-
Diskussionspapiere 1338 / 2013
US shale gas production is generally expected to continue its fast rise. However, a cautious evaluation is needed. Shale gas resource estimates are potentially overoptimistic and it is uncertain to which extent they can be produced economically. Moreover, the adverse environmental effects of ever more wells to be drilled may lead to a fall in public acceptance and a strengthening of regulation. The ...
2013| Philipp M. Richter
-
Diskussionspapiere 1342 / 2013
We analyse a stylized model of the world grain market characterized by a small oligopoly of traders with market power on both the supply and demand side. Crops are stochastic and exporting countries can impose export tariffs to protect domestic food prices. Our first results is that export tariffs are strategic complements and that for poor harvests equilibrium tariffs can explode (shedding some light ...
2013| Pio Baake, Steffen Huck
-
Diskussionspapiere 1441 / 2015
The financing of infrastructures is a major topic in recent energy policy debates. Project finance, as a specialized form of debt finance, thereby has become a well-established financing tool. This paper contributes a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the determinants of the debt ratio in project finance, using data on 26 liquefied natural gas (LNG) export and import projects. We argue that ...
2015| Sophia Rüster
-
Externe Monographien
Zur Bekämpfung des Klimawandels haben politische Entscheidungsträger auf europäischer, nationaler und regionaler Regierungsebene CO2-Reduktionsziele formuliert, die erhebliche Investitionen erfordern. Studien haben zahlreiche Marktbarrieren ermittelt, die diese Investitionen verhindern. Zur Überwindung dieser Barrieren wurden regulatorische, preis- und informationsbasierte Politikinstrumente implementiert. ...
Berlin:
TU Berlin,
2014,
X, 102 S.
| Anne Schopp
-
Other refereed essays
In the framework of the Energy Modeling Forum 28, we investigate how climate policy regimes affect market developments under different technology availabilities on the European power markets. We use the partial equilibrium model EMELIE-ESY with focus on electricity markets in order to determine how private investors optimize their generation capacity investment and operation over the horizon 2010 to ...
In:
Climate Change Economics
4 (2013), 1, 22 S.
| Andreas Schröder, Thure Traber, Claudia Kemfert
-
Diskussionspapiere 1214 / 2012
This paper derives a new effect of trade liberalisation on the quality of the environment. We show that in the presence of heterogeneous firms the aggregate volume of emissions is influenced not only by the long-established scale effect, but also by a reallocation effect resulting from an increase in the relative size of more productive firms. We show how the relative importance of these effects, and ...
2012| Udo Kreickemeier, Philipp M. Richter
-
Refereed essays Web of Science
In this article, we analyse the effects of emissions trading in Europe, with special reference to Germany. We look at the value of the flexibility gained by trading compared to fixed quotas. The analysis is undertaken with a modified version of the GTAP-E model using the latest GTAP version 6 database. It is based on the national allocation plans (NAP) as submitted to and approved by the EU. We find ...
In:
Climate Policy
6 (2006), 4, S. 441-455
| Claudia Kemfert, Michael Kohlhaas, Truong P. Truong, Artem Protsenko
-
Diskussionspapiere 423 / 2004
We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of .rms and of the insiders. share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...
2004| Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
-
Refereed essays Web of Science
We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the insiders' share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...
In:
International Journal of Industrial Organization
22 (2004), 8-9, S. 1067-1089
| Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
-
Externe Monographien
Cambridge, MA:
CEEPR,
2004,
25 S.
(CEEPR Working Papers ; 2004-002)
| Guillaume L'Hégaret, Boriss Siliverstovs, Anne Neumann, Christian von Hirschhausen