Discussion Papers 1543, 18 S.
Pio Baake, Andreas Harasser, Friederike Heiny
2016
get_appDownload (PDF 367 KB)
Forthcoming in: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy (2017)
We analyze a simple supply chain with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about market demand. Focusing on the incentives of the supplier and the retailer to enhance their private information about the actual market conditions, we show that choices on information acquisition are strategic complements. While the retailer's incentives are mainly driven by the information rent that he can earn, the supplier will choose to acquire information only if the retailer is rather well informed, even though the information is free of charge.
Topics: Competition and Regulation
JEL-Classification: D82;D83;D86
Keywords: Asymmetric information, information acquisition, vertical relations
Frei zugängliche Version: (econstor)
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127443