To finance resolution funds, the regulatory toolkit has been expanded in many countries by bank levies. In addition, these levies are often designed to reduce incentives for banks to rely excessively on wholesale funding resulting in high leverage ratios. At the same time, corporate income taxation biases banks’ capital structure towards debt financing in light of the deductibility of interest on debt. ...
Vienna:
SUERF,
2020,
6 S.
(SUERF Policy Briefs ; 21/2020)
| Franziska Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
We analyse the first twenty years of the euro both from an economic and an institutional perspective. We find that in particular during the period since the financial crisis, convergence as measured by a variety of indicators has not improved. Design flaws in the Eurozone institutional architecture have contributed importantly to this lack of convergence. This is why further reforms are urgently needed. ...
Bruxelles:
European Parliament,
2019,
30 S.
(In-depth Analysis)
| Kerstin Bernoth, Franziska Bremus, Geraldine Dany-Knedlik, Henrik Enderlein, Marcel Fratzscher, Lukas Guttenberg, Alexander Kriwoluzky, Rosa Lastra
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction ...
Frankfurt a.M.:
ESRB,
2019,
36 S.
(Working Paper Series ; 103)
| Franziska Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer