Preference-Driven Contract Design: How Education Alters Risk, Patience, and Effort in Incentive Schemes

Abstract

Performance-contingent pay raises productivity, yet in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) only about 16% of workers report receiving performance pay, with the incidence being roughly seven percentage points higher among university graduates than among non-graduates. This coexistence of low aggregate take-up and a strong skill gradient is puzzling. This paper accounts for these twin facts with a principal–agent model in which the entire preference vector—risk aversion, probability weighting, time discounting, and effort cost—varies systematically with schooling. Endogenizing preferences yields two predictions: (i) optimal incentive slopes and induced effort increase with education-linked preferences; (ii) the productivity threshold for accepting performance pay falls with schooling, while heterogeneity in tastes keeps worker participation incomplete. A light calibration guided by documented schooling gradients reproduces modest overall incidence alongside a pronounced skill gradient. The key novelty is to treat the preference vector as an endogenous state variable that enters both sides of the principal–agent problem, shaping the optimisation problems of both the firm and the worker rather than being taken as a fixed primitive.