Preferences for wealth redistribution: The role of social background and merit

Abstract

This paper investigates preferences for wealth redistribution using a vignette experiment in which participants evaluate hypothetical taxpayers with a net wealth exceeding one million euros. The design allows us to study attitudes toward taxing the very wealthy. We differentiate between two forms of luck that may affect these preferences: brute luck such as random shocks unrelated to background or effort and circumstantial luck reflected in a privileged social background. Our findings show significantly stronger support for taxing individuals from rich families, particularly among relatively poor participants and those with low trust in official statistics. Attributing wealth to brute luck rather than effort also increases support for taxation, though this effect is weaker than the influence of a privileged background. When both forms of luck are present, i.e. being from a rich family and having experienced brute luck, the joint effect on support for taxation is only marginally larger than either factor alone.