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220 Ergebnisse, ab 211
Diskussionspapiere 919 / 2009

Mergers in Imperfectly Segmented Markets

We present a model with firms selling (homogeneous) products in two imperfectly segmented markets (a "high-demand" and a "low-demand" market). Buyers are mobile but restricted by transportation costs, so that imperfect arbitrage occurs when prices ..

2009| Pio Baake, Christian Wey
Diskussionspapiere 854 / 2009

Corporate Espionage

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the ...

2009| Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Sudipta Sarangi
Weekly Report 12 / 2009

Baltic Sea Pipeline: The Profits Will Be Distributed Differently

In late 2005, the German energy companies E.ON and Wintershall and Russian Gazprom reached an agreement to build a new huge pipeline Nord Stream through the Baltic Sea. This pipeline will provide Russia for the first time ever with the direct access

2009| Franz Hubert, Irina Suleymanova
DIW Wochenbericht 7 / 2009

Ostsee-Pipeline: die Gewinne werden neu verteilt

Ende 2005 vereinbarten die deutschen Energieunternehmen E.ON und Wintershall gemeinsam mit der russischen Gazprom eine neue Pipeline "Nord-Stream" zu bauen, mit der russisches Erdgas erstmalig direkt durch die Ostsee nach Deutschland geliefert werden

2009| Franz Hubert, Irina Suleymanova
Diskussionspapiere 423 / 2004

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of .rms and of the ...

2004| Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
Externe referierte Aufsätze

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the ...

In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004), 8-9, S. 1067-1089 | Roman Inderst, Christian Wey
Diskussionspapiere 1045 / 2010

Joint Customer Data Acquisition and Sharing among Rivals

It is increasingly observable that in different industries competitors jointly acquire and share customer data. We propose a modified Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity to analyze the incentives for such agreements and their

2010| Nicola Jentzsch, Geza Sapi, Irina Suleymanova
Economic Bulletin 3 / 2000

Global Commodity Markets: Intense Competition Despite Increasing Concentration

2000| Alfred Haid, Eberhard Wettig
220 Ergebnisse, ab 211