Vortrag
The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Food Supply Chains

Isabel Teichmann, Vanessa von Schlippenbach


Change and Uncertainty - Challenges for Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources : XIIIth Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists ; EAAE 2011 Congress
Zürich, Schweiz, 30.08.2011 - 02.09.2011




Abstract:
This paper highlights the strategic role that private quality standards play in food supply chains. Considering two symmetric retailers that are exclusively supplied by a finite number of producers and endogenizing the producers' delivery choice, we show that there exist two asymmetric equilibria in the retailers' quality requirements. The asymmetry is driven by both the retailers.incentive to raise their buyer power and the retailers' competition for suppliers. We find that the use of private quality standards is detrimental to social welfare. A public minimum quality standard can remedy this unfavorable welfare outcome.

Abstract

This paper highlights the strategic role that private quality standards play in food supply chains. Considering two symmetric retailers that are exclusively supplied by a finite number of producers and endogenizing the producers' delivery choice, we show that there exist two asymmetric equilibria in the retailers' quality requirements. The asymmetry is driven by both the retailers.incentive to raise their buyer power and the retailers' competition for suppliers. We find that the use of private quality standards is detrimental to social welfare. A public minimum quality standard can remedy this unfavorable welfare outcome.



JEL-Classification: L15;L42;Q13
Keywords: Private quality standards, vertical relations, buyer power, food supply chain
DIW-Link
Array

keyboard_arrow_up