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Johns Hopkins University:
1994,
| Lynn S. Duggan
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In:
Comparative Economic Studies
45 (2003), 1, 63-86
| Lynn S. Duggan
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In:
Journal of Pension Economics and Finance
7 (2008), 2, 131-156
| Kathrin Dummann
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1992,
| Greg J. Duncan, Björn Gustafsson, Richard Hauser, Günter Schmaus, Stephen P. Jenkins, H. Messinger, Ruud J. A. Muffels, et al.
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Despite very different macroeconomic conditions, demographic structures and degrees of income inequality, favorable income changes among low-income families with children were widespread and strikingly similar across the eight countries in our study. In most European countries, the combination of modest inequality and extensive mobility among the poor enabled virtually all families to avoid relative ...
In:
Journal of Population Economics
6 (1993), 3, 215-234
| Greg J. Duncan, Björn Gustafsson, Richard Hauser, Günther Schmauss, Hans Messinger, Ruud J. A. Muffels, Brian Nolan, Jean-Claude Ray
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In:
Proceedings of the 1998 Third International Conference of the GSOEP Study Users. Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung
68 (1999), 2, 290-296
| Thomas A. Dunn, Kenneth A. Couch
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In:
Proceedings of the 1996 Second International Conference of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study Users. Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung
66 (1997), 1, 151-158
| Thomas A. Dunn, Michaela Kreyenfeld, Mary E. Lovely
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We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these ...
In:
Journal of Economic Psychology
31 (2010), 4, 676-686
| Robert Dur, Arjan Non, Hein Roelfsema
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We develop a model where people differ in their altruistic preferences and can serve the public interest in two ways: by making donations to charity and by taking a public service job and exerting effort on the job. Our theory predicts that people who are more altruistic are more likely to take a public service job and, for a given job, make higher donations to charity. Comparing equally altruistic ...
In:
Labour Economics
51 (2018), April 2018, 13-24
| Robert Dur, Max van Lent
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We examine differences in altruism and laziness between public sector employees and private sector employees. Our theoretical model predicts that the likelihood of public sector employment increases with a worker’s altruism, and increases or decreases with a worker’s laziness depending on his altruism. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, we find that public sector employees are significantly ...
In:
German Economic Review
16 (2014), 3, 343-366
| Robert Dur, Robin Zoutenbier