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239 results, from 231
  • Berlin IO Day

    The 4th Berlin IO Day

    The Berlin IO Day is a one-day workshop sponsored by Berlin's leading academic institutions, including DIW Berlin, ESMT, Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Technische Universität Berlin, and WZB which takes place twice a year, in the Fall and in the Spring. The aim is to create an international forum for high quality research in Industrial Organization in the...

    13.03.2015
  • Diskussionspapiere 1408 / 2014

    Supplier Fixed Costs and Retail Market Monopolization

    Considering a vertical structure with perfectly competitive upstream firms that deliver a homogenous good to a differentiated retail duopoly, we show that upstream fixed costs may help to monopolize the downstream market. We find that downstream prices increase in upstream firms’ fixed costs when both intra- and interbrand competition exist. Our findings contradict the common wisdom that fixed costs ...

    2014| Stéphane Caprice, Vanessa von Schlippenbach, Christian Wey
  • Externe Monographien

    Impacts of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme on the Industrial Competitiveness in Germany: Research Report 3707 41 501

    How does emissions trading influence the competitiveness of the German industry? By increasing the costs of domestic production, emissions trading may induce the relocation of industrial production and the associated emissions – e.g. to non-EU countries with few or no climate protection regulations. On behalf of the German Emissions Trading Authority (DEHSt) at the Federal Environment Agency, the impacts ...

    Dessau-Roßlau: Umweltbundesamt, 2008, 59 S.
    (Climate Change ; 2008,10)
    | Verena Graichen, Katja Schumacher, Felix Christian Matthes, Lennart Mohr, Vicky Duscha, Joachim Schleich, Jochen Diekmann
  • Diskussionspapiere 423 / 2004

    The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

    We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of .rms and of the insiders. share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...

    2004| Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
  • Externe Monographien

    The Globalization of Industry and Innovation in Eastern Europe: From Post-Socialist Restructuring to International Competitiveness

    Cheltenham [u.a.]: Elgar, 2000, 340 S. | Christian von Hirschhausen, Jürgen Bitzer (Eds.)
  • Refereed essays Web of Science

    The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

    We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the insiders' share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is ...

    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004), 8-9, S. 1067-1089 | Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
  • DIW Economic Bulletin 28/29 / 2015

    Modernization and Innovation in the Materials Sector: Lessons from Steel and Cement

    Since 2007, the European cement and steel sectors have been characterized by substantial surplus production capacity. Hence re-investment in primary production of many materials remains limited and endangers the longer-term economic viability of many plants. Opportunities for innovation and modernization could overcome these challenges. They are linked to new demands for more efficient and lower-carbon ...

    2015| Karsten Neuhoff, Andrzej Ancygier, Jean-Pierre Ponssard, Philippe Quirion, Nagore Sabio, Oliver Sartor, Misato Sato, Anne Schopp
  • DIW Economic Bulletin 28/29 / 2015

    Combining Dynamic Allocation and Inclusion of Consumption into the EU ETS Would Be Beneficial: Six Questions to Karsten Neuhoff

    2015
  • Refereed essays Web of Science

    Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment

    This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms. Using information from the U.S. National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust ...

    In: The Review of Economics and Statistics 96 (2014), 2, S. 349-370 | Tomaso Duso, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Jo Seldeslachts
239 results, from 231
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