural ...

    In: Energy Economics 27 (2005), 4, S. 603-615 | Boriss Siliverstovs, Guillaume L'Hégaret, Anne Neumann, Christian von Hirschhausen
  • Refereed essays Web of Science

    A Note on R&D and Price Elasticity of Demand

    In: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 225 (2005), 6, S. 688-698 | Dorothea Lucke, Philipp J. H. Schröder, Dieter Schumacher
  • Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 3 / 2005

    Relevant Market and Pricing Behavior of Regional Newspapers in the Netherlands

    Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist es, den Einfluss von Marktstruktur und anderen regionalen Einflussgrößen auf die Preise der Zeitungen für Abonnements und Anzeigen zu analysieren. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich insbesondere eine negative Korrelation von Konzentration und Zeitungspreisen. Die Preise für Anzeigen hängen - anders als die für Abonnements - signifikant vom Einkommensniveau und der Bevölkerungsdichte ...

    2005| Hans L. van Kranenburg
  • Diskussionspapiere 432 / 2004

    Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

    This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other's markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, ...

    2004| Philipp J. H. Schröder
  • Refereed essays Web of Science

    The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

    We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the insiders' share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...

    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004), 8-9, S. 1067-1089 | Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
  • Externe Monographien

    International Market Integration for Natural Gas? A Cointegration Analysis of Prices in Europe, North America and Japan

    Cambridge, MA: CEEPR, 2004, 25 S.
    (CEEPR Working Papers ; 2004-002)
    | Guillaume L'Hégaret, Boriss Siliverstovs, Anne Neumann, Christian von Hirschhausen
426 results, from 391
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