Topic Industry

German Industry Returning to Cities

Is the German manufacturing industry, which has been leaving cities for less densely populated areas since World War II, being lured back into urban centers? This report analyses industrial start-ups from 2012 to 2016 and derives their preferred locations. The analysis shows that the start-up intensity in large agglomerations is on average almost 40 percent higher than in the other regions of Germany. ...

Price or Variety? An Evaluation of Mergers Effects in Grocery Retailing

Assortment decisions are key strategic instruments for firms responding to local market conditions. We assess this claim by studying the effect of a national merger between two large Dutch supermarket chains on prices and on the depth as well as composition of assortment. We adopt a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits local variation in the merger’s effects, controlling for selection on ...

Common Ownership and Market Entry: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Industry

Common ownership - where two firms are at least partially owned by the same investor - and its impact on product market outcomes has recently drawn a lot of attention from scholars and practitioners alike. Theoretical and empirical researchsuggests that common ownership can lead to higher prices. This paper focuses on implications for market entry. To estimate the effect of common ownership on entry ...

A Retrospective Evaluation of the GDF/Suez Merger: Effects on Gas Hub Prices

We present an ex-post analysis of the effects of GDF’s acquisition of Suez in 2006 created one of the world’s largest energy companies. We perform an econometric analysis, based on Difference-in-Difference techniques on the market for trading on the Zeebrugge gas hub in Belgium. Removing barriers to entry and facilitating access to the hub through ownership unbundling were an important part of the ...

Industry in the City

Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990–2009 period. Our empirical results suggest phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as—unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions—phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best ...

Weak Investment Poses a Threat to Industry in Europe

The global industrial structure has been in a constant state of change for some time now. While China’s share has steadily grown, Western industrialised countries have mostly experienced losses in industrial market share. Within Europe, the fates of the established industrialised nations have all played out very differently. For example, France and the UK have suffered massive losses, while Germany ...

German industry is spending more money on research and development than ever before

Manufacturing companies increased their expenditures by more than a fifth between 2010 and 2013 – research-intensive and large companies primarily responsible for the increase – development more dynamic in Germany than in other European countries In 2013, industrial companies in Germany spent a total of 57.2 billion EUR on research and development (R&D). This corresponds to an increase ...

The 4th Berlin IO Day

The Berlin IO Day is a one-day workshop sponsored by Berlin's leading academic institutions, including DIW Berlin, ESMT, Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Technische Universität Berlin, and WZB which takes place twice a year, in the Fall and in the Spring. The aim is to create an international forum for high quality research in Industrial Organization in the...

Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as – unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions – phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies ...