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594 results, from 521
  • Weitere externe Aufsätze

    Carbon Capture and Storage vs. Energy Efficiency: Incompatible Antagonists or Indispensable Allies?

    In: Saving Energy - Just Do It
    La Colle sur Loup : eceee
    S.1401-1412
    | Barbara Praetorius, Katja Schumacher
  • Economic Bulletin 7 / 1995

    Climate Change Policies in the Wake of the First UN Conference of the Parties in Berlin

    1995| Hans-Joachim Ziesing
  • Diskussionspapiere 341 / 2003

    How to Turn an Industry Green: Taxes versus Subsidies

    Environmental policies frequently target the ratio of dirty to green output within the same industry. To achieve such targets the green sector may be subsidised or the dirty sector be taxed. This paper shows that in a monopolistic competition setting the two policy instruments have different welfare effects. For a strong green policy (a severe reduction of the dirty sector) a tax is the dominant instrument. ...

    2003| Susanne Dröge, Philipp J. H. Schröder
  • Diskussionspapiere 432 / 2004

    Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

    This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other's markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, ...

    2004| Philipp J. H. Schröder
  • Weitere externe Aufsätze

    Is There a Role for EU Integrated Product Policy (IPP) in Solving Global Environmental Problems? Investigating IPP's Capacity for Correction at Source in a Global Context

    In: Frank Biermann (Ed.) , Global Environmental Change and the Nation State
    Potsdam : PIK
    S. 183-191
    Pik report ; 80
    | Lydia Illge, Klaus Hubacek, Stefan Giljum
  • Refereed essays Web of Science

    How to Turn an Industry Green: Taxes versus Subsidies

    Environmental policies frequently target the ratio of dirty to green output within the same industry. To achieve such targets, the green sector may be subsidized or the dirty sector be taxed. We show that in a monopolistic competition setting, the two policy approaches have different welfare effects, depending on the design of the instrument (ad valorem versus unit instrument) and the initial situation ...

    In: Journal of Regulatory Economics 27 (2005), 2, S. 177-202 | Susanne Dröge, Philipp J. H. Schröder
  • Diskussionspapiere 823 / 2008

    Perspectives of the European Natural Gas Markets until 2025

    We apply the EMF 23 study design to simulate the effects of the reference case and the scenarios to European natural gas supplies to 2025. We use GASMOD, a strategic severallayer model of European gas supply, consisting of upstream natural gas producers, traders in each consuming European country (or region), and final demand. Our model results suggest rather modest changes in the overall supply situation ...

    2008| Franziska Holz, Christian von Hirschhausen, Claudia Kemfert
  • Refereed essays Web of Science

    Perspectives of the European Natural Gas Markets until 2025

    We apply the EMF 23 study design to simulate the effects of the reference case and the scenarios to European natural gas supplies to 2025. We use GASMOD, a strategic several-layer model of European natural gas supply, consisting of upstream natural gas producers, traders in each consuming European country (or region), and final demand. Our model results suggest rather modest changes in the overall ...

    In: The Energy Journal (2009), Special Issue, S. 137-150 | Franziska Holz, Christian von Hirschhausen, Claudia Kemfert
  • Other refereed essays

    Carbon Capture and Storage: Settling the German Coal vs. Climate Change Dispute?

    In: International Journal of Environmental Technology and Management 9 (2008), 2/3, S. 176-202 | Corinna Fischer, Barbara Praetorius
  • Diskussionspapiere 919 / 2009

    Mergers in Imperfectly Segmented Markets

    We present a model with firms selling (homogeneous) products in two imperfectly segmented markets (a "high-demand" and a "low-demand" market). Buyers are mobile but restricted by transportation costs, so that imperfect arbitrage occurs when prices differ in both markets. We show that equilibria are distorted away from Cournot outcomes to prevent consumer arbitrage. Furthermore, a merger can lead to ...

    2009| Pio Baake, Christian Wey
594 results, from 521
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