The EU European Trading Scheme (EU ETS) started operating in 2005 and was established with the EU Climate Package of 2008 as a permanent mechanism for Europe. Now in its second phase, policymakers are evaluating its success to date and considering next steps for its evolution. With the ultimate goal of a low-carbon economy, key questions have been: does the ETS facilitate a shift from carbon-intensive ...
This project analyzes the impact of climate shocks on the livelihoods and welfare of households in Mongolia. Our analysis particularly focuses on extreme weather events, locally called dzud disasters (see box below). As a consequence of climate change and global warming, it is very likely that climate shocks, such as dzud, will occur more frequently and with greater intensity. As part of the...
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the main instrument to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Europe. Subject to a country specific limit, installations in the EU ETS can use EU allowances (EUA) and certified emissions reductions (CERs) generated through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to fulfil their emission reduction target. The CDM encourages and finances emission reduction projects ...
This paper examines the effects of firm-level innovation in carbon-abatement technologies on optimal cap-and-trade schemes with and without price controls. We characterize optimal cap-and-trade regulation with a price cap and a price floor, and compare it to the special cases of pure taxation and a simple emissions cap. Innovation shifts the tradeoff between price- and quantity-based instruments towards ...
We test the hypothesis that rising prices of emission allowances have a stronger impact on wholesale electricity prices than falling prices (asymmetric cost pass-through). Using an autoregressive distributed lag model, we confirm this hypothesis for the German market
Under perfect competition on the output market, first best technology subsidies in the presence of learning by doing are justified by knowledge spill overs that are not accounted for by individual companies. First best output subsidies are thus depending directly on the learning effects and are, if applicable, positive. Considering electricity markets, a setting of imperfect competition is more appropriate. ...