-
In:
International Migration Review
37 (2003), 1, 133-162
| Claudia Diehl, Michael Blohm
-
In:
Migration Studies (Studi Emigrazione)
40 (2003), 152, 747-771
| Claudia Diehl, Sonja Haug
-
This contribution analyzes whether remigration intentions and actual remigration to their homeland on the part of Turkish migrants to Germany have evolved over time, and if so, why. To do so, event-history analysis is applied to data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Findings reveal an increase in remigration intentions as well as rates of return for first generation migrants after the ...
In:
Zeitschrift für Soziologie
44 (2015), 1, 22-41
| Claudia Diehl, Elisabeth Liebau
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This study addresses the difficulty in linking ethnic discrimination and integration outcomes of immigrants in empirical research. Many of the existing studies look at the relationship between perceived discrimination and integration, but most are based on cross-sectional data. We argue that perceived discrimination should not be taken as an accurate indicator of actual experiences of discrimination, ...
Berlin:
DIW Berlin,
2017,
(SOEPpapers 945)
| Claudia Diehl, Elisabeth Liebau
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In:
Weekly Report
4 (2008), 2, 8-13
| Claudia Diehl, Steffen Mau, Jürgen Schupp
-
2005,
| Claudia Diehl, Rainer Schnell
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In:
International Migration Review
40 (2006), 4, 786-816
| Claudia Diehl, Rainer Schnell
-
In:
Proceedings of the 1998 Third International Conference of the GSOEP Study Users. Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung
68 (1999), 2, 290-296
| Thomas A. Dunn, Kenneth A. Couch
-
In:
Proceedings of the 1996 Second International Conference of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study Users. Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung
66 (1997), 1, 151-158
| Thomas A. Dunn, Michaela Kreyenfeld, Mary E. Lovely
-
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these ...
In:
Journal of Economic Psychology
31 (2010), 4, 676-686
| Robert Dur, Arjan Non, Hein Roelfsema