This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner; if the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor. Increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under different assumptions about the economic environment,
Following Keen and Marchand (1997), the paper analyses the effect of fiscal competition on the composition of public spending in a model where capital and skilled workers are mobile while low skilled workers are immobile. Taxes are levied on capital and labour. Each group of workers benefits from a different kind of public good. Mobility of skilled workers provides an incentive for jurisdictions
Tax competition may be different in "new economic geography settings" compared to standard tax competition models. If the mobile factor is completely agglomerated in one region, it earns an agglomeration rent which can be taxed. Closer integration first results in a "race to the top" in taxes before leading to a "race to the bottom". We reexamine these issues in a model that produces stable
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