The Berlin IO Day is a one-day workshop supported by the Berlin's leading academic institutions, including DIW Berlin, ESMT Berlin, Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and Technische Universität Berlin. The aim is to create an international forum for high quality research in Industrial Organization in the heart of Berlin, one of Europe's most vibrant and intellectually lively cities.
The workshop is fully booked.
Program (PDF, 70.38 KB)
| 09:15 | Registration & coffee |
| 09:55 | Opening Andreas Asseyer, Freie Universität Berlin |
| Morning | Chair: Roland Strausz, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin |
| 10:00 | Strategic Multiproduct Trading of Indivisible Goods Amparo Urbano, University of Valencia |
| 11:00 | Coffee |
| 11:15 | Collusion without Patience Jacopo Bizzotto, Oslo Metropolitan University |
| 12:15 | Lunch |
| Afternoon | Chair: David Ronayne, ESMT Berlin |
| 13:15 | Sizing the Market for Plant-based Meat Replacements Max J. Pachali, Tilburg University |
| 14:15 | Coffee |
| 14:30 | Price Discrimination Under Asymmetric Access to Consumer Data Ioana Chioveanu, University of Nottingham |
| 15:30 | Coffee |
| 16:00 | Subsidy Design, Price Setting, and Quality Provision: A Study of Medicare Advantage Ying Fan, University of Michigan |
| 17:00 | Closing Remarks Tomaso Duso, DIW Berlin & Technische Universität Berlin |
Jacopo Bizzotto (Oslo Metropolitan University):
Collusion without Patience
(joint with Toomas Hinnosaar)
PDF (PDF, 0.54 MB)
Abstract: Tacit collusion is usually linked to repeated interactions between patient firms. We show that it can also arise in a one-shot duopoly. When firms choose capacities and face outsourcing contracts with minimum order quantities, gaps in feasible outputs allow commitment not to sell intermediate quantities. For a range of parameters, there exists a collusive equilibrium in which both firms produce less and earn more than under competition. Three other equilibria can also arise: competitive, leadership, and miscoordination. We then extend the model to general two-sided limited commitment and show that it yields the same set of equilibria.
Ioana Chioveanu (University of Nottingham):
Price Discrimination Under Asymmetric Access to Consumer Data
PDF (PDF, 0.79 MB)
Abstract: A platform-affiliated retailer competes in prices with third-party sellers over two periods. After the first period, the affiliate has access to market-wide purchase data and an informational advantage. Third-party sellers either do not obtain data (exclusive data use) or obtain only data on their own past customers (shared data use). Data access enables price discrimination by consideration in the second period. With exclusive data use, price discrimination benefits all retailers compared to uniform pricing. The affiliate benefits more than third-party sellers. However, third-party sellers’ lack of data limits the extent to which the affiliate can use its superior information. With shared data use, all retailers benefit equally from price discrimination compared to uniform pricing. Mandatory sharing of past customer data does not harm the affiliate, although it reduces its informational advantage, and benefits third-party sellers. However, while leveling the playing field on the supply side, it harms consumers.
Ying Fan (University of Michigan):
Subsidy Design, Price Setting, and Quality Provision: A Study of Medicare Advantage
(joint with Colleen Carey and Yiyi Zhou)
Abstract: Public–private partnerships often feature imperfect competition, leading to distortions in prices and quality. This paper studies subsidy design in the Medicare Advantage market, focusing on the 2012 Quality Bonus Program, which linked key subsidy parameters to plan quality. We develop a stylized model showing that quality-linked subsidy pass-through can mitigate distortions in both pricing and quality incentives. We then estimate a structural model of demand and supply using plan-level and individual-level data from 2010--2017. We find that quality-dependent subsidies raise quality and welfare, and that linking the rebate rate to quality delivers the largest efficiency gains without increasing government spending.
Max J. Pachali (Tilburg University):
Sizing the Market for Plant-based Meat Replacements
(joint with B. Bronnenberg and T. Otter)
Abstract: We quantify the market potential for plant-based meat replacements (PBMR), a fast-growing category with major implications for reducing food-related emissions. Despite their relevance, many consumers still exclude PBMR from their diets. To explore behavioral barriers, we build a unique data set linking actual grocery purchases with survey responses on product consideration, attitudes, and knowledge of environmental impact. We propose a novel demand model that combines revealed and stated consideration and find that consideration is mainly driven by variables like taste perceptions, cooking familiarity, and meat-eating habits, while demographics explain little beyond generational differences. Counterfactual simulations show that addressing experiential barriers could substantially boost market share. For example, if consumers perceived the taste and texture of PBMR as comparable to meat, the market share would increase by 6.2 percentage points. In contrast, increasing awareness of environmental and health impacts yields only modest gains. Our estimates allow us to make recommendations, specific to demographic profiles, on which attitudinal changes result in the largest dietary change toward PBMR. In general, the main obstacles to adoption are experiential, not informational or economic. Campaigns should therefore focus on improving taste, familiarity, and ease of preparation rather than solely raising awareness.
Amparo Urbano (University of Valencia):
Strategic Multiproduct Trading of Indivisible Goods
(joint with Iván Arribas)
PDF (PDF, 0.55 MB)
Abstract: This paper analyzes markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multi-product firms to a finite set of heterogeneous buyers, who may have non-monotonic preferences over bundles of products. We prove the existence of efficient subgame perfect equilibrium by formulating the problem as the linear programming relaxation of the standard Package Assignment Problem. Specifically, we show that the projection of the dual’s Pareto efficient frontier on the sellers’ coordinates characterizes a class of efficient equilibrium prices, the Strong equilibrium prices.
Many thanks to Andreas Asseyer from Freie Universität Berlin and David Ronayne from ESMT Berlin!
The Berlin IO Day is a one-day workshop supported by the Berlin's leading academic institutions, including DIW Berlin, ESMT Berlin, Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and Technische Universität Berlin which takes place twice a year, in the Spring and in the Fall.
For each Berlin IO Day, we will invite four or five speakers to present their recent work on a variety of IO topics, followed by a general discussion. The aim is to create an international forum for high quality research in Industrial Organization in the heart of Berlin, one of Europe's most vibrant and intellectually lively cities.
Organizers:
Themen: Märkte , Unternehmen , Verbraucher , Wettbewerb und Regulierung