Publications Based on SOEP Data: SOEPlit

Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these ...

Serving the Public Interest in Several Ways: Theory and Empirics

We develop a model where people differ in their altruistic preferences and can serve the public interest in two ways: by making donations to charity and by taking a public service job and exerting effort on the job. Our theory predicts that people who are more altruistic are more likely to take a public service job and, for a given job, make higher donations to charity. Comparing equally altruistic ...

Intrinsic Motivations of Public Sector Employees: Evidence for Germany

We examine differences in altruism and laziness between public sector employees and private sector employees. Our theoretical model predicts that the likelihood of public sector employment increases with a worker’s altruism, and increases or decreases with a worker’s laziness depending on his altruism. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, we find that public sector employees are significantly ...

Do We Stay or Not? Return Intentions of Temporary Migrants

Earnings Adjustment of Temporary Migrants

Return Intentions of Migrants: Theory and Evidence

Self-Employment and Paid-Employment among Migrants and Natives

Speaking Fluency, Writing Fluency and Earnings of Migrants

Return Migration - The European Experience

The social assimilation of immigrants