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The Environmental and Economic Effects of European Emissions Trading in Germany

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the insiders' share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of .rms and of the insiders. share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...

Endogenous Production Capacity Investment in Natural Gas Market Equilibrium Models

The large-scale natural gas equilibrium model applied in Egging, 2013 combines long-term market equilibria and investments in infrastructure while accounting for market power by certain suppliers. Such models are widely used to simulate market outcomes given different scenarios of demand and supply development, environmental regulations and investment options in natural gas and other resource markets.. ...

Endogenous Investment Decisions in Natural Gas Equilibrium Models with Logarithmic Cost Functions

The liberalisation of the natural gas markets and the importance of natural gas as a transition fuel to a low-carbon economy have led to the development of several large-scale equilibrium models in the last decade. These models combine long-term market equilibria and investments in infrastructure while accounting for market power by certain suppliers. They are widely used to simulate market outcomes ...

Market Power, Fuel Substitution and Infrastructure: A Large-Scale Equilibrium Model of Global Energy Markets

Assessing and quantifying the impacts of technological, economic, and policy shifts in the global energy system requires large-scale numerical models. We propose a dynamic multi-fuel market equilibrium model that combines endogenous fuel substitution within demand sectors and in power generation, detailed infrastructure capacity constraints and investment, as well as strategic behaviour and market ...

Market Power, Fuel Substitution and Infrastructure: A Large-Scale Equilibrium Model of Global Energy Markets

Assessing and quantifying the impacts of technological, economic, and policy shifts in the global energy system require large-scale numerical models. We propose a dynamic multi-fuel market equilibrium model that combines endogenous fuel substitution within demand sectors and in power generation, detailed infrastructure capacity constraints and investment, as well as strategic behaviour and market power ...

Technical Greenhouse-Gas Mitigation Potentials of Biochar Soil Incorporation in Germany: Data Documentation

Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment

This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms. Using information from the U.S. National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust ...

Secondary Use of Personal Data: An Economic Analysis

The European Commission is currently overhauling the most important instrument for the regulation of cross-border flows of personal data, the Data Protection Directive of 1995 (Directive 95/46/EC). Among the most tedious legal issues is the use of personal data for secondary purposes. Such use occurs if data collected for one purpose (such as credit granting) are later used for another purpose (e.g. ...