German Long-Term Health Insurance: Theory Meets Evidence

Diskussionspapiere extern

Juan Pablo Atal, Hanming Fang, Martin Karlsson, Nicolas R. Ziebarth

Cambridge: University of Pennsylvania, 2022,
(NBER Working Paper No. 26870)

Abstract

By insuring policyholders against contemporaneous health expenditure shocks and future reclassification risk, long-term health insurance contracts are a viable alternative to community-rated short-term contracts with an individual mandate. German long-term health insurance (GLTHI) is the largest market for private long-term health insurance contracts in the world. It features a simple design with initial risk-rating followed by guaranteed-renewable constant premiums over the lifecycle. We estimate the key ingredients of a life-cycle model to assess the welfare effects of the GLTHI contract and compare them to the optimal contract. This comparison provides further lessons about the trade-offs of long-term health insurance design.



Keywords: long-term health insurance; individual private health insurance; reclassification risk, intertemporal incentives, ACG scores, health transitions
Externer Link:
https://web.sas.upenn.edu/hfang/files/2022/07/Long_Term_Health_Insurance_Main.pdf

DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3386/w26870

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